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Abstract 
This dissertation describes a mixed methods research project seeking to add to our understanding 
how the internationalization process of Chinese firms relates to the internationalization process of 
Western firms. The focus of this project was on the assumed competitive advantage for Chinese 
firms in relatively high-risk host countries. In the first and quantitative part of my study I use a 
conceptual framework presented by Child and Marinova (2014) to study the role of institutional 
distance for the location choice of Chinese and U.S. firms. I ran an analysis on the determinants of 
FDI from Chinese and U.S. firms in a group of African destination countries for the period 2003-
2011. Contrary to popular believe, I found that Chinese investments are not directed to countries 
with a low level of IM and investments from both China and the U.S. are directed to countries with 
a low level of political stability. The finding that U.S. investments are – and Chinese investments are 
not – significantly directed to institutionally mature countries, is explained by Chen, Dollar and Tang 
(2016) as evidence for an indifferent attitude of Chinese investors towards a weak rule of law. 
However, I find the evidence for this statement too weak. Therefore, I decided to use process 
tracing to study the causal mechanism that could explain how the levels of political stability and 
institutional maturity in China could give Chinese firms an advantage in high-risk emerging markets 
far away from China. I looked at the case of Chinese telecom vendors in Nigeria to study in detail if 
and how the levels of political stability and institutional maturity in China impact the challenges and 
advantages for Huawei and ZTE in Nigeria. The combination of the two studies confirms that 
financial support via the China Exim Bank does play a role in the location choice of Chinese investors 
in Africa; however, it also shows that the success of Chinese firms in challenging host markets 
depends on much more than push factors only. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
The rapidly growing share in global investment flows from China since the Chinese government 
implemented the Go Global Strategy in 2001 worries traditionally dominant investors from the 
West and made scholars wonder whether the on Western studies based foreign direct investment 
(FDI) theories need to be adapted.   
In 2001, Chinese direct investment flows accounted for only 1.8 per cent of global FDI flows; this 
increased to 12.6 per cent in 2016 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Statistics 
(UNCTAD Stat), 2018). Although China surpassed major FDI source countries like Germany, Japan 
and the Netherlands in 2016, it is still performing below its relatively size in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and population size. In comparison, direct investment flows from the United States 
(U.S.) accounted for more than twenty per cent of global FDI flows in 2016 (UNCTAD Stat, 2018). It 
can therefore be expected that China’s share of global FDI flow will keep increasing over the coming 
years. 
The rise of China as an important source of global investment is reflected in a rising number of 
academic studies on the topic (e.g. Amighini, Rabellotti & Sanfilippo, 2011; Berning & Holtbrügge, 
2012; Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & Zheng, 2007; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; 
Meunier & Bargoon, 2014; Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2008; Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet, 2012). The 
main debates revolve around two issues: the determinants and motives for Chinese direct 
investment, and the uniqueness of the characteristics of Chinese investment behavior. In short, 
Chinese investment is assumed to be particularly attracted to countries with weak institutions 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2012) and not deterred from political risk (Buckley et al., 2007).  
These assumed unique characteristics of Chinese outward investment are often translated into 
accusations of exploitation and neocolonialism; especially with regards to Chinese investments in 
South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa. These accusations occur in both news and academic 
reports in which China is referred to as a hungry dragon (“A hungry dragon,” 2004; Cáceres & Ear, 
2013; “China’s material needs,” 2004; Furniss, 2006; Lorenz & Thielke, 2007) exploiting countries 
with poor institutions and natural resources (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). And in speeches from 
  2 
politicians, like for example the speeches by then U.S. Secretary of State Ms. Clinton during her 
visits to Zambia (“Clinton warns against,” 2011) and Senegal (“Chinese state media slam,” 2012). 
These assumptions are persistent: a week after the New York Times wrote down Chinese economic 
activities in Africa as driven by the Chinese state, using Chinese workers, focusing on extracting 
resources and flooding Africa with cheap imports (Larmer, 2017), McKinsey presented a study that 
refute these accusations (Jayaram, Kassiri & Sun 2017). McKinsey found that around thirty per cent 
of the about ten thousand Chinese firms in Africa are actually operating in the manufacturing 
sector, that 86 per cent of their employees are local — as are forty per cent of their managers — 
and that 85 per cent of the firms are privately owned (Jayaram et al., 2017). Still, during his visit to 
the African continent as U.S. Secretary of State in March 2018, Mr. Tillerson stated again that 
Chinese investment is creating ‘few if any jobs in most countries’ (Koran, 2018). 
The perseverance of the accusations towards Chinese economic activities in Africa is related to the 
enormous success of China in what was long regarded to be Europe’s backyard by some and the 
strategic position of the African region. In the past two decades, China has grown rapidly from being 
a relatively small investor in the continent to becoming Africa’s largest economic partner. In 2009 
China surpassed the U.S. and became the largest trading partner of the African region and in 2016 
China became the single largest investor in terms of capital (Ernst & Young, 2017). Furthermore, 
China was the first country in the world hosting a large delegation of Heads of States of 41 African 
states during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit in Beijing in 2006 (Shelton & Paruk, 
2008). This was only matched by the U.S. in 2014 when President Obama hosted fifty leaders of 
African states during the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit (the Whitehouse, 2014).1 
Africa is a strategic region because of the abundance of “strategic minerals”, access to one of the 
most strategic maritime passages, the large number of United Nation member states and the 
enormous market potential. Access to these strategic minerals and maritime passage, and votes in 
the United Nations could explain the interest of the Chinese government in the African continent. 
However, Western governments have similar interests on the African continent. If it is not for their 
unique interests, why would Chinese firms target African countries with “poor institutions”? 
The main argument of this thesis is that the assumed unique characteristics of Chinese outward 
investment have not been sufficiently tested so far. In order to fill this gap, I decided to focus on 
the four most pertinent assumptions in international business (IB) theory regarding Chinese 
                                                          
1The latter could be seen as a sign that the Chinese leadership was ahead of its time by recognizing the 
economic and political potential of the continent. However, it could also be interpreted as a sign of 
continuous neo-colonialism by both China and the U.S. who do not seem to find it necessary to treat the 54 
African countries as independent nation states and rather prefer to deal with the continent as a whole.  
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outward investment in Africa, namely: 1.) the perceived advantage of minimum institutional 
distance for Chinese firms on the African continent, 2.) the advantage of receiving support from the 
Chinese government, 3.) their lack of choice due to their late-comer position and window of 
opportunity in Africa due to low competition, and 4.) the window of opportunity in Africa due to 
low competition. I start this study with a test of the institutional distance theory using quantitative 
analysis. 
Child and Marinova (2014a) state that firms are most successful in host countries with a similar 
level of political stability (PS) and institutional maturity (IM) as in their home country. Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc (2008) and Morck et al. (2008) argue that Chinese firms are more prevalent in 
countries with difficult institutional conditions, because their vast experience in navigating complex 
bureaucracies at home gives them a competitive advantage over Western firms. I link success with 
location choice based on the insights from Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) and Morck et al. (2008) 
and use Child & Marinova’s (2014a) framework to empirically test the role of institutional distance 
for the location choice of Chinese and U.S. investors in Africa. To do this I ran an analysis on the 
determinants of FDI from Chinese and U.S. firms in a group of African destination countries for the 
period 2003-2011. 
The results of this analysis show that both Chinese and U.S. investments are significantly directed 
to countries with low levels of PS. Furthermore, the results show that Chinese and U.S. investments 
are both rather directed to countries with high levels of IM; although this relation is not significant 
for Chinese investments. Chen et al. (2016) argue that this means that Chinese investors are 
indifferent with regards to rule of law in the host country; however, they do not provide empirical 
proof for this statement.  
In order to get a better understanding of the particular challenges and advantages of Chinese firms 
in high-risk host countries far away from their own region, I studied the case of Chinese telecom 
infrastructure companies in Nigeria. I used process tracing in order to trace down evidence for the 
four common assumptions in IB literature regarding Chinese outward investment in Africa. Nigeria 
is one of the countries in Africa with the lowest levels of PS and IM and the largest receiver of FDI 
from China on the continent. The telecom infrastructure sector is chosen due to its importance for 
the development of a country and the leading role Chinese firms play in the construction of 
telephone infrastructure in Africa. Another reason for choosing the telecom sector is the 
controversy around the involvement of the Chinese government in combination with the strategic 
position of the African continent and the option of building in spyware. 
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1.2. Rationale 
IB theory has been built largely on the study of Western firms by Western researchers and the 
contextual factors of the home countries—namely, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the U.S.—could 
have been regarded as familiar and quite similar. As a consequence, mainstream international 
business theory neglects push factors—factors associated with the home country—and focuses 
mainly on ownership advantages, internalization advantages and pull factors—factors associated 
with the host country—in order to explain the international location choice of investors. 
Traditional FDI theory predicts that firms prefer to invest in politically stable countries with strong 
institutions in order avoid risk and therefore costs. A possible reason for Chinese firms to invest in 
such challenging countries according to traditional FDI theory is that these markets do not attract 
much investment from the traditional investors; and therefore become an interesting opportunity 
for Chinese investors. As late-comers on the global market, Chinese firms might not have much 
choice other than investing in the more challenging “left-over” markets since the advanced markets 
are saturated.  
In contrast, more recent empirical studies have over-emphasized the role of push factors to explain 
the international location choice of investors from emerging markets. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 
and Genc (2008) and Morck et al. (2008), for example, point to the potential advantage of having 
experience with operating in a challenging business environment at home for operating in 
challenging countries abroad. They argue that Chinese firms are more prevalent in least developed 
countries with difficult institutional conditions, because their vast experience in navigating complex 
bureaucracies at home gives them a competitive advantage over Western firms. Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc define difficult institutional conditions as ‘the absence of a well-established 
infrastructure, well-developed market mechanisms, and a well-developed contracting and 
intellectual property rights regime’ (2008: 960). Moreover Morck et al. focus on ‘endemic 
government interference and related problems’ (2008: 346). However, this effect of institutional 
distance on the location choice and success of Chinese outward investment is currently merely 
based on assumptions and has not been empirically tested yet. 
Child & Marinova (2014a) argue that the contexts of both the home and host country are important 
in order to explain international investment. However, there framework has also not been 
empirically tested. The allocation of countries to the four quadrants in their matrix based on their 
levels of PS and IM is based on anecdotal evidence rather than measured.  
In other words, the main problem in current research on Chinese outward investment is a lack of 
evidence for the strong claims on the unique characteristics of Chinese outward investment. 
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Existing theories do not explain if and why Chinese firms indeed target host countries with relatively 
weak institutions and high levels of political risk, and if and why Chinese firms are more successful 
in such host countries than their Western competitors.  
Better knowledge about the motives and strategies behind Chinese outward FDI could enable host 
country policy makers – who are responsible for realizing the potentials of incoming FDI while 
avoiding negative impacts – to make better informed regulations concerning incoming FDI. 
Furthermore, better knowledge about the motives and strategies behind Chinese outward FDI 
could potentially reduce the tension between China and the West on the African continent; and 
thereby improve their relations in general.  
 
1.3. Problem statement 
In order to improve our knowledge about the motives and strategies behind Chinese outward 
investment this study compares the role of institutional distance for the location choice of Chinese 
and U.S. investments in Africa and explores the specific advantages and challenges of Chinese firms 
in a high-risk host country. The main research question is: 
 
Why do Chinese firms invest in (relatively risky) emerging markets far away from their home 
country? 
 
In order to answer this question, this research is divided into two studies: a quantitative study on a 
national level and a qualitative study on a firm level.  
The main research question for the first study is: 
1. Are Chinese firms significantly more attracted to African countries with “poor institutions” 
than U.S. firms? 
And the main research question for the second study is; 
2. How does the institutional and political situation in China influence the location choice of 
Chinese telecom firms for – and their success in– high-risk markets in Africa? 
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1.4. Concepts 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Foreign direct investment is defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) as: ‘a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy 
(the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct 
investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor’ (OECD, 
2008: 17). To explain the meaning of this definition we can look at the example of a car 
manufacturer. When this car manufacturer wants to move (part of) the production process to 
another country, it can either decide to build a factory from scratch or to buy an existing factory in 
that country. Both options are considered to be FDI – from the point of view of the host economy: 
direct investment by a foreigner. It is not considered to be FDI when the car manufacturer only buys 
stocks of a production company in another country. Direct investment includes both the intention 
of a long-lasting relation with – and control of – the company abroad; either in terms of voting 
power (evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting shares of the direct 
investment enterprise) or day-to-day management. 
 
Outward (foreign) direct investment (ODI) 
FDI is differentiated between inward and outward FDI. Inward FDI is the investment made by non-
resident investors in the reporting economy. Outward FDI is the investment made by the residents 
of the reporting economy to external economies. The total outward FDI of a selected economy can 
be measured in terms of OFDI flow, OFDI stock and number of OFDI projects. OFDI is also referred 
to as ODI because the term “foreign” is redundant in this acronym since outward direct investment 
is per definition foreign. Therefore, I refer to “outward FDI” as “ODI” in the remainder of this 
dissertation.  
 
ODI flows 
The value of the yearly ODI flows represent the yearly transactions that increase the investment 
that investors from a selected economy have in enterprises in a foreign economy, minus any 
transactions that decrease their investment in that foreign economy (OECD, 2018). Examples of 
transactions that increase the investment are purchases of equity or reinvestment of earnings. 
Examples of transactions that decrease the investment are sales of equity or borrowing from the 
foreign enterprise. 
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ODI stock 
ODI stock is the total value of the equity in – and net loans to – enterprises in foreign economies 
from all investors from a selected economy since 1980 (when UNCTAD’s measurement started). 
UNCTAD Stats provides a database with inward and outward direct investment flows and stock per 
economy measured on a yearly basis. 
 
FDI host country/ country of destination 
The country that is the recipient of the investment. 
 
FDI source country/ country of origin 
The country of nationality of the investor. In other words, the country from which FDI flows or 
projects originate. 
 
1.5. Methodology 
This study starts out with a quantitative analysis in order to test if Chinese firms indeed (uniquely) 
target high-risk host countries with relatively weak institutions. My former experiences with 
conducting field research in six African countries over the period 2009-2012 gave me the impression 
that Chinese firms do not target countries with relatively weak institutions for the assumed 
“unique” advantages of Chinese firms in such host countries found in the literature. Instead, I 
assumed more subtle differences – related, but not exhaustively, to certain home country factors 
– which I was eager to find out throughout in-depth interviews with Chinese firms and their 
Western competitors in Africa. However, in order to explore the necessity of further research, I first 
needed to test whether Chinese firms are indeed uniquely targeting countries with a high level of 
political risk (assumingly due to special government support) and low IM (assumingly due to 
institutional distance) or not. Therefore, I started with a regression analysis comparing the role of 
institutional distance for the location choice of Chinese and U.S. investments in Africa (see the 
Methods Chapter for a thorough explanation of the methods I used). 
After disproving the commonly believed claim that Chinese firms are uniquely not deterred from or 
even attracted to high risk markets due to the similarities between the business environment in 
China and these host countries, I conducted a qualitative study. The aim of the qualitative study 
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was to explore the motives of Chinese investors for investing in a typical high-risk country and their 
specific advantages and disadvantages in such a home country. I adopted a single case study and 
interviewed senior managers from Huawei Nigeria and ZTE Nigeria – the regional offices in Nigeria 
of two large, internationally operating Chinese telecom infrastructure companies and their main 
customers and competitor in Nigeria. I selected Nigeria as a typical high-risk host country since 
Nigeria is among the five African countries with the lowest levels of PS and IM (according to the 
World Bank and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)). Due to the high costs of conducting 
research in a high-risk country I could only select one of these countries and Nigeria is the largest 
receiver of Chinese investment on the African continent (UNCTAD Stat, 2018). The results of the 
qualitative study show that institutional distance, the late-comer position, and little competition 
are not important determinants for the success of Chinese telecom vendors in Nigeria. The study 
also shows that the Chinese government is not interested in Nigeria’s oil reserves. Instead, it seems 
that concessional loans are an important factor for the success of the firms in Nigeria.  
I then used the findings of the qualitative study to improve the model for the quantitative analysis 
and re-ran the model. The findings from the second regression analysis confirmed the findings from 
the qualitative study: concessional loans are an important factor for the location choice of Chinese 
investors. Or, in other words: concessional loans increase the chance that large investment projects 
get successfully through the negotiation phase and are actually implemented. In Chapter 7 it is 
explained that concessional loans are not typical for Chinese ODI; however, at this point of time the 
Chinese government is in a more favorable position than many Western governments in terms of 
financial capacity to support its national firms via concessional loans. Furthermore, different levels 
of success between two large Chinese telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria that both have access 
to finance via the Chinese government show that firm-specific advantages do play an important 
role as well.  
 
1.6. Outline of the remainder of the study 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review and 
theoretical framework for the quantitative and qualitative studies that I shortly introduced above. 
Chapter 3 describes systematically the methods that I used for these studies and explains my 
selections in detail. Chapter 4 provides the context for the quantitative study and describes in more 
detail the amount, shares and distribution of Chinese and U.S. outward investment; China-Africa 
and U.S.-Africa relations; and the strategic position of the African continent. Chapter 5 describes 
the quantitative study in which I compare the role of the levels of PS and IM for the location choice 
of Chinese and U.S. investors. Chapter 6 provides additional context information for the qualitative 
  
 
9 
study, including: China-Nigeria relations; the Nigerian business context; the historical and recent 
developments in the global telecom market; and a detailed description of the two largest Chinese 
telecom infrastructure firms: Huawei and ZTE. Chapter 7 describes the qualitative study in which I 
explore the motives for Huawei and ZTE – and their specific advantages and disadvantages of – 
investing in Nigeria. In Chapter 8 I explain how the results qualitative studies feed into a second 
quantitative and qualitative analysis; to end with a discussion and conclusion of the findings of the 
studies and mixed analysis in Chapter 9. 
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2. Literature review 
 
There are two questions that have been, and are still, central to FDI theory: why do firms invest 
abroad, and why do they invest in a particular economy? The common starting point of most FDI 
theory is that investors pursue profit maximization (Stevens, 1974).The simple answer to the 
question, “why do firms invest abroad?” is therefore, in general, “to make profit.” This answer is, 
however, not satisfactory and raises further questions about the specific circumstances that trigger 
outward FDI and the balance between the risks involved in, and the profit that can be made, by 
investing abroad. FDI theory has developed over time in search of an answer to these and other 
questions. 
Driven by research on mainly Western firms by mostly Western researchers, the answers to these 
questions in FDI theory have been traditionally based on the following assumptions: 
• Firms invest abroad in order to exploit their firm-specific advantages  
• All firms strive to increase their long-term profit 
• Internalization is an incremental process   
• Firms try to keep risk-taking at a low level 
• Firms chose their location based on location specific advantages that fulfill their market-, 
resource- and efficiency-seeking motives 
The following sections will discuss: the origin and limitations of these traditional FDI theories; the 
insights and limitations of the focus on home country factors in research on Chinese ODI; and recent 
efforts to study the combined effects of home and host country factors translated into “distance” 
and foreign liability. 
 
2.1. Traditional outward FDI theory 
 
2.1.1. Ownership advantages 
The first question that was addressed in studies on foreign investment studies was: why do some 
firms invest abroad while others do not. Hymer (1976) suggested that a successful multinational 
has some firm-specific (or ownership) advantages which allow it to overcome the costs of operating 
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in a foreign country. Dunning defines ownership advantages as ‘the intermediate products to which 
the firm has privileged access and which […] are the privileged property of the firm’ (2001: 122).This 
theory implies that only companies with strong competitive advantages invest abroad. However, 
ownership advantages were not considerate to be adequate to explain why FDI takes place. 
Establishing parts of a business in a foreign country involves risks and, therefore, there must be an 
explanation for why investors establish their businesses in a foreign country instead of licensing or 
selling their products/processes to a foreign firm and trading with them.   
2.1.2. Profit maximizing 
During his study of the firm, Coase (1937) developed the idea of transaction costs. Brown and 
Hogendorn (1994) summarize Coase’s theory as follows: ‘A firm would follow an internal route if 
transaction costs exceeded administration costs and would follow an external route if the reverse 
were true.’ In other words, a firm will invest in a new or existing production line of a product instead 
of purchasing the product from another company when it is relatively cheaper to invest than to 
purchase. Buckley and Casson (1976) built further on the Coasian nature of the firm and developed 
the internalization theory in order to analyze the behavior of the multinational enterprise (MNE) 
and the motives for outward FDI. The internalization theory explains that a firm will invest in a new 
or existing production line of a product abroad instead of purchasing the product from a foreign 
company when it is relatively cheaper to invest than to purchase. 
 The internalization theory is based on the assumption that the central reason for firms to invest 
abroad is profit making. It is highly likely that this was and still is the case for strong companies from 
advanced (and often satisfied) markets who look for opportunities to increase their profits by 
investing abroad. However, this theory neglects the potential strategic reasons for firms with fewer 
ownership advantages (whether or not from less developed markets) to invest abroad. I will come 
back to this in the section on Chinese ODI and strategic-asset seeking motives.  
2.1.3. Step by step and risk avoiding 
The idea of internalization as an incremental progressive process is derived from studies on the 
internationalization process of U.S. firms during the post-war period. The two main progressive 
models are the product life cycle theory (Vernon, 1966) and the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahne, 
1977). 
The product life cycle theory of Vernon (1966) was the most influential theory on FDI up to the early 
1970s (Dunning, 2001: 121). The product life cycle theory states that production processes follow 
a certain sequence, namely starting from products being produced in the area where the product 
was invented followed by moving the production to foreign markets where there is a demand for 
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the product too. However, the theory does no longer apply since the international system of 
production became more complicated. For example, many parts of a single product are currently 
produced all over the world, new inventions are often produced abroad before they are produced 
at home, and there are many products that are produced in a country where there is no market for 
the product (for example clothes produced in Thailand for the American market and orange articles 
for Dutch football fans produced in China).  
The Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahne, 1977) was developed as an independent model based on 
the critique among Swedish researchers that the existing theories at that time neglected the 
challenges of cultural differences. This model assumes that firms move gradually towards culturally 
and geographically more distant markets while the firms simultaneously gradually increase their 
commitment in foreign markets (from only sporadic export, to export, to set up foreign sales 
subsidiaries, towards having foreign production and sales subsidiaries). The main assumption 
behind these gradual movements is that firms try to keep risk-taking at a low level. Although the 
Uppsala model has been criticized for not taking into account many other modes of entry (Doole & 
Lowe, 2008), it is still commonly believed that firms gradually intensify their internationalization 
following these lines. 
2.1.4. Location specific advantages 
Dunning (1977) combined the above-mentioned theories and added another dimension, namely: 
location-specific advantages. Dunning (1977) argues that although ownership-specific and 
internalization advantages are necessary conditions for outward FDI to take place, it must be 
profitable to use these advantages in combination with at least some factors associated with the 
country of destination (or location-specific advantages); otherwise the foreign market could be 
served exclusively by exports. Dunning (1977) integrated a variety of strands of thinking about the 
necessary conditions for a firm to invest abroad into the ownership, location, and internalization 
(OLI) framework. This framework identifies ownership, location, and internalization advantages and 
is currently the most widely used framework among FDI scholars. Examples of location-specific 
advantages are favorable government policy; availability, quality and costs of labor, energy, 
materials, components and semi-finished goods; and good infrastructure (Dunning, 2013). In other 
words, the location-specific advantages in the OLI framework refer to the factors that attract 
investors to a certain host country (or pull-factors).Dunning refers to Berhman’s (1981) typology of 
FDI and explains that the primary motivations for choosing a specific host country are: resource-
seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking. With the opening of new markets and new 
technological advances Dunning (2001) acknowledged that not all foreign production is primary a 
means of exploiting the existing ownership specific advantages and he added strategic-asset 
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seeking to the list. I will explain more about strategic-asset seeking as a primary motivation for 
investing abroad in the next section on specific theories regarding Chinese ODI. 
2.1.5. Summary 
According to traditional FDI theories it is not common for a firm to invest in a high-risk host country 
far away from its own region. This goes against the basic assumptions that firms avoid risk and 
internationalize gradually, starting with host countries that are geographically and culturally close 
(posing the least risk). However, from the perspective of emerging market investors, other 
emerging markets (that are often regarded to be high risk environments for advanced market firms) 
could be attractive as stepping stones towards investing in more advanced markets. The reason for 
this is that emerging market firms are relatively late-comers on the international market and their 
products and services often do not comply with the standards in advanced markets when they start 
to internationalize. Therefore, the demand for their products and services are higher in other 
emerging markets than advanced markets because of the similarity between the markets.  
This leads to the first hypothesis: 
1. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to their late-comer position (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Late-comer theory 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, since emerging market firms are late-comers on the global market it is likely that the 
most popular host countries (in terms of low risks and high profits) are already saturated; leaving 
the more challenging markets available for emerging market firms. Based on traditional outward 
FDI theory, we would expect that emerging firms will encounter few competitors from advanced 
market firms in these challenging host markets. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
2. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to the relatively little competition from 
advanced market firms in such markets (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Little competition theory 
 
 
 
 
2.1.6. Limitations 
The OLI framework and Uppsala model are still the most widely used frameworks in FDI theory; 
however, doubts have been raised concerning the explanation power of these frameworks for the 
internationalization of firms from emerging markets like China. 
During a doctoral course on International Business at Aalborg University in 2016, Olav Sørensen 
remarked that while the global economy is dynamic, the OLI framework is static and this could be 
part of the reason why we cannot see Chinese companies as an integral part of the global business 
system. For example, the OLI framework neglects the importance of the factors associated with the 
home country which seems to be caused by its origin in the study of Western firms by Western 
researchers. Traditional FDI theory has been built largely on the experience of industrialized country 
investors (Buckley et al., 2007: 501). The contextual factors of the home countries of the main 
investors under study – namely, the U.K. and the U.S. – could have been regarded as familiar and 
quite similar. This could have been the reason why pull-factors and firm-specific factors drew the 
attention of the scholars; leading to the neglect of the factors associated with the home country 
and the interaction between home- and host country and firm-specific factors in the OLI framework. 
The Uppsala model takes into account the relation between the home and host country (referred 
to as “distance” and including cultural, geographical, linguistic and political differences). However, 
since the model is based on the study of only four large Swedish companies, it does not take into 
account differences in various home country contexts that could influence this process. Besides, 
the Uppsala model starts the process of internationalization when companies move goods and 
resources across borders and do not take into account foreign competition on the home market 
(spill-over effects) or internationalizing via outsource contracts as the start of internationalization 
(Rana & Sørensen, 2013). Again, this can be explained by the fact that internationalization has been 
studied for a long time from the perspective of industrialized country investors only. 
Until quite recently investment was merely directed from advanced markets to other advanced 
markets or from advanced markets to so-called developing countries. These patterns have changed 
since large emerging markets became important investors globally. Figure 3 shows how Chinese 
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investment flows are distributed over the world: from an emerging market to other emerging 
markets as well as to advanced markets. (Note: the extraordinary share of Chinese “foreign” direct 
investment to Hong Kong can be explained by the fact that Hong Kong plays an important role in 
“round-tripping” of money (see page 58 for a detailed explanation)). 
Figure 3 The global distribution of Chinese ODI flows, 2011 
 
Source: OECD, 2013 
Do these changing FDI patterns require a new international business theory? How can relatively 
inexperienced Chinese firms with a lack of competitive advantages invest in advanced markets like 
Western European countries and the U.S.? Why and how do Chinese firms invest in high risk 
countries outside their own region in Africa? Since these Chinese outward investment patterns go 
largely against what traditional FDI theories predict, some scholars decided to study what makes 
Chinese investments different from traditional Western investors. The next section discusses more 
recent FDI theories with a focus on Chinese ODI.  
 
2.2. More recent theories on Chinese ODI 
The rise of China as an important source of global investment is reflected in a rising number of 
academic studies on the topic (Berning & Holtbrügge, 2012). The main debates revolve around two 
issues: the determinants and motives for Chinese outward FDI, and the uniqueness of the 
characteristics of Chinese outward FDI behavior. 
2.2.1. Strategic-asset seeking 
Dunning noticed that the opening up of new markets and new technological advances led to a shift 
from foreign production primary as a means of exploiting the existing ownership specific 
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advantages towards augmenting these advantages by acquiring complementary assets or new 
markets (2001: 135). However, this insight did not seem to have made much impact until Child & 
Rodrigues (2005) emphasized the importance of the strategic-asset seeking motive for Chinese ODI. 
Child & Rodrigues (2005) explain that Chinese firms do not invest in advanced markets in order to 
exploit competitive advantages, but are rather investing in these countries in order to address 
competitive disadvantages. 
Matthews (2017) argues that once becoming fully international in scale and scope all MNEs enjoy 
OLI advantages; however late-comers have to strategize their way into a global world—and he 
argues that his LLL-framework provides them with a strategic framework adapted to their needs as 
latecomers. LLL stands for linkage, leverage and learning. Matthews (2006) argues that emerging 
country multinationals take an outward orientation and seek to acquire resources and 
complementary assets, which can be accessed on the global market rather than in their home 
countries. Matthews (2006) refers to this acquisition of complementary assets as a firm-specific 
advantage. 
Rugman & Nguyen are skeptical about the success of a strategic-asset seeking motive and ask 
themselves: ‘Seeking yes, but finding?’ (2014: 54). Rugman & Nguyen are of course right about the 
fact that a willingness to augment competitive advantages is not sufficient to gain new competitive 
advantages. Some support would be welcome to achieve this. 
2.2.2. State support 
The Chinese government is unique in that it not only encourages inward FDI, but also actively 
encourages outward FDI via the in 1999 initiated Go Out Policy. Although this initiative is mainly a 
strategy to encourage and support Chinese firms to become global players and should be seen as a 
process during which Chinese firms gradually become more independent of the Chinese 
government, it is often perceived as a sign that the Chinese government is in control of these firms. 
Beijing’s pragmatic and no-strings-attached approach leaves much room for Chinese firms to invest 
in any country, no matter the political system or human rights record of the host country.  
Buckley et al. argue that the Chinese ‘state direction over firms (whether formal or informal) is likely 
to generate a signature in the locational pattern of outward investment that would not be predicted 
by the general theory of FDI, which assumes that firms are profit maximisers [sic]’ (2007: 
514).Kolstad and Wiig state for example that ‘Chinese FDI outflows differ from FDI from other 
regions, in their attraction to poorly governed countries rich in natural resources’ (2012: 33). 
Furthermore, Buckley et al. (2007) find that Chinese ODI is attracted to, and not deterred from, 
political risk.  
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General FDI theory predicts that when the risk in a host country goes up, investment goes down. 
The logical explanation is that risks involve costs and firms choose locations for their activities that 
minimize the overall costs of their operations (Buckley & Casson 1976). Buckley et al. (2007) find in 
their much-quoted study that when the risk goes down in a host country, Chinese investment goes 
down.2 Subsequently Buckley et al. provide a number of reasons for ‘why Chinese firms may not 
behave in the conventional manner’ (2007:510). Buckley et al. (2007) argue that the support from 
the Chinese government – together with home country capital market imperfections and the 
experience of Chinese firms with operating in a highly regulated and controlled domestic 
environment – ‘may have equipped Chinese MNEs with the special ownership advantages needed 
to be competitive in other emerging economies’ (2007: 514, emphasis added). 
2.2.3. Competitive advantage in so-called “weak states” 
Traditional FDI theory predicts that Chinese firms invest in countries with weak states and a high 
level of political risk because of their late-comer status; arguing that Chinese firms cannot be too 
picky and need to accept the left-over markets with lower quality demands. However, Morck et al. 
(2008) argue that Chinese firms might actually have competitive advantages over Western firms in 
challenging markets. Morck et al. explain that Chinese firms’ expertise in managing complex 
markets at home actually make them more capable than their Western counterparts ‘of dealing 
with burdensome regulations and navigating around the opaque political constraints’ in such host 
countries (2008: 346).  
For example, guanxi (Chinese for “connections” or “relations” and commonly described as ‘the 
system of social networks and influential relationships which facilitate business and other 
dealings’(Oxford dictionary)) is a very more important aspect of Chinese business culture. In the 
1980s and 1990s (the early stages of the development of private firms in China) was guanxi 
considered to be more important than formal contracts since there was more trust in the personal 
network than the official institutions (McNally, Guo and Hu, 2007). Putting emphasize on personal 
relationships requires Chinese business persons to develop strong social and networking skills. 
These skills could be valuable in other countries with inefficient formal structures too.  
2.2.4. Start of the internationalization process 
Traditional FDI theories tend to start the internationalization process when companies move goods 
and resources across border. As mentioned shortly before, Rana and Sørensen (2013) argue that 
these theories reason too much from the perspective of the lead companies (in value chain theory) 
                                                          
2 The other way around (Chinese investment going up when the risk goes up) would be more convincing; 
however, this is the way Buckley et al. (2007) describe their finding. 
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or MNEs (in outsourcing theory) and overlook the perspective of emerging market firms that often 
start their internationalization process in their home market. For example, emerging market firms 
might arise in order to serve or compete with foreign companies on their home market (spill-over 
theory) or receive training or upgrades of their facilities as part of outsourcing contracts. These 
companies that have a global focus and commit their resources to international ventures from 
inception are also referred to as “born globals” (Rennie, 1993). Sørensen pointed out (during the 
doctoral course) that this early start of the internationalization process is a fact for many Chinese 
firms as well. Since China is a major producer of goods sold in advanced markets – and since the 
Chinese government forces foreign firms to work closely with local firms – Chinese firms have the 
chance to quickly adapt to the technology and quality standards of the advanced market firms 
operating in China; preparing these Chinese firms for going global rapidly.  
2.2.5. Summary 
Recent theories on Chinese ODI challenge traditional FDI theories and predict that Chinese firms 
have a higher tolerance towards political risk and low levels of IM due to active support from the 
Chinese government (e.g. Buckley et al., 2007). This results in the third hypothesis:  
3. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to the support they receive from the Chinese 
government (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4 Government support theory 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, recent theories on Chinese ODI predict that Chinese firms developed a higher 
tolerance towards inefficient structures (which means a more difficult environment for doing 
business) due to their experience with operating in complex markets at home (e.g. Morck et al., 
2008). The theories by Child & Rodrigues (2005) and Morck et al. (2008) result in the fourth 
hypothesis: 
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4. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to their experience with operating in a 
similarly challenging business environment in their home country (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 Disadvantages become advantages theory 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.6. Limitations 
It needs to be noted that all above “statements” about the motivation for Chinese firms to invest 
in high risk emerging markets outside their own region are based on assumption, possible 
explanations of findings, and not results.  
For example, Buckley et al. (2007) presented a number of potential explanations for their findings 
in their results and discussion section; however, they were not empirically verified as such in the 
same study. It is interesting to note that these potential explanations have been quoted in later 
studies as findings (e.g. Amighini, Rabellotti and Sanfilippo (2013); Buckley, Yu, Liu, Munjal & Tao 
(2016)). Referring to his own study that Buckley published in 2007 with other co-authors, Buckley 
et al. (2016) write for example: ‘[…] research suggests that EMNEs have experience of, and high 
tolerance towards political risk, which makes them different from Western MNEs, and therefore 
political risk may not negatively affect their location choice decision’ (2016: 432). However, so far 
there is no empirical proof for a higher tolerance towards political risk by Chinese investors 
compared to other investors. 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) admit at the end of their paper that their results do actually not necessarily 
point to a unique attraction of Chinese investments to ‘poor states’. They state that their results 
show ‘that the interacted term is significant only for fuel exports’ (2012: 32) and that ‘it is possible 
that oil investment from China and from other countries is driven by the same set of factors’ (2012: 
33). However, this confession is not included in references to the findings of this study that Kolstad 
and Wiig not subtly refer to as: ‘our findings are consistent with an image of China as a “ravenous 
dragon”’ (2012: 33). 
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However, are Chinese investors indeed different from other foreign investors and are they more 
attracted to countries with relatively weak institutions and high political risk than other foreign 
investors? The above discussed studies with a focus on Chinese ODI showed us that too much 
emphasis on home country (or push-) factors and an exaggeration of the role of the Chinese 
government led to simplistic conclusions. What is needed is the integration of both the push and 
pull factors with the firm-specific factors (not just advantages) in an elaborate framework that 
explains the interaction between these different factors. 
 
2.3. Combining host and home country factors 
Child and Marinova (2014a) emphasize the importance of looking at both home and host country 
factors and aim to link them within a theoretical framework. Child and Marinova (2014a) state that 
investors are most successful in host countries with similar levels of PS and IM as in their home 
country. This is in line with the institutional distance argument that the costs of doing business 
abroad (also referred to as ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995)) depend on the extent of 
similarity/dissimilarity between the home and the host country. The concept of liability of 
foreignness suggests that the risks are relative and differ per investor; depending on how familiar 
the foreign investor is with the situation in the host country. 
To illustrate this, Child and Marinova (2014a) present a matrix in which countries are grouped 
according to their levels of PS and IM (see Figure 6). They categorize China as a category B country 
with a high level of PS and a low level of IM. 
Figure 6 Countries categorized according to their political stability and institutional maturity 
Source: Child & Marinova 2014a 
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Child and Marinova argue that Chinese investors are less successful in category A countries than in 
category B countries and that Chinese firms are relatively more successful in category D countries 
(with low levels of PS and IM) than their Western counterparts because of a similarly low level of 
IM. Child and Marinova (2014a) do not make the link between success in a specific business 
environment and location choice. However, following the line of argument from Morck et al. (2008) 
– that Chinese firms are more prevalent in least developed countries with difficult institutional 
conditions, because Chinese firms are more successful in such countries than their Western 
competitors – this framework could be used to further study the causal relation between the 
location choice of Chinese direct investment and the levels of PS and IM in the (potential) host 
countries. 
Child and Marinova define PS as a situation in which the governance system enjoys popular 
legitimacy, in which changes in government are orderly, and in which the policies of different 
governments exhibit substantial continuity (2014a: 353). The two possible measurements Child and 
Marinova (2014a) propose for measuring PS: the worldwide governance indicator ‘political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism’ from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘Political Instability Index’. 
IM is defined by Child and Marinova as ‘a situation in which a country’s institutions, such as its legal 
system and regulatory authorities, function in a transparent manner, adhering to clear rules that 
are applied in a universalistic manner to all citizens’ (2014a: 354). Child and Marinova (2014a) 
suggest the World Bank’s annual country ranking of ‘Ease of Doing Business’ for measuring the level 
of IM. Child and Marinova (2014a) did not measure the exact level of PS and IM, but rather 
categorized the countries based on anecdotal evidence; leaving the need to test their framework. 
2.3.1. Empirical studies 
Although there is no account of an empirical test of Child & Marinova’s (2014a) framework yet, 
there exist empirical studies on the effect of the levels of PS and the level of IM on the location 
choice of Chinese investors. For example, the work by Quer, Claver and Rienda (2012) in which they 
use data on 35 Chinese firms listed in Fortune 500 and show empirically that political risk is not 
detrimental to the location choice of the investment. Their sample is, however, relatively small and 
biased towards bigger firms who might have exploited opportunities to buy cheaper assets in more 
risky contexts.  
Chen, Dollar and Tang (2016) also conducted an interesting study on the motives behind Chinese 
investments in Africa which seems to present evidence for the statement that Chinese firms invest 
more in poor governance environments than Western firms. However, there are three critical 
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points to this research. Firstly, Chen et al. (2016) used two measures from the same database 
(namely “rule of law” and “political stability and absence of violence/terrorism” from the worldwide 
governance indicators (WGI) from the World Bank (2017a)). Since rule of law and political stability 
are related concepts it is recommendable to use measures derived from different backgrounds in 
order to avoid correlation effects. Secondly, for the first part of their study in which they look at the 
effect of poor governance on the location choice for Chinese investments they use FDI stock instead 
of number of investment projects. FDI stock is expected to be a less accurate measure of location 
choice for investment since the results can be biased due to single very large investments especially 
in the mining sector (see page 30 for a more detailed discussion on the matter). Thirdly, Chen et al. 
(2016) did not conduct a comparative analysis, but only compared total FDI stock in Africa with 
Chinese FDI stock in Africa. Since Western firms have been investing on the African continent for a 
long time already, for reasons that might have changed over the years, this comparison does not 
give an accurate picture of how the current motives between Western and Chinese firms differ. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In other words, there is still a need for a more accurate comparison between the impact of the 
levels of PS and IM on the location choice of Chinese and Western investors. Quantitative studies 
do however not show whether Chinese ODI is attracted to certain host countries or not. Regression 
analysis can point out the strength of a certain correlation but cannot proof a causal relation. These 
studies rather show that Chinese investment is not deterred from countries with a weak rule of law 
(Chen et al., 2016; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012) and a high level of political risk (Buckley, et al., 2007; Quer 
et al., 2012). Based on these findings, some bold statements are made about why Chinese investors 
are (relatively) attracted to countries with “poor” institutions. However, there is no empirical 
evidence for any of these claims. In order to further explore the reasons for Chinese firms to invest 
in high-risk markets outside their own region, we need to conduct qualitative studies. Case studies 
can make inferences on which causal mechanisms may have been at work by examining intervening 
variables in individual cases using process tracing. Beach and Pedersen (2016) refer to the causal 
mechanism as a system of entities that engage in activities that ‘move the mechanism from an 
initial or start condition through different parts to an outcome’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 83). 
Furthermore, Beach and Pedersen argue that if we theorize causal mechanisms as systems, ‘the 
theory needs to develop all of the important parts of the mechanism that link X with Y, with a clear 
causal explanation for what takes us from one part to another to ensure ‘productive continuity’ 
through the mechanism’ (2016: 98). We need to construct from what we have, then deconstruct, 
then reconstruct, and finally generalize so that we can build new theories.  
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Based on the possible explanations for the choice of Chinese investors to invest in high-risk markets 
outside their own region derived from reviewing both traditional and more recent FDI theories I 
constructed a causal mechanism (see Figure 7) that I will test in the remainder of this study. See 
Figure 8 for the legend. In the next Chapter I will explain the working of this rather complex causal 
mechanism in full detail. It needs to be noted that I changed the order of the hypotheses in order 
to make the flow of the mechanism clearer: 
Figure 7 Causal mechanism 
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Figure 8 Legend 
1.  
a. China is a difficult business environment for local firms due to inefficient formal structures. 
b. Chinese firms use informal structures to overcome faults in formal structures. 
c. Informal structures are more useful than formal structures in emerging markets. 
2.  
a. Chinese firms are late-comers on the global market. 
b. Products and services of Chinese firms are of low standard. 
c. Low in demand in advanced markets.  
d. Products and services are cheaper than products and services from advanced market firms. 
e. High in demand in emerging markets for their low costs. 
 
3.  
a. Chinese firms have close ties with the Chinese government. 
b. The Chinese government has strategic interests in some risky markets 
c. Chinese firms receive (financial) support for operating in these markets 
d. Chinese firms have more room to operate in such challenging host markets. 
 
4.  
a. Advanced market firms see markets with low levels of IM and PS as too high-risk business 
environments. 
b. Advanced market firms avoid high risk business environments. 
c. Advanced market firms target mainly other advanced markets. 
d. Chinese firms experience not much competition in risky emerging markets. 
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3. Methods 
3.1. Overview 
As described in the introduction, the purpose of this study was to learn more about the motives 
behind Chinese investments in high-risk markets and the particular advantages and disadvantages 
of Chinese investors in such countries. This research was born out of my observation that 
statements in international business literature about the determinants of Chinese foreign 
investments do not seem to match with the reality on the ground of Chinese economic activities in 
Africa. As described in the previous chapter, the dominant view in international business literature 
is that – in contrast to general FDI theory – Chinese overseas investment is not deterred by political 
risk (Buckley et al., 2007), and is directed to countries with weak institutions (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). 
The causal mechanism presented in Figure 7 at the end of the Literature Review shows the various 
possible explanations for the choice of Chinese investors to invest in high-risk markets outside their 
own region. However, so far these causal relations have not been empirically tested yet.  
In order to get a better understanding of the causal relation between the home country situation 
in China and Chinese investments in countries with relatively weak institutions, I have divided my 
research into two studies. The first study compares the location choice of Chinese investors with 
U.S. investors in Africa. The aim is to study the role of institutional distance in the location choice 
of Chinese and U.S. investors. The cross-case study allows me to either reject or not reject (NOT 
confirm) the hypotheses. For positive inferences one needs mechanistic within-case evidence. 
Therefore, the second study is a qualitative study and uses process-tracing in order to study the 
specific motives, challenges and advantages for two large Chinese telecom firms in Nigeria – a 
country with relatively low levels of PS and IM that attracts much Chinese FDI.  
The two studies have a different ontological and epistemological base. We can find out how much 
Chinese investment is going to certain countries and how this compares to investment from other 
FDI source countries. However, success is subjective and motives can be partly unconscious and 
therefore require an interpretivist approach. Therefore the first study is situated in a realist 
ontology with an objectivist epistemology, while the second study is situated in a relativist ontology 
with a subjectivist epistemology. The first study requires a statistical analysis while the second study 
requires ethnographic research and/ or in-depth interviews. Therefore this research project 
requires a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods. This means 
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that my research design is a mixed method design. To be more precise: a parallel mixed method 
design in which the methods are mixed during the data analysis. 
In the next section I will explain what mixed method design is, ending with the introduction of the 
specific mixed method design used in this study. After this, I describe the quantitative and 
qualitative studies separately in more detail. This chapter ends with an explanation of how the 
quantitative and qualitative study feed into each other at the level of data analysis and how I have 
come to my final results. 
 
3.2. Mixed method design 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: 11) define mixed methods designs as designs that use qualitative and 
quantitative data collection procedures or research methods. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: 14-15) 
mention three areas in which mixed methods designs are superior to single approach designs, 
namely: 
• Mixed methods research can answer research questions that the other methodologies cannot; 
• Mixed methods research provides better (stronger) inferences; 
• Mixed methods provide the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of divergent views. 
Creswell and Clark further expand that: 
Research problems best suited for mixed methods are those in which one data source may 
be insufficient, results need to be explained, exploratory findings need to be generalized, a 
second method is needed to enhance a primary method, a theoretical stance needs to be 
employed, and an overall research objective can be best addressed with multiple phases, 
or projects (Creswell and Clark, 2011: 8). 
In the case of my study the results from the quantitative strand were “surprising” –in terms that 
the results were in contrast with what general international business theory predicts. These results 
convincingly show the necessity for more explorative research on the motives, challenges and 
advantages for Chinese firms in African host countries. Teddlie and Tashakkori point out that ‘[a] 
major advantage of mixed methods is that it enables the researcher to simultaneously answer 
confirmatory and exploratory questions, and therefore verify and generate theory in the same 
study’ (2003: 15). As the case of my study shows, it can also be about disproving and exploring. 
The term “mixed methods designs” covers both mixed method and mixed model research. Teddlie 
and Tashakkori explain that ‘[m]ixed method research studies use qualitative and quantitative data 
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collection techniques in either parallel or sequential phases’ (2003: 11). This mixing occurs in the 
methods section of a study. Mixed model research, by contrast, is mixed in many or all stages of 
the study (questions, research methods, data collection and analysis, and the inference process) 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003: 11).  
In this study I am conducting mixed method research: I first use qualitative and quantitative data 
collecting, sampling and analyzing methods in parallel phases and then start mixing the methods in 
the analysis phase. My parallel mixed methods design looks as follows: 
Figure 9 The parallel mixed methods design used in this study 
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data that in turn helps me interpreting the results of my qualitative study. Combining my 
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3.3. Quantitative study 
3.3.1. Design 
The purpose of this quantitative strand is to test if Chinese and U.S. investments to Africa are indeed 
directed to host countries with similar levels of IM and PS. The study is conducted using a 
correlational design, which means that the extent of a relationship between the variables is 
measured by using statistical data. This design is also referred to as a descriptive design since the 
variables are not manipulated. 
The reason for choosing this design is that I am interested in information about: the allocation of 
Chinese and U.S. investment in Africa and the correlation between outward investment and 
institutional distance. Based on the institutional distance theory and Child and Marinova’s (2014a) 
framework I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese FDI is directed to African countries with a low level of IM. 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese FDI is directed to African countries with a high level of PS. 
Hypothesis 3: U.S. FDI is directed to African countries with a high level of IM. 
Hypothesis 4: U.S. FDI is directed to African countries with a high level of PS. 
I test my hypotheses based on the number of U.S. and Chinese FDI projects per African 
country as reported by respectively fDi Markets and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM). I will now first explain my sampling and data collection methods before I 
introduce the model. 
 
3.3.2. Sample 
The two populations that I compare are Chinese and U.S. investment projects on the African 
continent. Due to limitations in the availability of data, I look at all registered investment projects 
by respectively fDi Markets and MOFCOM for the period 2003-2011. The selected period of time is 
representative for China’s rising outward investments to Africa that rapidly increased since 2003 
and for the fluctuations in U.S. investments to the African continent (see Figure 22) for the 
developments of Chinese and U.S. total investments to the African continent from 2003 to 2015). 
The sample includes 35 of the 54 African countries due to the fact that ICRG has limited data on the 
level of government stability for many African countries. When using “political stability and absence 
of violence” from the WGI this study could include 51 countries. However, I was strongly advised 
against using the measures for PS and IM from the same database. In paragraph 1.1 I motivate my 
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choice for focusing on the African continent. I will now first explain which data is included in the fDi 
Markets and MOFCOM data bases in order to show that the data are comparable and robust. 
Furthermore, I note where gaps exist or what was excluded. 
 
FDi Markets– a service from the Financial Times – is a leading source of information on FDI. It 
collects data on greenfield FDI at the project level; including information on the home and host 
countries, the sector and the timing of each investment. There are three main drawbacks with the 
fDi Markets data: the first drawback is that fDi Markets does not cover mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). However, I do not expect that this will have a significant effect on the results of my study 
because the spread of U.S. M&As over the African continent is similar to the spread of U.S. 
investment projects in Africa. Ellis, Lamont, Reus & Faifman (2015) found 136 cases of M&As by 
U.S. firms in Africa in the period 2003-2012. They also found that by far the most M&As in Africa 
took place in South Africa (1766), Egypt (360) and Nigeria (189) (Ellis et al., 2015); which are also 
the top-three African countries with the most U.S. investment projects according to fDi Markets. 
The second drawback is that information on the real capital expenditure at the project level – 
though available – is not precise as it often reflects an estimated project size. Therefore, I decided 
to use the number of investments as a more precise proxy of FDI activities. The third drawback is 
that the fDi Market data is not complete for Chinese investment projects in Africa. Therefore, I use 
the MOFCOM database for the number of China projects. Despite the mentioned drawbacks, fDi 
Markets is still the most reliable source of information on U.S. outward investment projects.  
 
The MOFCOM database is freely accessible and shows all registered overseas investment projects 
by Chinese companies. MOFCOM used to provide the data on the names of the parent company 
and foreign entities, the province of origin in China, a short description of its activities, and the 
registration date of the project. From the descriptions of the business activities I found that the 
MOFCOM database also does not include Chinese M&As in Africa for the period 2003-2011 and 
therefore MOFCOM and fDi Markets data are comparable. The main drawback of the MOFCOM 
database is that these registered projects have been approved, but not necessarily implemented. 
It is likely that some of the projects have been cancelled in the process because of difficulties 
encountered during the implementation phase. Therefore, using this data allows me to measure 
the serious intention of the investor to invest in that specific host country, but not the actual success 
of the investment. However, the same could be said about using the fDi Market database since the 
database does not tell anything about the continuation of the projects after the initial investments. 
In short, the two databases are comparable and their combined use gives me the opportunity to 
compare the location choice of Chinese and U.S. investors in Africa. 
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3.3.3. Data collection 
The data for the dependent, main and control variables in this study were collected – or computed 
– from different sources. In this section I will identify the variables being measured and describe 
the methods used to obtain the data. All data was pre-existing or computed from pre-existing data.   
 
Variables and measures 
Table 1 summarizes the variables, measures, and data sources.  
Number of FDI projects. The independent variable is the total number of Chinese (and U.S.) 
investment projects to Africa per host country over the period 2003-2011 as registered by 
MOFCOM (China) and fDi Markets (U.S.). Prior studies have used FDI flow (e.g. Buckley et al., 2007) 
or stock (e.g. Chen et al., 2016) to measure Chinese investments abroad. Although one could argue 
that FDI stock is generally a more important basis for requesting and deploying political capital for 
both companies and governments, FDI flow and stock are not very accurate measures of location 
choice for investment. The reason is that the results can be biased due to single large investments 
in especially the extractive industry. When using FDI flow or stock the results are therefore expected 
to be biased to countries with natural resources since the mining and oil industries require much 
higher investments than most other industries. With the resource-curse theory in mind, the use of 
FDI stock or flow could thus lead to bias towards more instable countries. There are good arguments 
for the use of both stock and number of FDI projects; however, the use of project numbers is 
generally regarded to be less biased and therefore I choose to use project numbers. 
Table 1 Variables, measures and sources of data 
Variable Description Measure Main or control 
variable 
Data source 
lnFDIproj 
(dependent 
variable) 
Number of FDI 
projects 
Annual number of 
Chinese/U.S. FDI 
projects to Africa (per 
host country) 
Dependent Computed using data from fDi 
Markets and MOFCOM (2016) 
POL Political stability Annual estimate of 
governance stability in 
host country 
Main  Data from ICRG, published by 
the PRS Group 
INST Institutional maturity Annual estimate of 
governance of rule of 
law in host country 
Main  Data from worldwide 
governance indicators 
database, World Bank (2017a) 
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The two main variables are IM (INST in the model) and PS (POL in the model). Prior studies have 
either used composite measures or two or more separate measures from the same database to 
measure the level of governance and institutions in host countries. For example, Buckley et al. 
(2016) use both Government Stability and Rule of Law from the ICRG database to measure the 
quality of host countries’ institutions. Chen et al. (2016) look at “governance” using two measures 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators: Rule of law and Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism. Child and Marinova’s (2014a) framework suggests to separate PS and IM.  
Institutional maturity. Child and Marinova mention the Ease of Doing Business ranking from the 
World Bank as a measure for IM; however this ranking includes many more aspects of a good 
business environment than their description of IM, namely: ‘a situation in which a country’s 
institutions, such as its legal system and regulatory authorities, function in a transparent manner, 
adhering to clear rules that are applied in a universalistic manner to all citizens’ (2014: 353). 
Therefore, I use “rule of law” from the WGI from the World Bank to measure the level of IM. 
lnGDP Absolute market size Host country GDP at 
market prices (current 
USD) 
Control Data from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database, 
World Bank (2017b) 
NREXP Natural resource 
endowment 
The ratio of ore, metal, 
minerals and precious 
stones exports to 
merchandise exports of 
host country 
Control Computed using data from ITC 
Trade map (2017) 
INFL Host country 
inflation rate 
Host country annual 
inflation rate 
Control Data from World Economic 
Outlook, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2017) 
lnEXP Chinese (and U.S.) 
exports to the host 
country 
Total export per year Control Computed using data from ITC 
Trade map (2017) 
lnIMP Chinese (and U.S.) 
imports from the 
host country 
Total import per year Control Computed using data from ITC 
Trade map (2017) 
lnIFDI Openness to FDI Ratio of inward FDI stock 
to host GDP 
Control Computed using data from 
UNCTAD Stat (2017) and the 
WDI database, World Bank 
(2017b) 
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However, for a robustness check I replicate the measure using the Ease of Doing Business ranking 
from the World Bank as an alternative. 
 
Political stability. PS is in prior studies often measured from its negative opposite: political 
instability or political risk. The much quoted study from Buckley et al. (2007) for example uses 
“political risk” from the ICRG. The political risk rating from ICRG is composed of the following risk 
components: government stability; socioeconomic conditions; investment profile; internal conflict; 
external conflict; corruption; military in politics; religious tensions; law and order; ethnic tensions; 
democratic accountability; and bureaucracy quality (ICRG methodology at website PRS Group). 
Since this composite political risk measure includes also measures for IM, I decided to focus on the 
component “government stability” only to measure PS.  
 
The government stability component from ICRG is an assessment of both of the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. It includes the following 
three subcomponents: government unity, legislative strength, and popular support. The risk rating 
assigned is the sum of the three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a 
minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to 
Very High Risk. The measure government stability (POL) therefore fits Child and Marinova’s (2014a) 
description of PS, namely: a country which governance system enjoys popular legitimacy, in which 
changes in government are orderly, and in which the policies of different governments exhibit 
substantial continuity (2014: 353). As a robustness check I replicate the measure using “political 
stability” from the WGI from the World Bank.  
 
Control variables 
I control for the standard variables that have been included as controls in prior research and that 
apply to my sample, including: market size, natural resource endowments, inflation, existing trade 
relations, and how welcoming the host country is towards FDI in general. 
 
Market (GDP). The data are obtained from the WDI using GDP at market prices (current USD). 
 
Natural resources (NREXP). Amighini et al. (2011) refer to Buckley et al. (2007), Cheung and Qian 
(2009), and Kolstad and Wiig (2012) and state that the results of these studies show that Chinese 
investments are motivated by the need to satisfy their growing demand for primary resources, 
especially for investments going to developing countries. However, Buckley et al. (2007) and 
Cheung and Qian (2009) actually find that natural resources are insignificant, and Kolstad and Wiig 
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(2012) find only an interaction effect for natural resources and weak institutions in the host country. 
Despite these results, the popular assumption is still that Chinese firms are attracted to countries 
with natural resources, especially in developing regions. I use Buckley et al.’s (2007) measure for 
natural resource endowment, namely: the ratio of ore and metal exports to merchandise exports 
of the host country and add the categories precious stones and mineral fuels and oils (in order to 
include gold, silver, diamonds, oil and gas).  
 
Inflation (INFL). The conventional idea is that macroeconomic instability (proxied by high inflation) 
is a deterrent for foreign investors. I use the World Economic Outlook to measure the inflation rate, 
measured as the percentage change in consumer price index.  
 
Trade (EXP and IMP). Research has shown that trade and FDI have a strong relationship (Blomström 
& Kokko, 1997; Wells, 1983). FDI could be in support of trade or trade could be a substitute for 
exports for example (see springboard theory by Luo & Tung, 2007). For the export to and import 
from African countries of China and the U.S. I use data in current dollars from the International 
Trade Centre (ITC) Trade map.  
 
Welcoming to FDI (IFDI). Traditional FDI theory assumes that the more open a country is to 
international investment, the more attractive it is likely to be as a destination for FDI (Chakrabarti, 
2001). I am using the same proxy for the openness of the host economy to international investment 
as Buckley et al. (2007), namely the ratio of inward FDI stock to host GDP. I do this by excluding 
respectively Chinese and U.S. FDI to the total FDI received by each host country.  
 
I excluded Buckley et al.’s (2007) measures for cultural proximity, geographical distance, exchange 
rate and patent registration; and Amighini et al.’s (2011) measures for telephone mainlines, 
secondary education enrollment, research and development (R&D) expenditures and geographical 
distance. First of all, geographical distance is not very relevant for this study since the distance to 
the African host countries is not significantly different for both the U.S. and China. Cultural 
proximity is defined by Buckley et al. (2007) as when the percentage of ethnic Chinese of the total 
population is more than one per cent. However, when comparing between the cultural proximity 
of Chinese investors with U.S. investors African host countries then there are many other factors 
that play a role, like for example the enormous influence of U.S. food and pop culture in the world 
and number of African students that study in the U.S. versus in China. Coming from an 
anthropological background I find the concept of cultural proximity too complex to capture in a 
single or few measures. Amighini et al. (2011) use the number of telephone mainlines as a proxy to 
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indicate the availability of infrastructures and communication facilities in the host country. 
However, in most African countries mobile phone connection is much more developed than 
landline connection (Kefela, 2011). Furthermore, the lack of road, rail and telecom infrastructure in 
many African countries is actually an important factor that attract Chinese (and other) investors 
rather than withhold them. Secondary education enrollment, R&D expenditures and patent 
registration are proxies for strategic assets that could be obtained when investing in host countries 
with high levels of human capital and advanced technologies. I decided to not include these 
measurements since strategic asset seeking motives are associated with investments in advanced 
markets and not in Africa (see for example Child and Rodrigues (2005)).  
3.3.4. Data analysis 
Given the structure of the data and the expected relationships I apply a panel regression 
model using fixed covariate effects and a random intercept to account for the 
heterogeneity in receiving countries. Based on theoretical considerations and visual 
exploration of the data, I apply logarithmic transformations to some of my variables to 
stabilize linearity of the relationships and homoscedasticity of variances. Using the MIXED 
linear model command in SPSS (version 24) I fit to the data via generalized least squares a 
mixed effects model with fixed main effects and a random intercept: 
lnFDIproj = α + β1lnGDP + β2NREXP + β3INFL + β4lnEXP + β5lnIMP + β6lnIFDI + β7POL + β8INST + εit 
I expect some correlation between POL and INST since countries with a high level of PS are more 
likely to have a high level of IM and vice versa. Therefore I also run two separate models for PS and 
IM and compare the results with the results of my combined model. The advantage of combining 
the two variables in one model is that I compare the same group of countries for both IM and PS. 
Separately the IM model includes 51 of the in total 54 African countries and the PS model only 35, 
due to a lack of data on these countries. The combined model can therefore include a maximum of 
35 countries. In order to control for the impact of analyzing fewer countries on the results for IM, I 
also run a separate model for IM including only the 35 countries that are included in the PS model.  
The data on the number of FDI projects (FDIproj), GDP, export (EXP), import (IMP), and inward FDI 
(IFDI) are transformed into natural logarithms as I expect nonlinearities in the relationship on the 
basis of theory and previous empirical work. In order to be able to take logarithms, all values for 
IFDI are shifted by the smallest negative number plus one, so that only positive scores occur. 
Furthermore, I add one to all values for FDIproj so that zero projects become one project in order 
to be able to take the logarithms. 
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The results of this quantitative study show that, other than often assumed, both Chinese and U.S. 
investments in Africa are significantly directed to countries with low levels of PS. Furthermore it 
shows that both Chinese and U.S. investments in Africa are directed to countries with high levels of 
IM; however this relation is only significant for U.S. investments.   
 
3.4. Qualitative study 
There exists a common (mis)understanding in international business literature that Chinese 
investments are especially attracted to countries with relatively “weak” or “poor” institutions and 
or a high level of political risk. Quantitative studies do however not show that Chinese ODI is 
attracted to such host countries. These studies rather show that Chinese investment is – other than 
expected from the results of FDI in general – not deterred from countries with a weak rule of law 
(Cheung and Qian, 2009; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012) and a high level of political risk (Cheung and Qian, 
2009; Buckley et al., 2007). Based on these findings, some bold statements are made about why 
Chinese investors are (relatively) attracted to countries with “poor” institutions. However, as the 
results of my quantitative study show: there is not much difference between the location choice of 
Chinese and U.S. investors in Africa. The most that could be said based on these findings, is that 
Chinese investors are more indifferent towards a weak rule of law (Chen et al., 2016). 
The purpose of this qualitative strand is to further explore the reasons for Chinese firms to invest 
in high-risk markets outside their own region, by studying the link between the levels of PS and IM 
in China and the challenges and advantages Chinese firms experience in high-risk host markets. The 
study is conducted using a case study design. The purpose of this case study is to describe in-depth 
the experience of two large Chinese telecom companies in Nigeria. The main research question in 
this qualitative strand is: 
How does the institutional and political situation in China influence the location choice of Chinese 
telecom firms for – and their success in– high-risk markets in Africa? 
The next sections will explain the research design, the case selection, the expected causal 
mechanism, and the empirical prediction. 
3.4.1. Design 
In order to answer this question, a single case study is adopted. A case study is an empirical 
investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. According to Yin (2003: 
1), ‘case studies are the preferred strategy when ―how and ―why questions are being posed.’ It 
is often thought that the case study method allows for depth of investigation at the expense of 
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generalization (e.g. Bennett, 2004). However, Schreier (2017) explains that case studies lend 
themselves well for the recently reconceptualized notions of generalization, namely: 
“transferability” in the case of descriptive case studies and “analytical generalization” (also referred 
to as theoretical generalization) in the case of explanatory case studies. 
Transferability acknowledges the importance of the context and the core concern is ‘to determine 
whether the findings obtained for one instance or set of instances in one specific context also apply 
to other instances in a different context’ (Schreier, 2017: 86). In other words, transferability does 
not refer to actual empirical cases that I study, since I adopted a single case study. Instead it is about 
specifying the details of my case in such a way that my readers can decide to what extent the 
findings of my case also apply to other cases the reader has in mind – depending on how well the 
characteristics match. The extent to which the findings from one case can be transferred to another 
case can be assessed based on detailed information about the context in which the study was 
conducted, also referred to as ‘thick description’ by Geertz (1973).  
The most pertinent strengths of a case study approach are the ability to engage with complexity, to 
deal with unexpected issues, and to show the processes involved in causal relationships (Hodkinson 
& Hodkinson, 2001). According to Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2001) the depth and complexity of 
case study data can illuminate the ways in which such correlated factors influence each other. 
Currently, most studies on the motives behind emerging market outward FDI are based upon 
statistical correlation (for example, Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad& Wiig, 2010; Ramasamy et al., 
2012; Rasiah, Gammeltoft & Jiang, 2010). However, regression analysis can point out the strength 
of a certain correlation, but cannot proof a causal relation. Therefore, regression analysis alone is 
not sufficient for studying the motives behind Chinese outward investments.   
Instead, case studies can make inferences on which causal mechanisms may have been at work by 
examining intervening variables in individual cases using process tracing. Collier argues that 
‘process tracing is a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis’ that can contribute decisively to 
evaluating causal claims (2011: 823). Process-tracing involves a mechanistic understanding of 
causality. Venesson defines process tracing as: ‘a procedure designed to identify processes linking 
a set of initial conditions to a particular outcome’ (2008: 224). It is the search for intervening 
variables3 that link an independent variable with a dependent variable, commonly referred to as 
the causal mechanism.  
                                                          
3 It may sound contradictory to mention variables in a single case study; however, a single case can also 
contain variation, e.g. across time, subunits, and space. And when you do process tracing, you make use of 
the variance of that one case over time and look which factors coincide with which changes in the case. 
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Beach and Pedersen (2013) identify three types of process-tracing, namely: theory-testing, theory-
building, and explaining outcome process tracing. According to Beach and Pedersen (2013) 
“explaining outcome process-tracing” is the most common in practice, and it is used in a ‘situation 
where we want to explain a particularly puzzling historical outcome’ (2013: 11). Theory-building 
process-tracing ‘involves building a theory about a causal mechanism between X and Y that can be 
generalized to a population of a given phenomenon, starting from a situation where we are in the 
dark regarding the mechanism’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 11). In contrast, theory-testing process-
tracing is used when it is possible to theorize a mechanism linking a cause or causes with an 
outcome. Beach and Pedersen describe theory-testing process-tracing as follows: 
A causal mechanism is hypothesized to be present in a population of cases of a 
phenomenon. The researcher selects a single case where both X and Y are present, and 
the context allows the mechanism to operate. Here the goal is to evaluate whether 
evidence shows that the hypothesized causal mechanism linking X and Y was present and 
that it functioned as theorized (2013: 11) 
In the case of my study of the role of institutional distance for the location choice and success of 
Chinese outward investment various theories are available to hypothesize a causal mechanism from 
that we can test. Beach and Pedersen (2013) suggest five steps for theory-testing process-tracing, 
namely: 1) select typical cases, 2) conceptualize and operationalize the causal mechanism, 3) collect 
empirical material and evaluating whether the predicted evidence was and if we can trust it; when 
evidence is not found for the whole mechanism: 4) investigate whether the chosen case was 
idiosyncratic; when evidence is not found for a part of the mechanism: 5) engage in theory-building 
in order to revise the theory. The following sections will describe these steps, starting with 
sampling. 
The ultimate goal of process tracing is to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that 
leads to a specific outcome. I will use a within-case theory-building process-tracing method to 
find out if and how institutional similarity is connected to the location choice and success of 
foreign investment. The main drawbacks of process-tracing are the large amount of analytical 
resources required in order for conducting it properly, and that it only enables you to make 
within-case inferences. However, in return for this constraint on generality, ‘process tracing has 
the potential to generate relatively complete explanations’ (Waldner, 2012: 68). 
3.4.2. Sample 
The difference in sampling between variance-based designs and case-based research can be 
referred to top-down versus bottom-up. Whereas variance-based designs are taking the population 
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– or a sample thereof – as the analytical point of departure, the 'population' of cases in case-based 
research emanates from the sum total of all comparable individual cases in which the causal theory 
plays out in a similar fashion. In quantitative research case selection is often meant to be random, 
while in qualitative research case selection is intentionally. 
Beach and Pedersen define a “case” as ‘an instance of a causal process playing out, linking a cause 
(or set of causes) with an outcome’ (2016: 21). Beach and Pedersen argue that in any given case 
either a hypothesized causal relationship has taken place or not; which implies causal determinism 
and asymmetry (2016: 22). Causal homogeneity is vital when generalizing deterministic causal 
claims to other cases. Beach and Pedersen define a causally homogenous population as ‘one in 
which a given cause can be expected to have the same causal relationship with the outcome across 
cases in the population’ (2016: 53). It is important to make the contextual conditions under which 
the theorized relationship is expected to hold as explicit as possible (Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 98). 
Causally homogenous populations are created by using ‘thick’ definitions of concepts used in the 
definition of the population. The aim of thick definitions of concepts according to Beach and 
Pedersen is to ‘include more attributes and/or define them more narrowly’ so that fewer cases 
result being a member of the concept (2016: 107). When concepts are defined too broadly we allow 
too many cases to enter the population and are likely to create a causally heterogeneous 
population. 
This study focuses on two cases of Chinese multinationals investing in a high-risk host country in 
Africa outside the extraction industry. “Chinese multinationals” are defined as: enterprises 
operating in several countries but managed from China and that derive at least a quarter of their 
revenue from operations outside of China. I exclude investments in the extraction industry because 
the location choice for investors in this industry is limited to the host countries with natural 
resource endowments. Besides, based on the resource curse theory – although contested - we 
could expect a bias because of the tendency for low and middle income countries with an 
abundance of natural resources (that are relatively easily accessible) to have less economic growth, 
and PS than countries with fewer natural resources (e.g. Ross, 2006).  
I selected Huawei and ZTE: two large Chinese telecom equipment vendors, founded in the 1980s. 
Both have strong links with the Chinese government and receive indirect financial support from 
Chinese policy banks without being fully state-owned enterprises (SOEs) registered at the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Both 
Huawei and ZTE started winning their first overseas contract end 1990s and entered the Nigerian 
market around the millennium (see Table 2).  
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Table 2 Main similarities and differences between Huawei and ZTE. 
 Founded First 
overseas 
contract 
Year of 
entrance in 
Nigeria 
(SASAC 
registered) 
SOE 
Number of 
employees 
2017 
Revenue 
2015 (RMB 
bln) 
ZTE 1985 1998 
(Pakistan) 
2002 No +-75,000 100 
Huawei 1987 1997  
(Hong Kong) 
1999 No +-180,000 395 
 
Although Huawei and ZTE were of about equal size when they first started to invest abroad, Huawei 
became about four times larger than ZTE in 2015 in terms of revenue (see Figure 10).  
Figure 10 Revenue growth Huawei and ZTE, 2003-2015 
 
Source: Created by the author based on the annual reports of Huawei and ZTE. 
 
“High-risk host countries in Africa” are conceptualized as the African countries in quadrant D of 
Child and Marinova’s (2014a) framework applied to the African continent only: with a low level of 
PS and a low level of IM. These countries are: Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe (see Figure 11).  
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Figure 11 Levels of PS and IM standardized among African countries, 2003-2011 
 
Sources: created by the author based on data from WGI and ICRG 
 
PS is measured by using “government stability” from the ICRG, and IM is measured by using “rule 
of law” from the WGI from the World Bank (see page 31for a more detailed explanation). Nigeria 
stands out as the “high-risk” African host country that received most Chinese FDI over the period 
2003-2011 (see Table 3). 
Table 3 Main similarities and differences between the African host countries in quadrant D 
Country Level of PS Level of IM Chinese FDI stock in 
USD mln (2011) 
Number of Chinese FDI 
projects (2003-2011) 
Côte d’Ivoire -0.95 1.09 35 14 
DRC -0.32 0.81 709 68 
Ethiopia -0.59 0.04 427 94 
Guinea -0.77 1.10 168 16 
Kenya -1.63 0.38 309 54 
Liberia -0.14 0.80 115 16 
Nigeria -0.86 0.83 1416 191 
Zimbabwe -1.36 1.68 576 40 
Source: Created by the author based on ICRG, WGI, MOFCOM and fDi Markets 
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I exclude investments in the extraction industry because the location choice for investors in this 
industry is limited to the host countries with natural resource endowments. Besides, based on the 
resource curse theory – although contested - we could expect a bias because of the tendency for 
low and middle income countries with an abundance of natural resources (that are relatively easily 
accessible) to have less economic growth, and PS than countries with fewer natural resources (e.g. 
Ross, 2006). 
3.4.3. Data collection 
The data for this study consists of both primary and secondary data that were collected during field 
studies in China and Nigeria. In this section I will describe the methods used to obtain the data and 
identify the causal conditions that are the focus in this study. 
The data were collected using face-to-face interviews, observation techniques and public company 
documents like for example annual reports. I conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews. 
The advantages of face-to-face interviews compared to surveys are that the interviewee can: clarify 
questions when the respondent does not understand the question, ask follow-up questions and 
build rapport with the respondent. The latter is especially important since my study touches upon 
sensitive information for these Chinese firms, namely the company’s strategies and challenges. 
Furthermore, a semi-structured interview leaves much space for the respondent to mention the 
most pertinent issues according to him or her and has therefore a smaller risk to overlook important 
issues than with structured interviews or surveys. Another advantage of face-to-face interviews is 
that it allows for observations on location. In the case of this study, the observations of the 
differences between the offices of the Chinese firms in Nigeria provided extra information on the 
respective success of both firms in Nigeria. A disadvantage of face-to-face interviews is that it 
involves bigger costs in terms of time and money in order to meet the respondents in person. A 
disadvantage of semi-structured interviews is that it takes much time to transcribe and analyze the 
interviews. 
In order to get a full picture of the main challenges and advantages for Chinese firms in Nigeria, I 
did not only interview senior managers from both multinationals, but also representatives of the 
Chinese embassy and Ministry of Commerce, and the chairman of the Nigeria-China Business 
council. I also spoke with the main competitor of these Chinese firms (Ericsson) and two important 
clients (MTN and Smile) in Nigeria. Furthermore, I spoke with other Chinese business persons in 
Nigeria, an important Nigerian investment service group and representatives of the Dutch and U.S. 
embassies in Nigeria in order to explore the wider picture of the investment climate in Nigeria. 
Fout! Verwijzingsbron niet gevonden.shows the full list of the organizations, functions and l
ocations of the interviewees. The reason for interviewing not only the regional managing directors 
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of these firms is that I asked about sensitive information, namely: their company specific challenges 
and advantages of investing in Nigeria. Talking about these topics requires a level of trust and 
vulnerability that is not easy to create in the limited time available. The information that I received 
from the main competitors (on a company and country level) and clients helped me asking better 
informed questions which possibly made the managers of the Chinese telecom firms feel more 
comfortable sharing their information with me. Furthermore, the information from the partners 
and competitors around the Chinese firms helped me putting the information I received from the 
Chinese managers better in perspective. 
During the interviews I have asked my respondents about the challenges they experience in Nigeria 
for their company. Talking about challenges can make someone feel or seem vulnerable and that 
could be a reason for my respondents to not tell me in great detail about their challenges. 
Furthermore, the knowledge that the purpose of the interview is academic research and that the 
information will become publicly available has likely impacted the calculation my respondents 
made to decide what to tell me and what to keep for themselves. Especially talking about corruption 
could bring my respondents into serious trouble. Realizing the sensitivity of this topic, I tried to 
make it easier for my respondents by talking about corruption as a scale and by comparing as 
“corruption”-labeled behavior when it happens in Africa with as “lobbying”-labeled behavior when 
it happens in Europe. I tried to radiate a neutral stance to behavior that could be generally described 
in terms of networking and let my respondents talk about where they draw the limit and why. I 
stayed away from an ethical discussion about corruption and instead invited my respondents to 
talk about corruption in terms of to what extend it poses a risk for business and what ways they 
found to deal with the risk. This seemed to work since all my respondents were willing to at least 
discuss the topic of corruption and other challenges they encounter. However, I am aware of the 
fact that they are professionals and gave calculated responses.  
The interviews were conducted in January 2016 and reflect therefore the political and economic 
context of that time. President Buhari was inaugurated in May 2015. During his election campaign 
Buhari vowed to fight against corruption and insecurity and he made a clear stance by giving MTN 
a 3.9 billion dollar fine (which was later reduced to a bit less than half of that amount) after he 
became President. Some interviewees mentioned that this fine changed the way foreign firms 
behave in Nigeria realizing that the government is no longer looking away from scandals. This 
change of policy might have impacted the way my respondents spoke about corruption in Nigeria. 
Another important event during the time of the interviews is that the Naira dropped tremendously 
as a cause of falling oil prices due to the production of shale gas in the U.S., a country to which 
Nigeria exported most of its oil to until 2014.    
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Access to these persons was provided via my connections in China and Africa. My good friend and 
colleague in China-Africa research Prof. Dr. Wang Duanyong introduced me to a senior manager of 
ZTE in Johannesburg (South Africa). The manager in Johannesburg introduced me to senior 
managers at the headquarters (HQ) of ZTE in Shenzhen (China) and to senior managers at the ZTE 
offices in Lagos and Abuja (Nigeria). An employee at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who 
interviewed me on China-Africa relations introduced me to the Dutch embassy in Abuja and 
consulate in Lagos. A representative of the Dutch consulate brought me in contact with MTN, 
Ericsson and Smile. Prof. Wang joined me on my trip to Nigeria and brought me in contact with the 
Chinese embassy, the Ministry of Commerce, the Chinese Lekki Free Zone Development Company, 
the Nigeria-China Business council, Huawei, Stanbic bank and a Chinese hostel in Lagos where we 
met more Chinese business persons. A representative of the Dutch embassy brought me in contact 
with the U.S. embassy and a good friend and ambassador from Uganda brought me in contact with 
United Capital.  
 
To support the semi-structured interviews, I used an interview guide. The topics on this interview 
guide have been carefully selected based on the expected causal conditions resulting from the 
literature review (see Fout! Verwijzingsbron niet gevonden.). I will now explain the process of the s
election of these topics. Given the small number of cases in this study, measurement error 
potentially has huge impacts on the analytical results. To minimize the risks associated with this I 
will be as transparent as possible in developing the measures and assessing the cases in order to 
ensure inter-research reliability of measurement. I will provide clear descriptions of the procedures 
and sources used in order to enable other researchers to scrutinize and/or replicate my measures. 
The way these causal conditions are expected to interact create different potential paths in the 
causal mechanism (see Figure 12) that could explain how the institutional and political conditions 
in China can make Chinese firms more successful than their Western competitors in countries with 
low levels of PS and IM.  
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Figure 12 4 paths in the causal mechanism 
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The role of the Chinese government 
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In order to be able to test the causal mechanism we need to identify the potential observable 
manifestations (potential empirical fingerprints or predicted evidence) of the causal conditions 
identified in the literature. Testing a causal mechanism could be compared with the work of 
Sherlock Holmes who looks for evidence that proves or disproves his theories. In the same regard, 
“empirical fingerprints” are like fingerprints of which the presence could help prove or disprove a 
causal relation. We need to ask ourselves the question: if X causes Y, what do we expect to observe?   
Beach and Pedersen’s (2016) suggest to first identify as many potential observable manifestations 
as possible and to evaluate the pros and cons of these different observable manifestations in a 
systematic fashion before selecting the appropriate evidence (empirical fingerprints) of the causal 
relation. Table 4 shows an overview of the potential observable manifestations that I have 
identified. The table includes the clarity, match with the underlying causal structure, the fit with 
the semantic meaning, and sources for the proposed observables. The table is followed by a 
discussion on the choices I made.  
Table 4 Potential observable manifestations 
Causal concept Potential observable 
manifestations 
Vague terms? Match 
underlying causal 
structure? 
Captures the 
semantic meaning 
of attribute? 
Sources 
1. Inefficient 
formal 
structures in 
China 
A) Low ranking in “enforcing 
contracts”  
Vague – “low 
ranking” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Ease of Doing 
Business ranking 
(World Bank) 
 B) Complaints of MNEs 
regarding efficiency and 
affectivity of legal institutions 
Vague – 
“complaints” 
“efficiency”  
“affectivity”  
Yes Not objectively Media reports, 
interviews 
2. Chinese firms 
prefer informal 
contracts over 
formal 
contracts 
A) Contracts from Chinese 
firms broadly define the deal 
and do not include much 
detail 
Clear Indirectly Focus on the formal 
contracts only. 
Publicly available 
contracts 
 B) Chinese firms renegotiate 
their contracts after signing 
Clear Indirectly Focus on the formal 
contracts only. 
Media reports, 
interviews 
 C) Senior managers of 
Chinese firms have personal 
relationships with decision 
makers in important 
institutions in Nigeria 
Vague – 
“personal 
relationships” 
“important 
institutions” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Focus on the 
informal contracts 
only. 
 
 D) senior managers of 
Chinese firms state that they 
rely more on informal 
contracts than formal 
contracts 
Vague – 
“informal 
contracts” 
“formal 
contracts” 
Yes Not objective Interviews 
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3. Informal 
contracts are 
more 
successful than 
formal 
contracts in 
Nigeria  
A) Chinese firms are praised 
for their flexibility after the 
contract is signed by their 
customers in Nigeria 
Vague – 
“praised” 
“flexibility” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Not objective Interviews 
 B) Local business persons 
state that informal contracts 
are more important than 
formal contracts in Nigeria 
Vague – 
“informal 
contracts” 
“formal 
contracts” 
Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Interviews 
4. Late-comers on 
the 
international 
market 
A)Time spend from 
establishing the firm until 
internationalization 
Vague – 
“international
ization” 
Yes No, focus is on 
“coming after 
Western firms”. 
Annual reports 
 B) There are at least 10 years 
between when Ericsson 
internationalized and the 
moment the Chinese firms 
internationalized 
Vague – 
“international
ization” 
Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Annual reports 
5. Lower quality 
standards 
A) Clients and competitors of 
Chinese firms state that 
Chinese firms have lower 
quality standards than 
Ericsson and Nokia 
Vague – 
“lower quality 
standards” 
Yes Not objectively Interviews 
 B) Chinese firms use older 
technology than Ericsson and 
Nokia 
Vague – 
“older 
technology” 
Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Media reports, 
annual reports, 
interviews 
 C) Chinese firms use less 
advanced management 
systems than Ericsson and 
Nokia 
Vague – “less 
advanced 
management 
systems” 
   
6. Chinese firms 
make cheaper 
offers 
A) Customers in Nigeria 
declare that Chinese firms are 
cheaper than Ericsson in 
tenders  
Clear Yes Not measurable Interviews 
7. Nigerian 
customers 
prefer Chinese 
firms due to 
low costs 
A) Statements of customers 
from telecom infrastructure 
firms in Nigeria that they 
prefer Chinese firms due to 
their low costs 
Clear Yes Not objective Interviews 
8. Advanced 
markets block 
Chinese 
investments 
out of fear for 
political 
agenda  
A) Investments from Chinese 
firms in advanced markets are 
blocked out of fear for 
Chinese political agenda 
Vague – 
“blocked” 
“advanced 
markets” 
“fear for 
Chinese 
political 
agenda” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Media reports 
9. Chinese firms 
not successful 
A) Market shares of Chinese 
firms are low in U.S. and 
Europe 
Vague – “low” Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Not specified 
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in advanced 
markets 
10. Chinese firms 
target less-
advanced 
markets 
A) Chinese firms’ 
internationalization process: 
first targeted similarly less-
advanced countries  
Vague – 
“target” 
“similarly 
less-advanced 
countries” 
Looks at the 
process not on 
actual focus 
countries. 
Looks at the process 
not on actual focus 
countries. 
Publicly available 
documents 
 B) Chinese firms’ official 
internationalization strategy 
is to target less-advanced 
markets 
Vague – 
“official 
internationali
zation 
strategy” 
“target” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Interviews, 
internal 
documents 
 C) Shares of Chinese firms’ 
investments in less-advanced 
markets are higher than in 
advanced markets. 
Vague – “less-
advanced 
markets” 
“advanced 
markets” 
Not necessarily, 
because less 
investment could 
buy a larger 
market share in 
less-advanced 
markets. 
Not necessarily, 
because less 
investment could 
buy a larger market 
share in less-
advanced markets. 
Not specified 
11. Advanced 
markets 
saturated 
before Chinese 
firms arrived 
A) Hardly any new telecom 
infrastructure projects 
developed in advanced 
markets since Chinese firms 
started to invest abroad 
Vague – 
“hardly” 
Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Media reports 
12. Chinese 
government 
interferes in 
Chinese 
businesses 
A) Foreign firms are 
disadvantaged in favor of 
Chinese firms in China 
Vague - 
“disadvantag
ed” 
“favoring” 
Indirectly Not really Media reports, 
interviews 
 B) Board members of Chinese 
firms are high government 
officials 
Vague - “high 
government 
officials” 
Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Annual reports 
 C) Huawei and ZTE are SOEs Clear Yes Yes SASAC, Financial 
Times 
13. Chinese 
government 
uses Chinese 
firms to secure 
access to oil 
A) China imports large 
quantities of oil from Nigeria 
Vague – 
“large 
quantities” 
Only to one part 
of the causal 
structure. 
Only to one part of 
the causal 
structure. 
ITC Trademap 
 B) There is an infrastructure-
for-oil deal between China 
and Nigeria 
Clear Yes Yes, if the deal 
includes telecom 
infrastructure. 
Media reports 
14. Chinese 
government 
assists Chinese 
firms abroad 
A) Chinese firms have access 
to loans from the Chinese 
government for projects in 
Nigeria 
Vague – 
“access to 
loans” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Only when the 
loans are directly 
provided by the 
Chinese 
government to the 
Chinese firm. 
Interviews, media 
reports 
 B) The Chinese embassy is 
involved in business deals for 
Chinese firms in Nigeria  
Vague – 
“involved” 
“business 
deals” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Interviews, media 
reports 
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15. More room to 
deal with 
challenges in 
Nigeria 
A) Chinese firms experience 
fewer challenges in Nigeria 
than Ericsson 
Vague – 
“fewer 
challenges” 
 Not objectively Interviews 
 B) Some coping strategies of 
Chinese firms for challenges 
in Nigeria are no option for 
Ericsson 
Vague – 
“coping 
strategies”  
Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Interviews 
16. Advanced 
market firms 
perceive less-
advanced 
markets as 
high risk 
business 
opportunities 
A) Statements in media about 
high risks in less-advanced 
markets from advanced 
market firms  
Vague – “less-
advanced 
markets” 
“advanced 
markets” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Media reports 
17.     Advanced 
market firms 
target 
advanced 
markets 
A) Ericsson’s 
internationalization process: 
first targeted similarly 
advanced markets 
Vague – 
“target” 
“similarly 
advanced 
countries” 
Looks at the 
process not on 
actual focus 
countries. 
Looks at the process 
not on actual focus 
countries. 
Publicly available 
documents 
 B) Ericsson’s official 
internationalization strategy 
is to target advanced markets 
Vague – 
“official 
internationali
zation 
strategy” 
“target” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Interviews 
 C) Shares of Ericsson’s 
investment in advanced 
markets are higher than in 
less-advanced markets. 
Vague – “less-
advanced 
markets” 
“advanced 
markets” 
Not necessarily, 
because less 
investment could 
buy a larger 
market share in 
less-advanced 
markets. 
Not necessarily, 
because less 
investment could 
buy a larger market 
share in less-
advanced markets. 
Not specified 
18. Little 
competition 
from advanced 
market firms in 
less-advanced 
markets 
A) Market shares Chinese 
firms are much higher than 
Ericsson’s share in Nigeria  
Vague – 
“much 
higher” 
Yes Clearly captures 
meaning of 
attribute. 
Not specified 
19. Nigerian 
government 
accommodates 
to Chinese 
firms 
A) Chinese firms pay less tax 
in Nigeria than Ericsson does 
Clear Only when tax for 
similar activities 
is compared.  
All potential 
reasons for a 
difference in tax 
need to be 
explored. 
Not specified 
 B) Chinese firms have less 
troubles with corruption/ 
regulations in Nigeria than 
Ericsson 
Vague – “less 
troubles with 
corruption” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Not objectively Interviews 
 C) Chinese firms report to 
receive some kind of support 
from the Nigerian 
government 
Vague – 
“some kind of 
support” 
Depends on how 
measure is 
further specified. 
Not objectively Interviews 
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In the case of a singular proposed observable, this observable is automatically selected. When more 
than one observable is proposed then the best observable is selected based on a consideration of 
the clarity, match with the underlying causal structure, fit with the semantic meaning of the 
attribute and the sources. In some instances more than one observable is selected since these 
observables are expected to be linked. 
For the first causal condition I select “low ranking in enforcing contracts” because it clearly captures 
the meaning of the attribute. I improve the clarity of the observable by adding that China needs to 
be in the lowest 25 per cent of the ranking for “enforcing contracts” measured by the Ease of Doing 
Business ranking of the World Bank. 
For the second and third causal condition I rely on data that I acquire via interviews. I select “senior 
managers of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms state that they rely more on informal contracts 
than formal contracts” and “local business persons state that informal contracts are more 
important than formal contracts in Nigeria”. These proposed observables match the underlying 
causal structure best and capture best the semantic meaning of the attributes. I aim to triangulate 
the data by collecting data from interviews with managers of the Chinese firms, local business 
persons, and clients and competitors of the Chinese firms.  
In order to test the late-comer position of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms I select “at least ten 
years between when Ericsson internationalized, and the moment Chinese firms internationalized” 
since this proposed observable matches the underlying causal structure best and captures best the 
semantic meaning of the attribute. The data will be retrieved from the annual reports of Ericsson, 
Huawei and ZTE. 
I select “Chinese firms use less advanced technology than Ericsson” and “Chinese firms use less 
advanced management systems than their Western competitors” for the causal condition that 
Chinese firms have lower quality standards than their Western competitors. I will use media report, 
annual reports and interviews in order to look for evidence whether Chinese telecom infrastructure 
firms used older technology than Ericsson and Nokia during the period under study (2003-2011). 
I expect to find the most pertinent evidence for whether Chinese telecom infrastructure firms 
target less-advanced markets by interviewing senior managers of the Chinese firms at their HQ in 
China and ask them about their official internationalization strategy. I aim to triangulate the data 
with internal documents on the internationalization strategy of these firms and evidence of their 
internationalization process – which markets did they target first?  
  
 
51 
In case the Chinese government interferes in the firms under study I expect to find that the 
government is the main shareholder of the companies; in other words that Huawei and ZTE are 
SOEs.  
In the case of the causal condition that the Chinese government uses Chinese firms to secure access 
to oil, large imports of oil are a necessary condition. Only after finding evidence that China is 
importing large quantities of oil from Nigeria I look for evidence of an infrastructure-for-oil 
agreement between the Chinese and Nigerian government that includes telecom infrastructure. In 
case the hard evidence of an infrastructure-for-oil deal is not found, then there could be still reason 
to suspect the Chinese government to actively support Chinese telecom firms to build the telecom 
infrastructure in Nigeria in case Nigeria is a large supplier of oil for China. 
The assistance of Chinese firms abroad by the Chinese government could be observed in two clear 
ways: either the Chinese firms receive financial support from the Chinese government for projects 
in Nigeria – most likely in the form of loans – or the Chinese embassy is actively involved in business 
deals for these Chinese firms in Nigeria. In the case of the loans, it needs to be clarified if this 
financial support is consistent and if the Chinese firms can rely on this financial support. In case of 
the involvement of the Chinese embassy it needs to be clarified in what way this support is different 
from the support provided by embassies from the U.S. and Europe to their firms in Nigeria. The 
data is triangulated by using media reports and interviewing Chinese firms, representatives of the 
Chinese embassy and representatives of the U.S. and European embassies.  
The fifteenth causal condition is on purpose very broad, because the main challenges for Ericsson 
and the Chinese firms and their coping strategies for these challenges will come out of the 
interviews. In case Chinese firms have indeed specific advantages in Nigeria due to the above 
mentioned reasons, then it is expected that the Chinese firms have some coping strategies that are 
not an option for Ericsson.  
I expect to find the most pertinent evidence for whether Ericsson targets advanced markets by 
interviewing the MD of Ericsson in Nigeria and ask him about Ericsson’s official internationalization 
strategy. I aim to triangulate the data with internal documents on the internationalization strategy 
of Ericsson and evidence of its internationalization process – which markets did Ericsson target 
first?  
I decided to add the causal condition that China is the most valued investor in Nigeria. I will compare 
the number of investment projects per country of origin to see whether China is the main FDI source 
country for Nigeria. 
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It is very tough to find evidence for special support from the Nigerian government to Chinese firms. 
The Chinese managers are not likely to admit in case they receive a special treatment in order to 
protect “the face” of their Nigerian partners and to avoid that they lose the support. Despite these 
considerations, I do a serious attempt in this study to find evidence by asking the Chinese managers 
more broadly about the support they received from the local government when starting their 
business in Nigeria and if they experience challenges with regulations and corruption in Nigeria. I 
expect that in case the Chinese firms receive more government support than Ericsson that the MD 
of Ericsson would report more difficulties with the regulations and corruption in Nigeria than the 
Chinese MDs do.  
The above discussion results in the following list of the expected empirical fingerprints: 
Figure 13 List of expected empirical fingerprints 
1. China is in 25% lowest ranking countries with regards to enforcing contracts. 
2. Senior managers of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms state that they rely more on informal contracts than 
on formal contracts in less-advanced markets. 
3. Local business persons state that informal contracts are more important than formal contracts in Nigeria. 
4. There are at least ten years between when Ericsson internationalized and the moment Chinese firms 
internationalized. 
5. A) Chinese firms use older technology than Ericsson and Nokia. 
B) Chinese firms use less advanced management systems than their Western competitors. 
6. Customers from telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria declare that Chinese firms are most often cheaper than 
Ericsson in tenders. 
7. Customers from telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria state that they prefer Chinese firms due to their low 
costs. 
8. Investments from Chinese telecom infrastructure firms in advanced markets are blocked out of fear for Chinese 
political agenda. 
9. The market shares of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms are relatively low in the U.S. and Europe. 
10. Chinese firms’ official internationalization strategy is to target less-advanced markets. 
11. Hardly any new tenders for telecom infrastructure projects in advanced markets since Chinese firms started to 
invest abroad. 
12. Huawei and ZTE are SOEs. 
13. A) China is importing large quantities of oil from Nigeria. 
13. B) There is an infrastructure-for-oil agreement between the Chinese and Nigerian government that includes 
telecom infrastructure 
14. Chinese telecom infrastructure firms receive financial support from the Chinese government for projects in 
Nigeria. 
15. Chinese firms have some coping strategies that are not an option for Ericsson. 
16. Advanced market telecom infrastructure firms state in media that they perceive less-advanced markets as high 
risk business environments. 
17. Ericsson’s official internationalization strategy is to target advanced markets. 
18. The market shares of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms are much higher than Ericsson’s share in Nigeria. 
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19. China is the most valued investor in Nigeria.   
20. Chinese firms experience fewer difficulties with regulations and corruption in Nigeria than their Western 
competitors.  
 
Based on the selection of these observables I developed the Interview Guides for the interviews 
(see Appendix 2 and 3 on pages III and VI). The order of the questions was consciously chosen in 
order to build rapport before getting to the more sensitive questions and the words were 
consciously chosen in order to make the respondent comfortable to talk about challenges. 
However, the order and precise formulation of the questions was only used as a guideline and not 
strictly followed in order to have a natural conversation on these topics.   
 
3.4.4. Data analysis 
Upon arrival I of my field trips to China and Nigeria I transcribed the recordings of the interviews. 
Then I searched for the relevant passages mentioning the causal conditions that I am interested in. 
Most often I used the data from the interviews as guideline for searching further information on 
the topic, rather than taking the individual statements as individual proof for the (non-)existence 
of the causal condition. Furthermore, I use abstracts from the interviews as introduction to a 
specific empirical fingerprint in the empirical chapter. Due to the limited number of interviews and 
the different reasons for interviewing the various stakeholders, I decided to analyze the data 
manually. Another reason for not using software for qualitative data-analysis is that I was not 
looking for patterns in the data, but for particular evidence. 
According to the Bayes' theorem – on which process tracing is build – new empirical evidence 
updates our belief in the validity of the hypothesis. It can either increase or decrease our belief in 
the hypothesis based contingent upon: 1) our prior confidence based on existing research, 2) the 
theoretical weight of the evidence in relation to the hypothesis, and 3) the amount of trust we can 
place in the evidence being accurate (Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 178). 
Prior confidence in a causal hypothesis is the result of our assessment of how confident we can be 
in its validity based upon existing research. The level of the prior confidence in our hypothesis (high 
or low) affects whether we should focus on collecting confirming or disconfirming evidence. Beach 
and Pedersen (2016) explain that if our prior confidence is high, given that only very strong 
confirming evidence would further increase our confidence, it is more productive to focus on 
disconfirming evidence in an attempt to potentially learn something new. In the case of a low prior 
confidence, even relatively weak confirming evidence will update our confidence (see Figure 14).  
  54 
Figure 14 Prior confidence, certainty and uniqueness of evidence in relation to a causal hypothesis 
 
Source: Friedman in Beach and Pedersen (2016: 189). 
 
Therefore it is important to determine the high (H), low (L) or medium (M) levels of prior 
confidence (p), theoretical certainty (c), uniqueness (u), and accuracy (a) of the selected empirical 
fingerprints based on theoretical arguments before collecting and analyzing the data. Figure 35, 
Figure 37, Figure 40, and Figure 46in the second empirical chapter show per theory the updated 
causal mechanism based on the carefully selected empirical fingerprints with the levels of prior 
confidence, uniqueness, accuracy and theoretical certainty for each selected empirical finger 
print. The second empirical chapter that focuses on the qualitative study describes in detail the 
reasons for the high, low and medium levels of the prior confidence, theoretical certainty, 
uniqueness, and accuracy of the selected empirical fingerprints; supported by theoretical 
arguments. 
 
The causal mechanisms look slightly different from the ones presented in the data collection section 
because I refined my understanding of the causal relations during the process of determining the 
levels of prior confidence, certainty, uniqueness and accuracy.  
 
3.5. Sequential Mixed Methods Analysis 
After analyzing the data of the qualitative study it appeared that Chinese government loans to the 
host country could be a key explanation factor for the success of Chinese firms in high-risk host 
countries outside their own region; and therefore a key explanation factor of the location choice of 
Chinese outward FDI. I had not taken government loans into account as a variable in the first 
quantitative study. Therefore I decided to run the regression analysis again, this time including 
government loans as a main variable. The results of the new regression analysis confirmed the 
results from the qualitative study that government loans is a strong explanatory factor for the 
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success (and therefore the location choice) of Chinese firms in high-risk countries outside their own 
region. The confirmation from the quantitative analysis was then used to further explore the causal 
relation between the institutional and political situation in China and the success of Chinese firms 
in high-risk host countries. During the second qualitative analysis4 it became clear that the two 
Chinese firms under study benefit in a similar way from Chinese government loans to the Nigerian 
government; however, Chinese Huawei is much more successful in Nigeria than ZTE, due to – 
among other reasons – differences in management style. This led to the conclusion that host- and 
home-country factors are mediated through firm-specific factors.  
 
In other words, part of the output of the first qualitative analysis was used as input for a second 
quantitative analysis. The confirming output from this second quantitative analysis was then used 
for a second qualitative analysis to further explore the causal relation between the institutional and 
political environment in China > Chinese government loans to Nigeria > and the success of Chinese 
firms in Nigeria. This sequential mixed methods analysis is visualized in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Sequential mixed methods analysis 
 
 
  
                                                          
4 While the first qualitative and quantitative studies are clearly organized separately, the second qualitative 
and quantitative analyses are more difficult to distinguish from each other as the analysis evolved 
simultaneously.  
Qualitative study 
Results 
Sampling 
Data collection 
Data analysis 
Interpretation 
Quantitative study 
Results 
Results 
Sampling 
Data collection 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 2 Data analysis 2 
  56 
4. Chinese and U.S. investments and the strategic position of Africa 
 
Counting the number of ODI projects is a very resource-intensive task which makes access to this 
data very costly. For the quantitative analysis in the next chapter, I did manage to get access to data 
on the number of Chinese and U.S. ODI projects in Africa for the period 2003-2011; however, not 
for Chinese and U.S. investments globally. Therefore, in this introduction about the share of Chinese 
and U.S. ODI globally and their global distribution, I focus on ODI flow and stock data that is freely 
available on the website of UNCTADStat. UNCTADStat provides a database with inward and 
outward direct investment flows and stock per economy measured on a yearly base. 
 
4.1. Chinese and U.S. outward investments globally 
4.1.1. Increasing amount of ODI flows 
Until quite recently, most investment came from the so-called advanced markets in the West; 
particularly from the U.S. and Western Europe. Investment was merely directed from advanced 
markets to other advanced markets or from advanced markets to so-called developing countries. 
These patterns have changed since large emerging markets like China became important investors 
globally. 
Chinese outward investments grew rapidly since the Chinese government implemented the Go 
Global Strategy in 2001. Figure 16 shows the increase of China’s ODI flows over the period 1982-
2016. 
Figure 16 China’s outward FDI flows, 1982-2016 
 
Source: Calculated with data from UNCTADStat 
In 2011, China became the second largest FDI source country in the world in terms of ODI flows 
(see Figure 17).   
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Figure 17 Outward FDI flows of the 5 major FDI source countries, 1982-2016 
 
Source: Calculated with data from UNCTADStat 
 
However, the distance between the U.S. (the world’s largest FDI source country) and China is still 
enormous. 
In terms of ODI stock China stepped up with historically major FDI source countries like Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands in 2016 (see Figure 18). 
Figure 18 Global shares in ODI stock of the major FDI source countries, 2016 
 
Source: Calculated with data from UNCTADStat 
 
In short, China is still performing below its relatively size in terms of GDP and population size and it 
can therefore be expected that China’s share of global ODI stock will keep increasing over the 
coming years. However, it is important to note that China’s share in global ODI flows is likely to be 
34%
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over-estimated because the biggest chunk of Chinese ODI is actually directed to its own special 
administrative region Hong Kong – which is largely re-invested in Mainland China. The next sub-
section will explain this phenomenon in more detail.  
4.1.2. Global distribution Chinese ODI 
Between 2012 and 2016 Chinese global ODI stock has been more than doubled (from 532 billion 
USD in 2012 to 1281 billion USD). Since there is no data available for the distribution of Chinese ODI 
after 2012, we do not know if Hong Kong was still the main destination of Chinese ODI in 2016. In 
other words, it is impossible to know how much China will lose of its 12.6 per cent share of global 
FDI flows in 2016 if we take out Chinese investments to Hong Kong. 
UNCTAD provides bilateral FDI statistics until 2012. This database is based on the data reported by 
the investing country. Figure 19 shows that by far most Chinese ODI was directed to Asia in 2012. 
This finding seems to be in line with general FDI theory that predicts that firms start to invest in 
geographically and culturally close regions and gradually move to geographically and culturally 
more distant locations.   
Figure 19 Global distribution of Chinese ODI stock, 2012 
 
Source: Calculated with data from UNCTAD bilateral FDI statistics 
 
However, as I mentioned before, most Chinese ODI to Asia is directed to one single economy, 
namely Hong Kong. A staggering 83 per cent of Chinese ODI stock in Asia (and 58 per cent of Chinese 
global ODI stock) was invested in Hong Kong in 2012. Hong Kong plays a crucial role in the round-
tripping of capital from China: value that is created in China is transferred to Hong Kong from where 
it is re-invested in China in order to take advantage from the special benefits foreign investors 
69%
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6%
4%
4%
3%
1%
2012
Asia
Caribbean
Europe
North America
Africa
Oceania
Latin America
Total 532 $US 
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receive in China. Geng (2004) argues that ‘[i]n the past two decades, about 40% to 60% of China’s 
FDI inflows were from Hong Kong. However about half of Hong Kong’s FDI to China, as reported by 
China, cannot be verified or confirmed from the related statistics collected in Hong Kong’ (Geng, 
2004: 2). Because of Hong Kong’s status as special administrative region to China (and additionally 
this round-tripping of money between mainland China and Hong Kong), I do not consider 
investments from mainland China into Hong Kong as ODI.     
When we leave out Chinese investments to China’s special administrative regions (Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan), we find that Chinese ODI is actually much more spread over the different 
regions in the world than often assumed. More diversified than for example U.S. investments that 
are mostly directed to Europe (see Figure 20).     
Figure 20 Global distribution of U.S. and Chinese ODI stock, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated with data from UNCTAD bilateral FDI statistics 
 
Most of Chinese ODI stock in 2012 was invested in the Caribbean. The Caribbean islands are 
notorious for their tax haven status; most notably the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. 
Also quite a large portion (thirteen per cent) of U.S. investments went to the Caribbean. By far most 
Chinese and U.S. ODI stock invested in these territories will be re-invested again in China/ the U.S. 
itself as well as in other countries; however it is unknown to which extent. This uncertainty does 
make comparisons between the location-choice of FDI source countries challenging; however, it is 
still telling to compare the overt information on the direction of ODI flows. 
When we look at flows instead of stock, it is interesting to see that Africa has been a prominent 
receiver of Chinese direct investments during the period under study, namely from 2003 to 2012. 
The African continent received ten per cent of Chinese ODI flows during that period while Latin 
U.S. China 
US$ 4.5 trillion US$ 532billion 
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America received only three per cent. Data on U.S. ODI flows show that Africa became a less 
important destination for U.S. investments compared with the period before 2003 (see Figure 21). 
Figure 21 Global distribution of U.S. and Chinese ODI flows, 2003-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated with data from UNCTAD bilateral FDI statistics 
 
Let us have a closer look at Chinese and U.S. investments in Africa. 
Why do Chinese investments in Africa make headlines in the U.S. despite the marginal interest of 
U.S. investors in the African continent? Why do U.S. Secretaries of State warn their African partners 
for these Chinese investments?  
 
4.2. Chinese and the U.S. firms in Africa 
Africa is not a key destination for global FDI; it received only three per cent of the world‘s total FDI 
inflow in 2016 (calculated with data from UNCTADStat, 2018). Part of the reason is that many 
private firms perceive most of the African economies as high risk business environments. Another 
reason is that many African countries receive other major flows of finance in the form of official 
development assistance (ODA). However, China’s influence on the continent is rising and in order 
to keep a foot on the African continent, national governments of traditional donors are increasingly 
willing to support their national companies in Africa with their aid budgets.  
In 2009, China became Africa’s largest trading partner – surpassing the U.S. (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 
UNECA, 2011). However, that is when export and import flows are added. When only the export 
flows from Africa are taken into account, African countries together exported almost USD 20 billion 
U.S. China 
US$ 90 billion US$ 262 billion 
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more to the U.S. than to China in 2009. According to ITC Trademap statistics, China became also 
the main export destination for the African continent in 2012. Furthermore, a McKinsey report 
shows that China is also by far the largest financer of infrastructure projects in Africa: in 2015 China 
financed seven times more infrastructure projects in Africa than Japan – the second largest 
infrastructure financer in Africa (Jayaram et al., 2017: 20). 
The success of China in Africa has both spurred critique from the West and sparked a renewed 
interest in the continent by the West. The renewed interest in Africa by the U.S. for example could 
be seen in the sudden increased investments on the African continent after the peak of Chinese 
investments in 2008 (see Figure 22).  
Figure 22 Chinese and U.S. ODI flows to Africa in USD billions, 2003-2012 
 
Source: Calculated with data from UNCTAD bilateral FDI statistics 
 
Furthermore, the change of perspective in the West about Africa can also be seen in the changes 
of the title pages of The Economist for issues on Africa. Africa went from a ‘hopeless continent’ in 
2000, to a rising continent in 2011 and to an aspiring continent in 2013 (The Economist, 2000; 2011; 
2013) (see Figure 23). 
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Figure 23 The changing attitude towards Africa of the Economist 
 
 
 
The Chinese government has taken the lead in integrating aid and investment in its Africa policy 
supported by the publicly announced aim for win-win cooperation. This win-win cooperation – first 
described in China’s first Africa policy paper in 2006 – has been often misunderstood by Western 
scholars and government officials as a claim that Chinese development cooperation with Africa is 
well-balanced. However, the Chinese aim for a win-win situation should actually be understood as 
an opposition to the rhetoric of the West: claiming to be in Africa just to assist African countries 
with their development. Instead, Chinese government representatives state that they are in Africa 
to do business and that development cooperation should also serve China’s own development 
goals. As stated in a news report by Xinhua about China’s second Africa policy paper published in 
2015:   
The core principle is to connect assistance to developing countries, including those in 
Africa, for their independent and sustainable development with China's own 
development, achieve win-win cooperation and common development, and promote 
more balanced, inclusive and sustainable development of the world at large (Huaxia, 
2015, December 4). 
While media coverage in the West portrays China in Africa as a dragon hungry for resources(“A 
hungry dragon,” 2004; “China’s material needs,” 2004; Lorenz & Thielke, 2007), Western actors 
have long concealed their economic interests in Africa and instead promised to bring civilization, 
democracy and good governance to the continent. Yet, the success of China in Africa and the revival 
2000 2011 2013 
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of the discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of aid with the publication of Moyo’s book 
Dead Aid in 2009 led European governments rethink their Africa policies.  
In 2013, the Netherlands introduced “A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and 
Investment”, a policy document that sets out its vision for combining aid, trade and investment. 
The country’s approach is characterized by three objectives: eradicate extreme poverty, promote 
sustainable and inclusive economic development worldwide, and facilitate business of Dutch 
companies abroad. In this report the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the Dutch 
Government eradicates extreme poverty out of solidarity while it stimulates trade and investment 
mostly out of their own interests.  
In 2017 Germany presented its new Africa policy: Marshall Plan with Africa. Some critiques were 
quick to point out that it is a Marshall Plan for Africa since the African partners were not consulted, 
as usual. The report states that the German government wants to support German investments in 
Africa.  
Why do Western nations step up and use their development support budgets increasingly to 
support their firms in Africa?  
 
4.3. Strategic position of the African region 
Africa is a strategic region because of the abundance of “strategic minerals”, access to one of the 
most strategic maritime passages, the large number of United Nation member states and the 
enormous market potential. 
4.3.1. Strategic minerals 
The five main strategic minerals in Africa are: platinum group metals (South Africa), chromium 
(South Africa), manganese (South Africa), cobalt (DRC) and uranium (Niger and Namibia) (Burgess, 
2010). These strategic resources are needed for the production of many defense products such as 
jet engines and missile components (Hagerman, 1984, no page number). 
Platinum group metals 
Platinum is, among other things, used as a catalyst to improve the efficiency of fuel cells (Royal 
Society of Chemistry, 2017a). South Africa has 85 per cent of the world’s platinum group metal 
resources. The country’s endowment is valued at some US$2.5 trillion (MISTRA, 2013). By far most 
platinum from South Africa goes to the U.S., the U.K. and Germany. China is the sixth destination 
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of platinum from South Africa; importing less than four per cent the amount of platinum the U.S. 
imports from South Africa (ITC Trademap, 2018).  
 
Chromium 
Chromium is used to harden steel and to produce stainless steel (Royal Society of Chemistry, 
2017b). South Africa is by far the number one global chromium ore producer and China is by far the 
main customer for South African chromium ore: 56 per cent of South African chromium ore went 
to China in 2017 while the second and third largest customers of South African chromium ore (the 
U.S. and the Netherlands) imported only two per cent (ITC Trademap, 2018).  
 
Manganese 
Manganese is too brittle to be of much use as a pure metal and is therefore mainly used in alloys, 
such as steel. Manganese steel contains about thirteen per cent manganese and is extremely 
strong. It is used for railway tracks, safes, rifle barrels and prison bars (Royal Society of Chemistry, 
2017c). South Africa is the main producer of manganese and China is by far the main importer of 
manganese from South Africa. More than fifty per cent of the South African production of 
manganese goes to China; India – the second largest destination for South African manganese – 
imports less than twelve per cent (ITC Trademap, 2018).A report from the U.S. army war college 
from 2003 states that ‘the United States consumes over a million tons of chromium and manganese 
every year primarily in their ferroalloy form’ (Butts, 1993). Butts warns that ‘without sufficient 
stockpiles of these materials, the United States is vulnerable to a shortfall in munitions and 
armaments in time of surge capacity’ (1993). 
 
Cobalt 
Chinese firms are now dominating the supply chain of cobalt, a raw material crucial to developing 
batteries (for electric cars and smart phones) and for industrial and military purposes (super alloys, 
catalysts, magnets, pigments). Demand for the material is expected to soar by more than two-thirds 
over the next decade (Sanderson, 2016). 
The DRC is the world’s biggest source of cobalt (“Cobalt to be,” 2018, March 14, 2018). The DRC has 
currently six of the top 10 cobalt mines globally; and by 2022 the central African nation will host 
the nine largest cobalt producers – due primarily to Chinese investment (Els, 2018). The price of 
cobalt more than tripled since the beginning of 2016 due to the increasing demand from the electric 
car industry.  
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Figure 24 Rising cobalt prices since the start of 2016 
 
Source: Els (2018) 
 
The price of cobalt is set to rise further since the DRC government said that it will declare cobalt 
(and coltan) strategic resources which means that royalties paid to the government from cobalt 
mining will jump from two to ten percent (“Cobalt to be,” 2018, March 14, 2018). 
 
Despite the fact that China has not cobalt reserves of its own, Chinese firms are top-producers. The 
Chinese Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, the world's top cobalt refiner, was on its own responsible for 
twenty per cent of global output in 2017 (Els, 2018). According to Els (2018), the company sources 
nearly half its requirements from mines it owns in the DRC. 
 
In January 2017, China Molybdenum Co Ltd (CMOC) assisted the Chinese private equity firm BHR in 
acquiring a 24 per cent stake in the Tenke mine from Canada’s Lundin Mining (“China Moly to,” 
2017, January 22). CMOC promised to provide financial guarantees and other assistance to BHR. As 
part of the agreement CMOC would have the right to purchase BHR’s stake at a pre-agreed price if 
BHR left the project (“China Moly to,” 2017, January 22).CMOC also announced that it would 
purchase a 56 percent stake from Freeport-McMoRan Inc in Tenke mine for $2.65 billion; however, 
in June 2017 Freeport and CMOC agreed to determinate the discussions without closing a deal 
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(“Freeport, China Moly,” June 14, 2017). With the Freeport deal, CMOC would have become the 
majority owner of the Tenke mine.  
 
Apple seems to be worried about a possible cobalt shortage and wants to secure its supply and 
talks with mining companies about purchasing several thousand tons of cobalt over the next five 
years (Farchy & Gurman, 2018). Following Apple, Samsung C&T has approached one of their 
suppliers of copper (Somika SPRL) to buy also the cobalt produced at its Kisanfu mine in the DRC 
(Clowes& Kim 2018). In both cases it is still unclear how much cobalt will be bought. 
4.3.2. Strategic maritime passage 
The Suez Canal is an artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the 
Red Sea through the Isthmus of Suez. It was constructed by the Suez Canal Company and officially 
opened on 17 November 1869. The canal offers ships a shorter journey between the North Atlantic 
and northern Indian Oceans via the Mediterranean and Red seas by avoiding the South Atlantic and 
southern Indian oceans, and reduces the journey by approximately 7,000 kilometers(Mohit, 2018). 
Under the Convention of Constantinople, ‘The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, 
in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of 
flag’ (Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, 1988: 123.) 
Two professors in transport state on a widely used online reference source about transportation 
that: 
A closure of a maritime chokepoint in the current global economy, even if temporary, 
would have important economic consequences with the disruption of trade flows and 
even the interruption of some supply chains (e.g. oil). These potential risks and impacts 
are commonly used to justify military naval assets to protect sea lanes even if such 
benefits are difficult to demonstrate (Rodrigue & Notteboom, 2018). 
For this reason, Djibouti is home to many foreign military bases. Djibouti is strategically located at 
the southern entrance to the Red Sea on the route to the Suez Canal. It is home to Africa’s largest 
US army base and France’s biggest Foreign Legion deployment. Japan and Italy also have their own 
base, while troops from Germany and Spain are hosted by the French. These bases were all from 
nations with friendly relationships between them, until when China opened its first overseas 
military base in Djibouti, just a few kilometers away from the American camp, in August 2017 
(“China formally opens,” 2017). In March 2018 concerns grew in the U.S. when the story went that 
a key port in Djibouti was seized illegally from Dubai Ports World, one of the world’s biggest port 
operators, in order to give the port to China as a gift (Ali & Stewart, 2018). Marine General Thomas 
Waldhauser, the top U.S. military commander overseeing troops in Africa, has been paraphrased 
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by Reuters stating that ‘if China placed restrictions on the port’s use, it could affect resupplying the 
U.S. base in Djibouti and the ability of Navy ships to refuel there’ (Ali & Stewart, 2018).  
4.3.3. United Nations 
Africa is the continent with the largest number of UN member states. Having a strong foothold in 
the region could also lead to strong support within the UN. The newly independent African states 
played for example an important role in replacing the Republic of China (ROC) in the UN and the 
Security Council of the UN for People‘s Republic of China (PRC).  
“China” refers nowadays to the PRC; however, that has not always been the case. When the UN 
was established in 1945, the ROC was one of the founding members and occupied the seat for China 
in the UN and in the UN security Council.5 In 1949, the PRC seized power in China and claimed to 
have replaced the ROC. However, only since 1971 – with the support of newly independent 
countries from Africa and other regions (see Figure 25) – the PRC was recognized as the sole 
representative of China and took over the UN seat from the ROC.6 The remainder of this dissertation 
refers to the PRC as “China”. 
Figure 25 Voting situation in the UN general assembly respect to resolution 2758 (1971). 
  
                                                          
5http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/founders.shtml. 
6https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/legacy/AppImages/1971-UN-China-seating.pdf. 
  68 
5. A quantitative analysis of Chinese and U.S. investments in Africa7 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative strand is to test if Chinese and U.S. investments to Africa are indeed 
directed to host countries with similar levels of IM and PS.  
As explained in Chapter 4, Africa is a strategic region because of the abundance of “strategic 
minerals”, access to one of the most strategic maritime passages, the large number of United 
Nation member states and the enormous market potential. These are all good reasons that could 
explain the interest of the Chinese government in the African continent. However, why would 
privately owned Chinese firms invest in the African continent, despite the political risk and 
corruption? Why are Chinese firms not deterred from political risk and perhaps even attracted to 
“poor institutions”? Are Chinese firms significantly more attracted to African countries with “poor 
institutions” than U.S. firms? 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) and Morck et al. (2008) provided a theoretical explanation for the 
assumed attraction of Chinese firms to countries with weak institutions. They argue that Chinese 
firms are more prevalent in least developed countries with difficult institutional conditions, because 
their vast experience in navigating complex bureaucracies at home gives them a competitive 
advantage over Western firms. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc define difficult institutional conditions as 
‘the absence of a well-established infrastructure, well-developed market mechanisms, and a well-
developed contracting and intellectual property rights regime’ (2008: 960). Moreover Morck et al. 
focus on ‘endemic government interference and related problems’ (2008: 346). 
                                                          
7 This chapter is based on a paper that I wrote in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Sanfilippo and Prof. Dr. Wilhelm. 
Both Prof. Dr. Sanfilippo and Prof. Dr. Wilhelm added valuable additions to my draft. Furthermore, Prof. 
Wilhelm guided me in choosing the right statistical analysis method and Prof. Sanfilippo asked the right 
questions to help me improve the paper and helped me getting access to some of the data. I would like to 
thank Prof. Dr. Möllering who encouraged me to do a "quick" empirical check of the Child & Marinova thesis, 
as a warm-up and background study for the case-study work I had planned; which turned out to be a mayor 
part of my research project. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Lattemann for his involvement in the initial 
drafts of this paper and Prof. Dr. Marinova for making the time to explain the intention of her paper to me in 
detail over a Skype meeting. Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Jean-Francois Hennart, Prof. Dr. 
Jorma Larimo, Prof. Dr. Andrei Panibratov, Prof. Dr. Teemu Santonen, Prof. Dr. Per Servais, Prof. Dr. Oded 
Shenkar, Prof. Dr. Olav Jull Sørensen, Prof. Dr. Romeo Turcan, participants to the International Business 
Conference in Aalborg in 2016, participants to the 5th International CA/AC conference in Brussels in 2018, and 
the Field C colloquia at BIGSSS for insightful discussions and for their suggestions on earlier draft versions of 
the paper. I am indebted to BIGSSS colleague Dr. Georgi Dragolov who helped me working with the newest 
version of SPSS and to my friend Stijn Depla who helped me with the complex formula for the bubble graphs.  
. 
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Taking stock of the above discussion, the aim of my study is to compare the role of institutional 
distance for the location choice of Chinese and U.S. investors in Africa. Child and Marinova present 
a conceptual framework – which they adapted from Rodrigues (2010) – that could be used to 
further study the role of regulative institutional distance for the location choice of Chinese firms 
(2014a: 354). In line with Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) and Morck et al. (2008), Child and 
Marinova (2014a) state that firms are most successful in host countries with a similar level of PS 
and IM as in their home country. Their framework groups countries in four clusters, defined by their 
levels of PS and IM. Since Child and Marinova allocate China to the cluster with a high level of PS 
and a low level of IM, they expect that Chinese firms are most successful in host countries with 
similar high levels of PS and low levels of IM (2014a: 354-359).  
Although Child & Marinova (2014a) mention similar advantages and disadvantages as Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc (2008) and Morck et al. (2008) do for Chinese firms in more or less challenging 
host countries, they do not make a link with the location choice like Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 
(2008) and Morck et al. (2008) do. However, Child & Marinova (2014a) define PS and IM better and 
the framework they introduce clearly shows the link between the home and host country context. 
Therefore, I link success with location choice based on the insights from Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 
(2008) and Morck et al. (2008) and use the framework to empirically test the role of institutional 
distance for the location choice of Chinese and U.S. investors in Africa. To do this I run an analysis 
on the determinants of FDI from Chinese and U.S. firms in a group of African destination countries 
for the period 2003-2011.  
The results provide interesting new insights on the role of institutional distance, and on the 
uniqueness of Chinese FDI. I find that – contrary to popular belief – investments from both China 
and the U.S. are significantly directed to countries with a low level of PS and both Chinese and U.S. 
investments are directed to countries with a high level of IM (though this latter relation is only 
significant for investments from the U.S.). These results seem to reject the hypothesis that Chinese 
investments in Africa are attracted to high risk countries because of the relatively small regulative 
institutional distance that should give Chinese firms a competitive advantage over their Western 
counterparts in these countries. The results remain robust to different empirical specifications, and 
their sensitivity is supported when comparing Chinese FDI to Africa with those by other developed 
and emerging economies. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the existing literature on the rise of Chinese outward 
FDI and the assumptions regarding the uniqueness of Chinese outward investments. I then discuss 
the theoretical framework, grounded in the work by Child and Marinova (2014a) and its 
antecedents. Based on this review, hypotheses are developed. After this I present the data, the 
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model and the methodology for the empirical analysis. Next, I present the results of the empirical 
analysis and discuss their implications. I conclude by outlining the contributions of the present study 
to existing knowledge and drawing some implications for future research. 
 
5.2. Short literature review and theoretical framework 
As mentioned in the Literature Review, general FDI theory predicts that when the risk in a host 
country goes up, investment goes down. The logical explanation that is given is that risks involve 
costs and firms choose locations for their activities that minimize the overall costs of their 
operations (Buckley & Casson 1976). More generally, poor governance is associated with low levels 
of attraction for FDI, given that it often poses a threat to the protection of property rights and 
contract enforcement (Dixit, 2012). However, literature seems to suggest that MNEs from emerging 
markets (EMNEs) might be an exception to this rule. The literature on location choices by EMNEs 
generally shows that these firms are relatively indifferent to the institutional conditions in host 
countries and this has been so far considered to be a competitive advantage related to their 
domestic experience in coping with poor governance (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Dixit, 2012). 
China represents a case in point. 
Deviating from this general theory Buckley et al. (2007) find that when the risk goes down in a host 
country, Chinese investment goes down. Subsequently Buckley et al. provide a number of reasons 
for ‘why Chinese firms may not behave in the conventional manner’ (2007:510). Their potential 
explanations are presented in their results and discussion section but they were not empirically 
verified as such in the same study. 
General FDI theory focuses merely on competitive advantages that enable foreign investment 
(Dunning, 1977; Horst, Caves & Baumann (in Dunning, 2000); Hymer, 1976; Johanson & Vahne, 
1977; Vernon, 1966), and host country factors that attract foreign investors (Dunning, 1977; 
Dunning, 2013). The Location factors in the famous OLI-framework for example refer to host 
country factors only (Dunning, 2013).  
More recent empirical studies on Chinese direct investment put much more emphasis on the 
impact of home country factors (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Morck et al., 2008; 
Ramasamy et al., 2012). For example, Morck et al. argue that Chinese firms’ expertise in managing 
complex markets at home makes them more capable than their Western counterparts ‘of dealing 
with burdensome regulations and navigating around the opaque political constraints’ in host 
countries (2008: 346). Buckley et al. argue that ‘capital market imperfections and institutional 
factors in China may have induced a perverse attitude to risk’ (2007: 510). Kolstad and Wiig state 
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that ‘Chinese FDI outflows differ from FDI from other regions, in their attraction to poorly governed 
countries rich in natural resources’ (2012: 33). However, at the end of their paper Kolstad and Wiig 
admit that their ‘results show that the interacted term is significant only for fuel exports’ (2012: 32) 
and that ‘it is possible that oil investment from China and from other countries is driven by the 
same set of factors’ (2012: 33). Both Ramasamy et al. (2012) and Amighini et al. (2013) argue that 
this apparent aversion towards risk is more likely to characterize the internationalization pattern of 
SOEs, rather than private firms. 
As mentioned in the Literature review, Child and Marinova (2014a) emphasize the importance of 
looking at both home and host country factors and aim to link them within a theoretical framework. 
One of the arguments in their paper is that investors are most successful in host countries with 
similar levels of PS and IM as in their home country (Child and Marinova, 2014a). To illustrate this, 
Child and Marinova (2014a) present a matrix in which countries are grouped according to their 
levels of PS and IM (see Fout! Verwijzingsbron niet gevonden..  
However, so far the mentioned relationships are mostly based on anecdotal evidence. My study 
aims to provide a more accurate comparison between Chinese and U.S. investments on the African 
continent in order to get a better understanding of the role of regulative institutional distance for 
the location choice of Chinese investments. This will provide a first empirical assessment of the 
framework proposed by Child and Marinova (2014a) – although I am aware that I do not measure 
the success of the firms, but their location choice based on this success according to Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc (2008) and Morck et al. (2008) – while bringing fresh comparative evidence on the 
different drivers of location choice of foreign investors from countries with different institutional 
contexts. 
Based on the institutional distance theory and Child and Marinova’s (2014a) framework I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese FDI is directed to African countries with a low level of IM. 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese FDI is directed to African countries with a high level of PS. 
Hypothesis 3: U.S. FDI is directed to African countries with a high level of IM. 
Hypothesis 4: U.S. FDI is directed to African countries with a high level of PS. 
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5.3. Research design and methods 
I test my hypotheses based on the number of U.S. and Chinese FDI projects per African country as 
reported by respectively fDi Markets and MOFCOM. Chapter 0 specifies which data is included in 
the fDi Markets and MOFCOM data bases and which gaps exist; in order to show that the data are 
comparable and robust. Furthermore, chapter 0elaborates on the selection of the variables and the 
methods used to obtain the data and summarizes the variables, measures, and data sources. 
Given the structure of the data and the expected relationships I apply a panel regression model 
using fixed covariate effects and a random intercept to account for the heterogeneity in receiving 
countries. Based on theoretical considerations and visual exploration of the data, I apply logarithmic 
transformations to some of my variables to stabilize linearity of the relationships and 
homoscedasticity of variances. Using the MIXED linear model command in SPSS (version 24) I fit to 
the data via generalized least squares a mixed effects model with fixed main effects and a random 
intercept: 
lnFDIproj = α + β1lnGDP + β2NREXP + β3INFL + β4lnEXP + β5lnIMP + β6lnIFDI + β7POL + β8INST + εit 
I expect some correlation between POL and INST since countries with a high level of PS are more 
likely to have a high level of IM and vice versa. 
 
5.4. Results and discussion 
Table 5 shows the results for the effect of IM and PS on the location choice for Chinese and U.S. 
investments to Africa for the period 2003-2011. 
Table 5 IM and PS as determinants for Chinese and U.S. investments to Africa, 2003-2011 
 
Significance for 
Chinese FDI 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Significance 
for U.S. FDI 
Hypothesis 
supported 
INST 
0.115 
(0.076) 
 0.252*** 
(0.063) 
Yes 
POL 
-0.164*** 
(0.029) 
No -0.045+ 
(0.024) 
No 
lnGDP 
0.003 
(0.051) 
 
0.220*** 
(0.050) 
Yes 
NREXP 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Yes -0.003** 
(0.001) 
No 
INFL 
0.017** 
(0.005) 
No 0.007 
(0.005) 
 
lnEXP 0.364*** Yes 0.253*** Yes 
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(0.040) (0.045) 
lnIMP 
0.054** 
(0.020) 
Yes -0.005 
(0.019) 
 
lnIFDI 
-0.133** 
(0.044) 
No 0.120 
(0.079) 
 
Observations 293  293  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
The strong positive relation with GDP for U.S. investments to Africa is conventional and confirms 
the importance of market-seeking motives explained in general FDI theory. 
Natural resource endowments are positive and significant for Chinese investments in Africa; 
supporting the view that natural resource-seeking is a key motivation of Chinese FDI in the region. 
For U.S. investments the relation with NREXP is negative and significant. In other words, the data 
shows that U.S. firms invest more in relatively resource-poor countries in Africa. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that by far the most U.S. investment in Africa is directed to South 
Africa. South Africa is a resource-rich country; however, the South African economy is more 
diversified than most other African countries and the revenue from natural resources is therefore 
lower compared to the other resource-rich countries in Africa.    
It is interesting to note that inflation is significantly and positively related to Chinese investments 
to Africa. This means that there are significantly more Chinese investment projects in countries with 
relatively high levels of inflation. This finding is in contrast with general FDI theory that predicts that 
investors target countries with relatively low levels of inflation which are deemed to be 
economically more stable. Buckley et al. (2007) find the same for their sample of Chinese FDI over 
the period 1984-2001 and provide two possible explanations: first, moderate demand inflation 
accompanies economic growth and this growth could attract Chinese firms. Second, Buckley et al. 
argue that ‘this may support the view that the investment decisions of Chinese firms are unusually 
tolerant of less stable countries with respect to local economic conditions’ (2007: 511). However, 
since inflation is also positively related to U.S. investments to Africa – albeit not significantly – the 
first explanation seems to be more plausible. 
Welcoming FDI is negatively and significantly related to Chinese investments. This shows that there 
are more Chinese investment projects in countries that are receiving relatively little FDI in general. 
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An explanation could be that as late-comers, Chinese firms have little choice except to invest in less 
saturated markets. 
As predicted by Child and Marinova (2014a) U.S. investment is significantly directed to countries 
with a relatively high level of IM. This is in line with general FDI theory – which predicts that FDI 
goes up when the level of IM goes up. A more interesting finding however is that Chinese 
investments are not directed to countries with a low level of IM. These results support Hypothesis 
3, and do not support Hypothesis 1. 
I did check the effect on my results if I would use the Ease of Doing Business (EoDB) data instead of 
Rule of Law from the WGI as a proxy for IM. When I use EoDB U.S. investment projects are still, and 
Chinese investment projects become, highly significantly directed to host countries with a high level 
of IM (see Table 6). This is in line with general FDI theory, but not with the assumptions regarding 
the unique characteristics of the location choice of Chinese investors. 
Table 6 Comparing the results when using a different proxy for institutional maturity 
 
Significance for 
Chinese FDI 
Significance for 
U.S. FDI 
 Significance for 
Chinese FDI 
Significance for 
U.S. FDI 
POLICRG 
-0.164*** 
(0.029) 
-0.045+ 
(0.024) 
POLICRG 
-0.155*** 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
INSTWGI 
0.115 
(0.076) 
0.252*** 
(0.063) 
INSTEoDB 
0.014** 
(0.004) 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
Observations 293 293  248 248 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
Another important finding is that both Chinese and U.S. investment projects are significantly 
directed to African countries with a relatively low level of PS. These results are contrary to both 
Hypothesis 2 and 4. As discussed in the literature review, Buckley et al. (2007) found that Chinese 
FDI is not deterred from political risk; however they claim this finding to be unique for Chinese FDI. 
My findings show that both Chinese and U.S. investments in Africa do not seem to be deterred by 
political instability.  
The attraction of Chinese FDI towards countries with a low level of PS could be partly explained by 
being attracted to countries rich in natural resources in combination with the resource curse theory. 
The following countries are in the top ten FDI host countries on the African continent for China: 
Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, Egypt, the DRC, Sudan and Angola (in order of their importance 
Chinese investors). Zambia, Nigeria, the DRC and South Africa (from very low to higher levels of PS) 
are all in the top 20 of African countries with the lowest levels of PS; and Egypt, Sudan and Angola 
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follow soon thereafter. In the case of the U.S. this finding is mostly explained by the large number 
of U.S. investment projects in South Africa and Nigeria. 
I also checked the effect on my results if I would use the WGI data on “political stability and absence 
of violence” instead of the ICRG as a proxy for PS. The directions stay the same for U.S. investments. 
However, the directions for Chinese investments do change significantly(see Table 7). 
Table 7 Comparing the results when using a different proxy for political stability 
 
Significance for 
Chinese FDI 
Significance for 
U.S. FDI 
 Significance for 
Chinese FDI 
Significance for 
U.S. FDI 
POLICRG 
-0.164*** 
(0.029) 
-0.045+ 
(0.024) 
POLWGI 
0.122+ 
(0.063) 
-0.004 
(0.049) 
INSTWGI 
0.115 
(0.076) 
0.252*** 
(0.063) 
INSTWGI 
-0.197* 
(0.098) 
0.150* 
(0.074) 
Observations 293 293  420 420 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
The difference in the results for the relationship between Chinese investments and the level of PS 
in the host country seems to be mainly caused by the fact that South Africa and Zambia – both in 
the top three Chinese FDI project destinations in Africa – are much more negatively evaluated by 
the ICRG than the WGI over the period 2003-2011.  
Furthermore, I also checked how my results would be affected by using another proxy for the 
dependent variable, namely using FDI flow instead of number of FDI projects. Table 8 shows that 
my results are not affected by this change. 
Table 8 Comparing the results when using investment flows instead of number of projects 
 
Results FDI flow 
China 
Results FDI 
projects 
China 
Results FDI 
flow U.S.  
Results FDI 
projects U.S. 
POL 
-0.334*** 
(0.053) 
-0.164*** 
(0.029) 
-0.169* 
(0.075) 
-0.045+ 
(0.024) 
INST 
0.071 
(0.137) 
0.115 
(0.076) 
0.056 
(0.196) 
0.252*** 
(0.063) 
Observations 293 293 292 293 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
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Figure 26 and Figure 27 show the spread of African countries based on their levels of PS and IM and 
the number of Chinese and U.S. investment projects they hosted on average in the period 2003-
2011. 
Figure 26 Chinese investment projects in Africa for the period 2003-2011 
 
(Source: Authors’ elaboration on MOFCOM data) 
 
Figure 27 U.S. investment projects in Africa for the period 2003-2011 
 
(Source: Authors’ elaboration on FDi Markets data) 
The graphs show that both Chinese and U.S. investments are spread all over the continent. I do not 
see a clear preference for category A countries for U.S. investments or for category B countries for 
Chinese investments. When I compare these results of Chinese and U.S. investment projects in 
Africa for the period 2003-2011 I find that the country choice of U.S. and Chinese investors in Africa 
is surprisingly similar and not based on the institutional distance. 
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As a last robustness check I decided to compare these results with the results for U.S. and Chinese 
investments globally. For the same reasons as explained in paragraph 4.1.2, I decided to leave out 
the main tax havens and the special administrative regions of China. Since I do not have access to 
the number of Chinese and U.S. investment projects globally, I decided to use the less favorable FDI 
flows instead as a measure for Chinese and U.S. investments abroad. I left out the variables export, 
import and welcoming to FDI due to time constraints. In all other aspects the model is the same as 
for Chinese and U.S. investments in Africa. Table 9 shows the results. 
Table 9 IM and PS as determinants for Chinese and U.S. FDI flow excl. tax havens, 2003-2011 
 
Significance for 
Chinese FDI 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Significance for 
U.S. FDI 
Hypothesis 
supported 
INST 
0.114+ 
(0.062) 
No 0.826*** 
(0.110) 
Yes 
POL 
-0.080* 
(0.033) 
No -0.145* 
(0.059) 
No 
lnGDP 
0.175*** 
(0.016) 
Yes 0.294*** 
(0.028) 
Yes 
NREXP 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
Yes -0.001 
(0.003) 
 
INFL 
0.024** 
(0.009) 
No -0.018 
(0.014) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
Going against general FDI theory (that states that firms tend to avoid risks when investing abroad) 
both Chinese and U.S. global investments are significantly directed to countries with low levels of 
PS. These results are quite surprising, knowing that almost sixty per cent of U.S. investment flows 
over the period 2003-2011 were directed to Europe (see paragraph 4.1.2). Furthermore, when 
looking at global investments both Chinese and U.S. investments are significantly directed to 
countries with high levels of IM. 
Lastly, I compared the results for Chinese and U.S. investments to Africa with the results of 
investments from other advanced and emerging markets, namely: the U.K., France, Canada, Russia 
and India. The results show that investments in Africa from all countries under study are directed 
to host countries with relatively low levels of PS and high levels of IM; albeit with different levels of 
significance. These stable results point to a general trend in the international location choice of 
firms that transcends political, economic and cultural differences between the FDI source countries. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
Child and Marinova ‘tried to revive the tradition of developing a different way of looking at things 
through an argument that opens up some new space for academic debate’ (2014b: 409). However, 
they were also constraining themselves by discussing differences in opportunities for firms mostly 
on a national level. Furthermore, they perceived Chinese firms to be different than firms from other 
home countries based on assumptions about specific benefits and challenges Chinese firms face in 
host countries with different levels of PS and IM. For example, Child and Marinova state that ‘[o]ne 
reason why China can be regarded as a different case concerns the suspicion that the motives for 
its overseas investment are informed by a political agenda’ (2014a: 348, my italics).  
Child and Marinova argue that I should not focus on the host or home country alone; neither should 
I focus on ‘the simple ‘distance’ between them’ (2014b: 405). They state that it is rather ‘the 
qualitative interface between the two that is key to understanding what happens when companies 
engage in outward foreign direct investment’ (2014b). I agree with and applaud the idea of studying 
the ‘qualitative interface’. However, first I need to make clear that Chinese firms do not target 
institutionally immature or politically instable countries more than Western firms do, because this 
singling out of Chinese firms is not contributing to a better understanding of Chinese investment 
behavior or the internationalization process of firms in general. 
Therefore I decided to focus on the first part of Child and Marinova’s argument and to use the 
framework they presented on PS and IM in order to test the role of institutional distance for the 
location choice of Chinese and U.S. investments in Africa. I focused on the African region because 
of the heavy criticism towards Chinese investments in especially this region that accuses “China” 
(as if it is one monolithic actor) of exploiting countries with “poor institutions” without convincing 
empirical evidence. 
To conclude, my findings do neither confirm my hypotheses that Chinese firms are most prevalent 
in countries with a similarly high level of PS and low level of IM as China (or category B countries) 
nor that U.S. firms are most prevalent in countries with a high level of PS and a high level of IM (or 
category A countries). Instead, my findings show that both Chinese and U.S. investments to Africa 
are directed to countries in all four categories due to resource-seeking and market-seeking motives. 
In other words, Chinese firms do not differ substantially from U.S. firms in their location choice on 
the African continent and regulative institutional distance is not a key explanatory factor for the 
international location choice of Chinese and U.S. investment. 
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6. Context: China-Nigeria relations and the telecom equipment market 
 
6.1. China-Nigeria relations 
‘In 1956 the first Chinese came to Nigeria: four business men from Hong Kong settled down in Kano. 
They owned textile factories in Hong Kong and learned about Nigeria from the Lebanese traders. 
Both Hong Kong and Nigeria used the pound and the Lebanese traders travelled between Hong Kong 
and Nigeria to buy Chinese fabric and sell it in Nigeria. This way the Chinese learned that there was 
a market for their fabric in Nigeria. Nigeria is a good market for textile because Nigerians are using 
about seven yards per dress and they have many dresses per person for weddings and other big 
events. My father belonged to the second group of Chinese business men from Hong Kong who went 
to Nigeria end 50s. He established ten textile factories in Nigeria with each more than 1,000 
employees. At that time it was quite easy to do business in Nigeria. The demand was high and there 
was not much competition. It is currently much more difficult because there are many more Chinese 
in Africa and the image of China is deteriorating in Africa’ (Mr. Hu Jieguo, President of the Golden 
Gate Group in Nigeria and Deputy Director of the China-Africa Business Council, personal 
communication, January 11, 2016). 
 
This section discusses the political and economic relations between China and Nigeria since the 
independence of Nigeria. The first subsection provides a short history of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria, and an overview of official state visits and bilateral 
agreements between the two nations. The second part of this section discusses the trade, aid and 
investment relations between China and Nigeria.  
 
6.1.1. Political relations 
 ‘China and Nigeria, the two nations with the biggest population and economies in their continents’, 
(Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria Zhou Pingjian emphasizes the similarities between China and 
Nigeria in: “Special bond exist,” 2018, March 21). 
Nigeria and China established formal diplomatic relations on February 10, 1971 (Chinese embassy 
to Nigeria, 2004a). At that time General Yakubu Gowon was the leader of Nigeria. General Gowon 
had visited China one time during his period in power (from 1966 to 1975). In July 1975 General 
Murtala Mohammed took over in a bloodless coup, accusing General Gowon of corruption and 
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delaying the promised return to civilian rule. It took 25 years before a Nigerian Head of State would 
visit China again (see Table 10).  
Table 10 State visits from Nigeria to China from 1971 
Date Key persons Head of State Nigeria 
1973 Mr. Okoi Arikpo, Foreign Minister Gen. Yakubu Gowon 
1974 Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head of State Gen. Yakubu Gowon 
1983 Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme, Vice-President Shehu Shagari 
1984 Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, Chief of the Army Staff Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Buhari 
1989 Gen. Sani Abacha, Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Ibrahim Babangida 
1997 Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, Chief of the Defense Staff Gen. Sani Abacha 
1999 Olusegun Obasanjo, (about to be inaugurated) President Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar 
2001 Olusegun Obasanjo, President; Anyim, President of Senate Olusegun Obasanjo 
2002 Abubakar, Vice President; Nwuche, Deputy Speaker of the 
National Assembly 
Olusegun Obasanjo 
2005 Oluyemi Adeniji, Foreign Minister; Olusegun Obasanjo, President Olusegun Obasanjo 
2006 Olusegun Obasanjo, President Olusegun Obasanjo 
2008 Umaru Yar'Adua, President Umaru Yar'Adua 
2010 Jubril Martins-Kuye, Minister of Commerce and Industry Goodluck Jonathan 
2013 Goodluck Jonathan, President Goodluck Jonathan 
2014 David Mark, Senate President Goodluck Jonathan 
2016 Muhammadu Buhari, President Muhammadu Buhari 
Source: Chinese embassy to Nigeria, 2004a; 2005a; 2011a; 2014a; 2016a 
It is striking that successive Nigerian army chiefs have visited China. Agubamah (2014) attributes 
the visit of general Abacha to the fact that both China and Nigeria faced international isolation at 
the time due to brutal military actions against their own citizens. One could also argue that these 
visits suggest strong military cooperation between China and Nigeria at the time. However, I think 
the main reason is that by far most of the Nigerian Heads of State right after independence were 
military leaders.  
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In that light it is interesting to note that four Nigerian heads of state had visited China during an 
official state visit before becoming Head of State: Babangida visited China one year before he 
overthrew the Buhari government in August 1985, Babacha visited China four years before taking 
office, Abubakar visited China one year before replacing Abacha and Obasanjo visited China one 
month before his inauguration in May 1999. After President Obasanjo, Nigerian presidents made it 
into a habit again to visit China while they are in office. China-Nigeria relations were growing 
especially strong under President Obasanjo who visited China three times as President of Nigeria. 
The first official state visit from China to Nigeria after China and Nigeria established diplomatic 
relations took place in 1978 when Geng Biao, the Vice Premier, visited Nigeria. Twenty other 
Chinese state leaders followed in his footsteps until the state visit by Foreign Minister Wang Yi in 
2017 (see Table 11). 
Table 11 State visits from China to Nigeria from 1971 
Date Key persons 
1978 Geng Biao, Vice Premier 
1981 Huang Hua, Vice Premier 
1984 Tian Jiyun, Vice Premier 
1990 Wu Xueqian, Vice Premier 
1995 Qian Qichen, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister 
1996 Luo Gan, State Councilor and Secretary General of the State Council 
1997 Li Peng, Premier 
1999 Ismail Amat, Special Envoy of the President and State Councilor 
2000 Tang Jiaxuan, Foreign Minister 
2002 Jiang Zemin, President 
2003 Han Qide, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
2004 Hu Jintao, President; Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC 
2005 Wen Jiabao, Premier 
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2006 Hu Jintao, President; Zhai Jun, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary General of 
the Preparatory Committee of the Beijing Summit and the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; Li Zhaoxing, Foreign Minister 
2010 Yang Jiechi, Foreign Minister 
2013 Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC 
2014 Li Keqiang, Premier 
2015 Han Changfu, Chinese President Xi Jinping's Special Envoy and Minister of Agriculture 
2017 Wang Yi, Foreign Minister 
Source: Chinese embassy to Nigeria, 2004a; 2006a; 2006b; 2010; 2011a; 2013; 2014a; 2015a; 2017 
It can be concluded from this data that the governments of both Nigeria and China attach great 
importance to their relationship. Both countries have sent high officials over the course of time: 
five Nigerian heads of state have visited China in the period 1974-2016 and two Chinese presidents 
and 3 Chinese premiers have visited Nigeria in the period 1997-2017. Although, it seems that the 
Chinese leadership was a bit more reluctant than the Nigerian leadership until about 1995. 
Since 1971, China and Nigeria have signed at least 21 key bilateral agreements focused on 
strengthening the respective political, economic and cultural ties (see Table 12). 
Table 12 Key bilateral agreements signed since 1971 
Date Agreement 
1971 Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the PRC and 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1972 Agreement on economic and technical cooperation 
2001 Trade agreement; Agreement on Investment Promotion and Protection 
2002 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with respect to Taxes on Income 
 Agreement on Consular Affairs 
 Agreement on Cooperation and Strengthening Management of Narcotic Drugs, 
Psychotropic Substances and Diversion of Precursor Chemical 
 Agreement on Tourism Cooperation 
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2003 Trilateral agreement of South-South cooperation between China, Nigeria and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
2005 Strategic Partnership Agreement (covering investment, telecommunication service 
and technical cooperation) 
2006 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on petroleum cooperation 
2008 Joint Press Communiqué between the Government of the PRC and the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
 Strategic Partnership in power and energy and in transport infrastructure 
2013 Agreement on comprehensive financial cooperation 
 Preferential buyer credit agreement for Nigeria’s four airports expansion project 
 Agreement on economic and technical cooperation 
 Agreement on mutual visa exemption for holders of diplomatic and official passports 
from both countries 
 Agreement for the prevention of the theft, illicit import and export of cultural property 
 Agreement on Space Science and Technology Cooperation 
2014 Joint Statement between the PRC and the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
2016 Agreements on cooperation in infrastructure, production capacity, investment, 
aviation, science and technology, and finance 
2017 Agreement on “One China” policy 
Source: Chinese embassy to Nigeria, 2004a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015b, 2016b; “China, Nigeria to,” 2005; “Nigeria, 
China sign,” 2017, January 11; Agande, 2013; Rindap, 2015. 
Among the more common diplomatic, trade and investment agreements, there are two 
agreements that deserve special attention, namely: the agreements on space science and the ‘One 
China’ policy.   
The China-Nigeria space cooperation started in 2004 (Chinese embassy to Nigeria, 2014d).In 
2007,Nigeria commissioned China Great Wall Industry Corporation to design and build a Nigerian 
Communication Satellite (NIGCOMSAT-1) and to launch it into orbit at the Xichang Satellite Launch 
Center in China's southwestern Sichuan Province (“Chinese contractor hands,” 2007, July 7). 
NIGCOMSAT-1 was Nigeria’s second satellite and Africa’s first communication satellite (Osuagwu, 
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Elebeke, Youdeowei & Nwankwo, 2017). Its launch marked the return of China’s space industry on 
the international market after U.S. restrictions prohibited export of satellites and components to 
China since 1999 (Shea, 2016). Since that first launch China-Nigeria space cooperation only 
intensified. In January 2013, China and Nigeria signed the Agreement on Space Science and 
Technology Cooperation which includes the building of a satellite designing center and a satellite 
assembly, integration and testing center in Nigeria and supporting training programs (Chinese 
embassy to Nigeria, 2014d). In 2016, the Chinese government offered to build a ground receiving 
station in Nigeria that would link Nigeria to China’s satellite base and training for 1,000 Nigerian 
engineers in the space development sector (“China to train,” 2016, April 18). 
The Chinese government has used Nigeria’s strong position in the region for its One China policy – 
the insisting of the PRC for official international recognition that both Taiwan and mainland China 
are inalienable parts of a single "China". In 2004, the Chinese government set up the West African 
Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China in Lagos, Nigeria. A Proclamation that 
was adopted at the conference called on all Chinese citizens and ethnic Chinese in West Africa to 
unite against "Taiwan independence" and support the reunification cause of China (Chinese 
embassy to Nigeria, 2004b). During a seminar on Sino-Nigerian Relations hosted by the Chinese 
ambassador to Nigeria, the ambassador disclosed attempts by the "Taipei Trade Mission" to make 
"two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan" in Nigeria, and urged the Senate to continue to uphold 
one China policy (Chinese embassy to Nigeria, 2005b).  
Finally, during the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister in 2017, the Chinese and Nigerian Foreign 
Ministers signed the agreement on ‘One China’ policy (“Nigeria, China sign,” 2017, January 11). 
During this meeting the Chinese Foreign Minister stated that: 
A few days ago, the Nigerian side asked Taiwanese offices in Nigeria to remove their "false names" 
and "false plates", move out of the capital city as well as reduce power and personnel and reiterated 
its adherence to the one-China policy, which China highly appreciates (in Chinese embassy to Nigeria, 
2017). 
In January 2017 the Nigerian government indeed ordered Taiwan to move its office from the capital, 
change the name of the office and cut the number of office staff (Hou, August 3, 2017). 
Furthermore, on March 31 the Nigerian government demanded that the trade office's director 
leave the country and on June 30 Nigeria sent armed police to seal off the trade office and force 
the staff to leave (Hou, August 3, 2017). This is a clear example of the economic and political power 
the PRC has gained over the past decades. The next section discusses the economic cooperation 
between China and Nigeria. 
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6.1.2. Trade, aid and FDI 
 ‘Nigeria is the biggest Chinese investment destination in Africa, the second largest export market 
and the third largest trading partner of China in Africa’ - Deputy Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria, Lin 
Jing (in Okonedo, 2018). 
Trade 
Nigeria’s main export product is crude oil, namely: it accounts for 96 per cent of its total export (ITC 
Trademap, 2018). For long the U.S. has been by far the largest trade partner of Nigeria due to its 
large demand of Nigerian crude oil. However, the U.S. had stopped the importation of crude oil 
from Nigeria in 2014 – a development that was tied to the discovery of shale oil and gas in 
commercial quantity at home. Nigeria started looking at China and India as new markets for 
Nigerian crude oil. China and India bought indeed more crude oil from Nigeria in 2014 (see appendix 
4). However, India’s appetite shrank again quickly and China never had been very interested in 
Nigerian oil because of the quality of the oil.  
Nigerian oil is sweet and light; which makes it highly appropriate for processing it into gasoline, 
kerosene, and high-quality diesel. However, Chinese refineries work better on heavy oil (from 
Angola for example) which is processed into fuel oil for China’s booming industries. The main reason 
for China to buy crude oil from Nigeria is to do something about its trade imbalance with Nigeria. 
All Nigerian oil Chinese actors buy is sold on the international market.8 
In 2015, China became Nigeria’s largest trade partner – merely based on the vast amounts of 
Chinese exports to Nigeria (see Appendix 5). Nigeria imports mostly machinery and vehicles from 
China (ITC Trademap, 2018). 
 
Aid 
According to the 2011 white paper on China’s foreign aid, published by the State Council of the PRC, 
China offers foreign aid in eight forms, namely: complete projects, goods and materials, technical 
cooperation, human resource development cooperation, sending medical teams, emergency 
humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries, and debt relief (State Council of the PRC, 
2011). China and Nigeria signed the first economic and technical agreement in 1972. Since then the 
                                                          
8 This information was shared with me by three of my respondents during my fieldwork in Nigeria. This seems 
a plausible explanation for the low demand for Nigerian oil from China. I also found corresponding evidence 
in this blog from a senior editor of Oil News: http://blogs.platts.com/2015/05/25/two-crudes-nigeria-
angola/.   
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two sides have been engaged in various technical cooperation projects including well-digging and 
water supply, a large hospital, rural primary schools, a Friendship and Culture Center and solar 
traffic lights. Since 1993, the Chinese government provides scholarships for Nigerian students to 
study in China. According to a message from the Chinese embassy to Nigeria (2004a) there were 24 
Nigerian students studying in China, from 2002 to 2003. The number of Nigerian students studying 
in China on a Chinese scholarship increased rapidly. Around 2011 there were about 100 Nigerian 
students on government scholarships studying in China (Chinese embassy to Nigeria, 2011b) and in 
2016 this number increased to 237 Nigerian students (Saliu, 2016).   
The financial resources provided by China for foreign aid mainly fall into three types: grants (aid 
gratis), interest-free loans and concessional loans (State Council of the PRC, 2011). Grants are 
mainly used to help recipient countries to build hospitals, schools and low-cost houses, and support 
well-digging or water-supply projects, and other medium and small projects for social welfare. In 
addition, grants are used for human resources development cooperation, technical cooperation, 
assistance in kind and emergency humanitarian aid. Interest-free loans are mainly provided to 
developing countries with relatively good economic conditions. Both grants and interest-free loans 
come from China's state finances (State Council of the PRC, 2011). Concessional loans are mainly 
used to help recipient countries to set up productive projects that are generating both economic 
and social benefits, like for example infrastructure projects. Concessional loans are loans with 
substantial more generous conditions than market loans in terms of interest rates and grace periods 
and are provided by the Export-Import Bank of China; as designated by the Chinese government. 
Table 13 provides an overview of a selection of the main financial aid flows from China to Nigeria 
over the period 2001-2017.  
Table 13 Chinese financial aid flows to Nigeria, 2001-2017 
Date Amount in USD Type of aid Purpose 
2001 200,000,000 Concessional National Rural Telephony Project 
2002 297,750,000 Concessional Papalanto plant (electricity) 
2003 600,000,000 Grant Equipment for the Akwa Ibom refinery 
2003 2,500,000 Grant Unidentified 
2003 2,515,044 Debt cancellation Debt cancellation 
2005 200,000,000 Export credits Purchase of communication satellite 
2006 1,000,000,000 Concessional Fast rail system from Lagos to Abuja 
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2006 627,082 Grant Anti-malaria products and training  
2006 20,000,000 Concessional Private telecoms operator Reltel wireless Limited 
2007 300,000,000 Concessional Hydroelectric project on the Mambila plateau 
2008 500,000,000 Concessional Construction of the space satellites NigComSat 2 
and 3 
2008 7,200,000 Grant Schools in rural areas 
2010 600,000,000 Concessional National Public Security Communication System 
2012 30,600,000 Concessional Digitization of the State Media Corporation 
2012 500,000,000 Concessional Fast rail system from Lagos to Abuja – part 2 
2012 100,000,000 Concessional Galaxy backbone information technology (ICT) 
network 
2013 500,000,000 Concessional New terminals at all 4 Nigeria’s national airports 
2013 12,700 Grant Nigerian Red Cross Society in Benue 
2015 927,000,000 Concessional 700 megawatt hydropower station 
2017 6,700,000,000 Concessional Various railway projects 
Source: Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2017plus additional cross-checking with various sources 
 
China’s first white paper on China-Africa relations was published in 2006 and introduced the 
Chinese approach towards development cooperation, namely: an integration of aid and 
investment. This new approach – the approach to contribute to economic development in Africa 
via investments – is welcomed and applauded by many African leaders and embraced by Dambisa 
Moyo, the author of the best-seller “Dead Aid” (“Economist Dambisa Moyo”, 2013, February 28). 
Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand (2010) point out that the development cooperation of China is 
outspokenly meant to be mutually beneficial – in contrast to much development assistance from 
traditional donors that is (at least according to their official discourse) to be helping the recipient 
(see also page 62).  
Traditional donors to Africa – used to managing these two flows of capital through separate 
ministries – tried to pursue the Chinese government to use their framework of ODA; with 
alternating success. However, recently some traditional donors started to adopt a similar approach 
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as the Chinese government and integrated aid and investment in order to support their national 
companies abroad (see for example the recent Dutch and German Africa policies: German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, 2013).  
 
6.2. Nigerian business context 
Nigeria is the largest economy of Africa and has a population of more than 190 million. Although 
Nigeria’s GDP was estimated at $1.1 trillion USD in 2017 (CIA Factbook, 2018), GDP per capita was 
only $5,900 USD. According to a 2010 estimation, seventy per cent of the Nigerian population lives 
below the poverty line (CIA Factbook, 2018). 
 
Nigeria is perceived to be not an easy environment for business. Although being applauded for 
rising 24 places in the ranking of countries, Nigeria was still number 145 in the EoDB ranking of the 
World Bank of 190 countries in 2017 (“Nigeria among most,” 2017, October 31). The EoDB ranking 
is aimed to measure the costs to firms of business regulations in 190 countries. The study has 
become one of the flagship knowledge products of the World Bank Group in the field of private 
sector development, and is claimed to have motivated the design of several regulatory reforms in 
developing countries. In some quarters, the EoDB ranking is seen as a scorecard for a deregulatory 
race to the bottom (“The World Bank’s”, 2018, January 20). With this in mind it is interesting to see 
that close to the Nigerian elections of begin 2015 – that were won by President Buhari who 
promised more transparency and accountability – Nigeria’s ranking went down significantly (see 
Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28 Ease of Doing Business ranking Nigeria, 2008-2017 
 
 
The EoDB ranking from the World Bank is under fire after Paul Romer’s – then Chief Economist of 
the World Bank – critique of the impact of changes in the methods on the ranking of countries 
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(Zumbrun & Talley, 2018). In that regard, the scores of the WGI from the World Bank are much 
steadier (see Figure 29). According to the WGI, Nigeria scores very low in terms of “rule of law”, 
“political stability and absence of violence” and “control of corruption” all through 2006-2016 
(World Bank, 2017a). High levels of corruption and low levels of PS are usually associated with high 
risks for businesses; and not an attractive location for investment.  
 
Figure 29 WGI scores Nigeria, 2006-2016 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017a 
 
 
Located on Africa’s western coast on the Gulf of Guinea (see Figure 30), Nigeria is rich in many 
natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead and zinc. 
Petroleum is the main engine of Nigeria’s economy. According to the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) the oil and gas sector accounts for about 35 per cent of gross domestic 
product, and petroleum exports revenue represents over ninety per cent of total exports revenue 
(OPEC, 2018). It is therefore not surprising that Nigeria’s economy has been heavily impacted by 
the recent steep drop in crude oil prices; falling more than sixty per cent between 2014 and 2016 
(Ngai, 2016; Wallace and Doya, 2016).  
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Figure 30 Gulf of Guinea 
 
 
In January 2016 the Nigerian government calculated its expenditure at Nigerian Naira (NGN) 3.1 
trillion (USD 15.4 billion) and its revenue at NGN 1.8 trillion (USD 8.9 billion); meaning a deficit of 
USD 6.5 billion (source: presented on the Nigerian state television during my field trip in Abuja in 
January 2016). In a response, President Buhari, announced plans to increase transparency, diversify 
the economy away from oil, and to improve fiscal management. The government is working to 
develop stronger public-private partnerships for roads, agriculture, and power. The regulator hopes 
for the telecoms sector to account for up to 25 per cent of GDP by 2025 (Elebeke, Udofia & Iruoma, 
2015). 
 
Nigeria is the largest and most lucrative telecommunications market on the African continent with 
more than 150 million mobile phone subscribers (CIA Factbook, 2018). The rapid growth in the 
number of subscribers led to problems with network congestion, quality of service and security, 
prompting the telecom regulator to impose fines and sanctions on the network operators 
(Lancaster & Lange, 2018). Telecom operators have responded by investing billions of dollars in 
base stations and fiber optic transmission infrastructure to support the ever increasing demand for 
bandwidth (Lancaster & Lange, 2018). This offers a huge chance for the three main telecom 
infrastructure companies in Nigeria, namely: Ericsson, Huawei and ZTE. 
 
The registration process in Nigeria is extremely thorough in part to undercut Boko Haram’s 
communication capacity (Bergstresser, 2016: 156). When the South African telecom operator MTN 
Group – the market leader controlling more than forty per cent of the Nigerian mobile phone 
market – refused to deactivate almost 40 million improperly registered subscriber identity module 
(SIM) cards it received a USD 5.2 billion fine in October 2015 (from interviews in Nigeria and 
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confirmed by a report from Financial Times (Cotterill & Fick, 2017)). MTN has been able to negotiate 
the money down till 1.7 billion USD (Cotterill & Fick, 2017), but serious damage was done already. 
At the moment of the settlement with the Nigerian government MTN’s share price was 36 per cent 
lower than a year earlier (Palazzo & Hill, 2016). 
 
 
6.3. Global telecom market 
 
6.3.1. History of telecommunications 
For thousands of years people have been able to communicate over long distances via for example 
smoke signals, beacons, lighthouses, drumbeats, and whistles. However, 20th and 21st century 
technologies rapidly increased the distance over which could be communicated, the length of the 
message, the speed with which the message could be transmitted and the number of people that 
could be reached. In a speaking comparison, Huurdemann argues that ‘if automobile technology 
had progressed at the same pace as telecommunications, a Rolls-Royce would cost less than $2 and 
get 40,000 miles to the gallon (equal to 17,000 km/L)’ (2003:10). 
 
Increasing knowledge about the theory of electromagnetism, basic laws of electricity and the basic 
theory of sound supported the evolution from telegraphy to telephony (Huurdemann, 2003). 
Furthermore, the discovery of electromagnetic radiation and the creation of electronic tubes 
started the electronic era, which enabled the evolution from radio-telegraphy to radio-telephony 
and mobile radio (Huurdemann, 2003). In 1932, a plenipotentiary Telegraph Conference and the 
International Radiotelegraph Conference met in Madrid and decided to merge into a single entity: 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The new term “telecommunication” was defined 
in the Convention as follows: any telegraphic or telephonic communication of signs, signals, writing, 
facsimiles and sounds of any kind, by wire, wireless or other systems or processes of electric 
signaling or visual signaling (semaphores) (“International Telegraph Conference,” 2018). Currently, 
the ITU defines telecommunication as: any transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, 
writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other 
electromagnetic systems (ITU, 2012).  
 
Commercial radio broadcasts began in the 1920s, but the development of radio communications 
remained a priority for the military (“Breakthrough for mobile,” 2018). It took many years before 
frequency allocation authorities were willing to grant frequencies for mobile telephony. One 
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problem was that the frequencies available for mobile telephony could not be used sufficiently 
effectively. Besides the necessary technological development there was also a political obstacle. In 
most countries, telephony had long been the domain of state-owned monopolies and interest for 
development and change was limited. According to Ericsson, it was only when telecom industry was 
liberalized that mobile telephony could achieve a breakthrough (“Breakthrough for mobile,” 2018).  
 
Since the 1970s we went through three new generations of wireless technologies and the fifth 
generation will be available to the public soon. The first generation (1G) was not used to identify 
wireless technology until the second generation (2G) was released. From 1G to 2G was a major 
jump in the technology when the wireless networks went from analog to digital.  
 
Table 14 Overview of five generations of wireless technologies 
1G 2G 3G 4G 5G 
1977 1991 1998 2008 -/+ 2020 
Analog. First 
cellular phone 
system in Chicago 
licensed to Illinois 
Bell. Only simple 
phone calls 
possible. 
Digital. Simple text 
messaging 
possible. 
Faster data 
transfer speeds (at 
least 2 Megabits 
per second). Made 
the smartphone 
possible. 
Data transfers of 1 
Gigabit per 
second. 
Promises to be 
roughly 1,000 
times faster than 
what is available 
with a 4G 
connection. 
Source: Agar, 2013  
 
 
With new technologies 5G promises to be roughly 1,000 times faster than what is available with a 
4G connection – opening up complete new possibilities in transportation, medicine, manufacturing, 
and many other areas of life. The first tests are done with 5G but analysts expect that smartphones 
running on 5G will only have a noteworthy market share from about 2021 (Boden, 2018). 
 
6.3.2. Telecom market structure 
The mobile telecom market exists of network equipment vendors, mobile device vendors, mobile 
network operators, over the top (OTT) communication providers + content service providers, and 
retailers. Telecom equipment vendors build the telecom equipment for telecom operators. A 
mobile network operator, also known as a mobile network carrier, is a provider of wireless 
communications services that owns or controls all the elements necessary to sell and deliver 
services to an end user. This includes radio spectrum allocation, wireless network infrastructure, 
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back haul infrastructure, billing, customer care, provisioning computer systems and marketing and 
repair organizations. Figure 31 shows the various segments of the telecommunications industry and 
their share of revenues. 
 
Figure 31 Telecommunications industry value chain — 2015 share of revenues by segment 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Ernst &Young (2015), based on “All phone manufacturers” (2018). 
 
 
The data shows that by far most revenue is made by the operators and that telecom infrastructure 
vendors only earn a small share of the total revenue. This has not always been the case. 
 
In the early days of the building of the first mobile networks, telecom vendors made a fortune 
selling expensive infrastructure equipment to operators. However, those days are at an end. For 
example, Ericsson now runs with an operating margin of six to eight per cent (Nordstrom, 2015). 
The strongly decreased profit margin has three main reasons. Firstly, the mobile telecom 
infrastructure market has transformed from a fast-moving, high-growth emerging sector into an 
established mature market that delivers much lower returns. Thirty years ago we had no mobile 
subscriptions and no mobile networks: in 2017 we had 7.8 billion mobile subscriptions worldwide 
and networks that cover 95% of the world’s population (Ericsson Mobility Report, November 2017). 
Secondly, mobile networks became cheaper because of technology advances and international 
standardization (every node in the network not only costs just ten to twenty per cent of what it did 
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fifteen years ago, but can also handle hundred times more network traffic). Thirdly, price pressures 
from increasing competition with Chinese telecom equipment vendors (namely Huawei and ZTE). 
 
According to an analyst from a Dutch independent market research and consulting firm focused on 
the ICT industry, the rise of Huawei has driven a consolidation in the telecom industry (Bilderbeek, 
2015). Around the year 2000 there were about twenty large telecom companies worldwide active 
in the telecom equipment sector. Due to the aforementioned changes in the market, many telecom 
equipment vendors were outcompeted or bought up by more successful firms or moved to a niche 
sector. Marconi, Alcatel, Lucent, Siemens Communications, Nortel and Motorola no longer exist. 
Belkin, Avaya, Alcatel Lucent Enterprise (Huaxin), BenQ, Gigaset, Unify, Microsoft, Lenovo, 
Motorola Solutions, Sony and Mitel now compete in consumer and enterprise telecoms markets. 
Cisco focuses on enterprise networking. Currently there are only four telecom infrastructure 
companies left, namely: Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia Networks, and ZTE. These vendors today face a 
reality of declining volumes and intense price competition (Nordstrom, 2015).  
 
6.3.3. Telecom market in China 
Most Chinese consumers have leapfrogged to mobile telephony without having owned fixed-line 
telephones. By end-2015 there were about 1.3 billion mobile-phone subscribers in China compared 
with 231 million fixed-line subscribers, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (“China’s 
infrastructure leap” 2016, February 12). 
 
Prior to the 1980s, China was heavily dependent on foreign companies for telecommunications 
equipment, a core component was telephone exchange switches. In 1982, the Chinese government 
opened up the telecom equipment market by allowing joint ventures (JVs) between Chinese and 
foreign companies. Leading multinationals in the telecom industry set up JVs in China in order to 
circumvent import restrictions and agreed to transfer technology as a condition for access to the 
Chinese market (Nolan 2001: 795). Alcatel Shanghai Bell was founded in 1984 and in 1988 Beijing 
Nokia Mobile Telecommunications was founded. 
 
In 1985 a group of Chinese investors associated with China's Ministry of Aerospace Industry 
established the precursor of ZTE which was tasked to develop stored program control (SPC) 
technology – the most widely applied telecommunications technology for telephone exchanges 
that had just been introduced from abroad (Guo, 2005). In November 1989, the precursor of ZTE 
developed the ZX500, the first homegrown digital SPC exchange of China with independent 
intellectual property rights (Guo, 2005). In the meantime, Ren Zhengfei – a former deputy director 
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of the Engineering Corps of the People's Liberation Army – decided to use reverse engineering with 
local researchers in order to develop Chinese telephone exchange technology. Mr. Ren founded 
Huawei in 1987.  
 
In the 1990s, when 2G came about, the telecom business was booming in China, but there was still 
fierce competition in advanced technologies from international competitors. Figure 32 shows that 
Chinese firms did not play a significant role in developing 2G networks in China. 
 
Figure 32 Digital switching market share in China in 1994 
 
 
Source: Rehak & Wang (1996) 
 
Domestic firms received support from the Chinese government. The in 1998 established Ministry 
of Information Industry (since 2008 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
encouraged Chinese operators to purchase telecommunications equipment from Chinese 
manufacturers, notably from Huawei, ZTE, Datang and Great Dragon (Low, 2005). During the late 
1990s the market share of key domestic players strongly increased (Nolan 2001). Huawei, for 
example, had established a twenty per cent domestic market share in network switches (Nolan, 
2001: 795). 
 
Further, government assistance was available to help local manufacturers compete globally, driving 
research and development spending, in advance of the impending World Trade Organization (WTO) 
2002 timeline for removal of industry assistance. By the end of the 1990s both Huawei and ZTE 
started to look outward for projects. Huawei had its first “overseas” contract in Hong Kong in 1996 
and ZTE followed suit with a large overseas investment in Pakistan in 1998. In 1999 the Chinese 
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government initiated the Going Global strategy in order to actively promote Chinese investments 
abroad and ZTE formalized its internalization strategy in 2001.  
 
In 2008, the Chinese government restructured the telecom sector in China. China Unicom merged 
with China Netcom to form the new China Unicom and China Telecom purchased China Unicom's 
Code Division Multiple Access(CDMA)-network. The three remaining mobile telecom operators in 
China were all granted a 3G license based on a specific technology: China Telecom was granted a 
3G license based on CDMA2000, China Mobile on Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple 
Access (TD-SCDMA) and China Unicom on Wide Band Code Division Multiple Access(WCDMA). 
CDMA was 2G technology and all China Telecom needed to do was to upgrade its CDMA-network 
to a 3G CDMA2000 network. It managed to do so in just two months’ time. In March 2009, China 
Telecom had the world's largest CDMA-network built in the shortest time frame (“China Telecom: 
CDMA2000,” 2011, December 10). TD-SCDMA is a standard that was developed in China 
(encouraged by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology) with the main purpose to avoid or reduce the license fees that have to be paid to non-
Chinese patent owners. In 2000, TD-SCDMA was approved by ITU as one of the three 3G mobile 
communication standards. WCDMA is worldwide the most-commonly used member of the 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) family and sometimes used as a synonym 
for UMTS.  
 
The three Chinese telecom operators subsequently put out tenders for the upgrade of their 
networks. Huawei and ZTE benefited strongly from the upgrade to 3G in China. The Chinese 
government purposefully postponed the launch of the 3G network in China until the TD-SCDMA 
technology was ready; so that the Chinese telecom industry did not have to rely on expensive 
imported standards WCDMA (in the European Union (EU)) and CDMA2000 (in the U.S.) (Emiroglu, 
2015). See Figure 33 for an overview of the CDMA, TD-SCDMA and WCDMA market shares per 
telecom equipment vendor in China in 2009. 
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Figure 33 CDMA, TD-SCDMA and WCDMA market shares in China, 2009 
Source: Kong, 2009 
The left circle diagram in Figure 33 shows that Huawei and ZTE were by far the main beneficiaries 
of the upgrade of the CDMA networks in China. An explanation for this is that Huawei and ZTE 
already built 2G CDMA networks and could relatively easily upgrade their networks to the 3G 
CDMA2000 standard. It is not surprising that ZTE and Datang, the two state-owned companies 
established with the aim to develop Chinese telecom switching technology, had the largest share 
in TD-SCDMA networks. It is actually interesting that foreign firms like Nokia and Ericsson also got 
a share in the development of this network in China. The reason for this might be that Chinese 
Mobile created space on purpose for foreign companies to invest in TD-SCDMA technology in order 
to boost the importance of TD-SCDMA as an international standard. Patrick Donegan, senior analyst 
at Heavy Reading, explains that while TD-SCDMA was an unwelcome distraction from global 
standards from the perspective of foreign equipment vendors, they did not want to risk their 
positioning for WCDMA equipment contracts in the largest telecom market in the world (Donegan, 
2007).  
 
After 2009, ZTE and Huawei managed to take over market shares from Datang by promising free 
upgrades of China Mobile’s network when China mobile replaced Datang technology for ZTE or 
Huawei technology. Although the Datang networks were of good quality and did not need to be 
replaced by ZTE or Huawei technology, China Mobile could not turn down the offer of free upgrades 
of its network. ZTE and Huawei could make up their losses with these free of charge replacements 
with the revenues from other product lines such as global system for mobile communications 
(GSM), CDMA and WCDMA. Since TD-SCDMA is Datang’s only product line and therefore Datang 
could not afford to do free replacements (“ZTE says wins,” July 15, 2009).9 
                                                          
9  https://www.reuters.com/article/zte-chinamobile/update-1-zte-says-wins-34-pct-of-china-mobile-
network-deal-idUSPEK13005020090715 
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The experiences Huawei and ZTE gained from building the 3G network in China led to their global 
success. In 2012, Huawei surpassed Ericsson as the world’s largest telecom equipment vendor in 
terms of sales. And ZTE fulfilled its ambition to become the third largest telecom equipment vendor. 
 
Figure 34 Developments in the telecom infrastructure market in China in the period 1982-2012 
 
 
Source: created by author 
 
 
In 2013, China Mobile, the world largest telecom provider with more than 700 mobile subscribers, 
awarded the contracts for the upgrade of its networks to 4G. Huawei and ZTE each obtained about 
25 per cent of the contracts, while Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent and Nokia obtained a share of about ten 
per cent each (Yee, 2013). Huawei also won a chunk of Europe’s 4G contracts in 2012 (Yee, 2013). 
The contracts for 4G networks in the U.S. went largely to Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent. 
 
Huawei’s and ZTE’s expansion overseas has met criticism in the U.S. and Europe. In 2013 the 
European Commission threatened with trade sanction against China if the Chinese government 
would not stop with ‘illegal subsidies’ to ZTE and Huawei (together occupying almost a quarter of 
the European market in 2013) (Bilby, 2013). However, in October 2014 the EU dropped the anti-
subsidies case against the two Chinese telecoms companies because of too much division on the 
matter within the EU: leading European telecom companies such as Alcatel-Lucent, Nokia Solutions 
and Network (NSN) and Ericsson did not want a trade war with China; southern European 
companies were afraid of China’s threat to block European wine imports as a countermeasure; and 
individual member states made separate deals with China (Oliver, 2014). 
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Telecom operators in the U.S. stay away from Huawei and ZTE after a 2012 congressional report 
said their hardware could be used by the Chinese government for spying purposes (Moritz, Gurman 
& Shields, 2018). According to a spokesman from Huawei, ‘the only purpose of such a report is to 
impede competition and obstruct Chinese (telecom) companies from entering the U.S. market’ (in 
Wolf, 2012). However, U.S. carriers were still selling phones from the two Chinese suppliers for 
several years; until 2018, when six intelligence community chiefs advised American customers not 
to buy products from Huawei and ZTE for security reasons. An article in Bloomberg called the 
evidence against Huawei and ZTE ‘flimsy’ and argued that it is more about protectionism than about 
security (Bershidsky, 2018). Chris Smith from Boy Genius Report explains that the real reason why 
the U.S. government is so afraid of Huawei is that it fears that China will get widespread 5G coverage 
before the U.S. does (Smith, 2018). Smith (2018) argues that this will allow China to accelerate the 
development of specific 5G-reliant technologies, setting the standards and possibly displace Silicon 
Valley as the world’s innovation center.  
 
Meanwhile, Huawei has signed 25 MoUs with European and other global telecom operators to trial 
5G equipment; including agreements with Britain’s BT, Bell Canada (BCE), France’s Orange 
Germany’s Deutsche Telekom and global player Vodafone. 
 
6.3.4. Huawei 
Huawei was founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei, a former engineer in the People's Liberation Army. 
About thirty years later (in 2018) Huawei became the second largest smartphone manufacturer in 
the world. Huawei’s strategy was: “Using the countryside to surround the cities” (with reference to 
Mao). From 1992 to 1997 Huawei focused merely on China’s rural market. In 1997-2000 Huawei 
shifted its focus to China’s urban market. The orange line in Table 15 shows the period in which 
Huawei was focused on the Chinese market. Fu (2015) explains in his book “China’s path to 
innovation” that Huawei looked abroad for continued growth because while business was booming 
in China in the 1990s the competition in advanced technologies from advanced markets was fierce. 
The founder of Huawei (Mr. Ren) compared Huawei’s situation to that of a mountain goat that 
needed to run faster and climb higher in order to avoid being eaten by the lion. Mr. Ren concluded 
that Huawei needed to become a wolf; a metaphor he used for years and which the Public 
Relations(PR) Manager of Huawei West Africa refers to as well in my interview with him. First, in 
the period 2000-2004 (yellow) Huawei focused on the global emerging market and since 2004 it 
shifted its focus to the global developed market (green) (see Table 15). 
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Table 15 Huawei’s development as an MNE 
 
Source: developed by the author 
 
6.3.5. ZTE 
ZTE was initially founded as Zhongxing Semiconductor Co., Ltd in Shenzhen in 1985 as a JV involving 
mainly subsidiaries of the then-Ministry of Aerospace Industry. In March 1993, Zhongxing 
Semiconductor changed its name to Zhongxing New Telecommunications Equipment Co., Ltd (ZTE) 
and created a new business model as a "state-owned and private-operating" economic entity. ZTE 
is listed on both the Shenzhen (1997) and Hong Kong (2004) Stock Exchanges. 
By the end of the 1990s both Huawei and ZTE started to look outward for projects. Huawei had its 
first overseas contract in Hong Kong in 1996 and ZTE followed suit with a large overseas investment 
in Pakistan in 1998. In 1999 the Chinese government initiated the Going Global strategy in order to 
actively promote Chinese investments abroad and ZTE formalized its internalization strategy in 
2001. ZTE moved from the domestic market to Pakistan, via Russia, to Europe (Fu, 2015: 296). 
 
Table 16 ZTE’s development as an MNE 
 
Source: developed by the author 
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7. The role of institutional distance in the challenges and advantages 
for Chinese telecom vendors in Nigeria10 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The results of the quantitative analysis show that both Chinese and U.S. investments are directed 
to countries with a high level of IM; however only for U.S. investments is this relation significant. 
Some argue that this indicates that Chinese investors are indifferent regarding the rule of law in the 
host country (Chen et al., 2016). Chinese firms are generally regarded to be more successful in host 
markets with a low level of IM than advanced market firms for various reasons. From the literature 
review I identified four popular theories explaining the relatively attractiveness of host countries 
with a low level of IM for Chinese firms, namely: 
1. Their experience with operating in a difficult business environment at home give Chinese 
firms a competitive advantage over advanced market-firms in emerging markets; 
2. Chinese firms have a higher tolerance towards low levels of IM due to the active support 
they receive from the Chinese government; 
3. Due to their late-comer status, the products and services of Chinese firms are more in 
demand by less advanced markets than advanced markets; 
4. Due to their late-comer status, Chinese firms are more or less forced to invest in the more 
challenging markets that are still available. 
Quantitative studies are limited to proving or disproving a correlation between various factors and 
are not able to identify a causal relation, let alone the mechanism of the causal relation. In order to 
study the causal mechanism one needs to collect qualitative data and analyze the data using 
process tracing. Beach and Pedersen argue that if we theorize causal mechanisms as systems, ‘the 
theory needs to develop all of the important parts of the mechanism that link X with Y, with a clear 
causal explanation for what takes us from one part to another…’ (2016: 98). In line with this idea, I 
developed a preliminary causal mechanism based on the literature review that I tested by 
conducting a case study, namely the case of large Chinese telecom equipment vendors in Nigeria. 
                                                          
10 Prof. Dr. Wang Duanyong joined me on my field trip to Nigeria. I prepared the list of topics for the interviews 
myself and led the interviews. Prof. Dr. Wang helped me getting access to the Chinese managers and 
embassy, translated during the interviews in Chinese and took care of our safety. The Dutch Embassy and Mr. 
Buitelaar from Smile brought me in contact with the other interviewees. Mr. Chan Yann helped me 
transcribing and translating the interviews on my return to Bremen. 
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The results led to the rejection of three of the four hypotheses and a careful indication that the 
main reason for these Chinese firms to be relatively successful in Nigeria – despite the challenging 
business climate – is linked to the financial support they receive from Chinese financial institutions.  
In the remainder of this chapter I will shortly discuss the relevant literature and present the 
theoretical framework (See page 10 for a lengthy literature review); explain the research design 
and methods I used; and present and discuss the results; ending with the conclusion. 
 
7.2. Short literature review and theoretical framework 
For this short literature review I change the order in which I mention the hypotheses that are 
discussed in more detail in the Literature Review in order to be consistent with the causal 
mechanism that resulted from the literature review.   
Traditional FDI theory suggests that a successful multinational has some firm-specific (or 
ownership) advantages which allow it to overcome the costs of operating in a foreign country 
(Hymer, 1976). As mentioned in the Literature Review, Dunning (2001) noticed that the opening up 
of new markets led to a shift from exploiting the existing ownership specific advantages towards 
augmenting these advantages elsewhere. However, this idea seemed to only have received widely 
recognition since Child & Rodrigues (2005) emphasized the importance of the strategic-asset 
seeking motive for Chinese ODI. Again, Chinese investment behavior was set apart from the 
behavior of investors from other FDI source countries.  
Besides Child & Rodrigues (2005), Morck et al. (2008) also argue that Chinese firms developed a 
higher tolerance towards inefficient structures (which means a more difficult environment for doing 
business) due to their experience with operating in complex markets at home.  
The theories by Child & Rodrigues (2005) and Morck et al. (2008) result in the first hypothesis: 
1. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to their experience with operating in a 
similarly challenging business environment in their home country (see Figure 5). 
From the study of the internationalization process of U.S. firms during the post-war period and 
Swedish firms in the 1970s the idea of internalization as an incremental progressive process derived 
(e.g. Johanson & Vahne (1977); Vernon (1966)). The main assumption behind the tendency of firms 
to internationalize gradually is that firms try to keep risk-taking at a low level. General FDI theory 
predicts that when the risk in a host country goes up, investment goes down.  
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As explained in the Literature Review, the logical explanation is that risks involve costs and firms 
choose locations for their activities that minimize the overall costs of their operations (Buckley & 
Casson 1976). Not in support with this general theory, Buckley et al. (2007) find that when the risk 
goes down in a host country, Chinese investment goes down. Buckley et al. (2007) argue that the 
support from the Chinese government could be seen as a special ownership advantage of Chinese 
firms operating in other emerging economies. This results in the second hypothesis:  
2. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to the support they receive from the Chinese 
government (see Figure 4). 
As explained above, according to traditional FDI theories it is not common for a firm to invest in a 
high risk host country far away from its own region. This goes against the basic assumptions that 
firms avoid risk and internationalize gradually, starting with host countries that are geographically 
and culturally close (posing the least risk). However, from the perspective of emerging market 
investors, other emerging markets (that are often regarded to be high risk environments for 
advanced market firms) could be attractive as stepping stones towards investing in more advanced 
markets. This would mean that emerging market firms also internationalize incrementally, starting 
with investing in more similar emerging markets and slowly moving towards more advanced 
markets. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
3. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to their late-comer position (see Figure 1). 
Furthermore, since emerging market firms are late-comers on the global market the chance is high 
that the most popular host countries (in terms of low risks and high profits) are already saturated; 
leaving the more challenging markets available for emerging market firms. Based on traditional 
outward FDI theory, it is likely that emerging firms can expect few competitors from advanced 
market firms in these challenging host markets. 
This leads to the fourth and last hypothesis: 
4. Chinese firms are more attracted to – and successful in – (risky) emerging markets than 
their competitors from advanced markets due to the relatively little competition from 
advanced market firms in such markets (see Figure 2).  
These hypotheses have been translated into the preliminary causal mechanism presented in Figure 
7. The next section discusses the methods used for this study and explains how the causal 
mechanism is used for the analysis.  
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7.3. Research design and methods 
The main research question in this qualitative strand is: 
How does the institutional and political situation in China influence the location choice of Chinese 
telecom firms for – and their success in– high-risk markets in Africa? 
In order to answer this question, a single case study is adopted and process tracing is the selected 
method for the qualitative analysis. Collier argues that ‘process tracing is a fundamental tool of 
qualitative analysis’ that can contribute decisively to evaluating causal claims (2011: 823). As 
explained in the Methods Chapter, process-tracing involves a mechanistic understanding of 
causality. It is the search for intervening variables that link an independent variable with a 
dependent variable, commonly referred to as the causal mechanism. Beach and Pedersen (2013) 
identify three types of process-tracing, namely: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining 
outcome process tracing. Theory-testing process-tracing is used when it is possible to theorize a 
mechanism linking a cause or causes with an outcome; as is the case in this study.  
In my study I test a theorized causal mechanism by carefully studying the case of two Chinese 
multinationals investing in a high-risk host country in Africa, namely: Huawei and ZTE in Nigeria. 
Huawei and ZTE share many similarities: they offer the same services and products (handsets and 
telecom infrastructure equipment), were founded in the 1980s, entered the Nigerian market 
around the millennium and are both large Chinese firms with strong connections with the Chinese 
government. However, do they also share the same challenges and advantages when operating in 
Nigeria? And are these linked to their shared home country conditions? 
The data were collected using face-to-face interviews, observation techniques and public company 
documents like for example annual reports. I started with interviewing senior managers of ZTE at 
their HQ in Shenzhen. These interviews provided valuable information about the motives of ZTE for 
investing in Africa and their internationalization strategies. Unfortunately, I was not allowed to 
quote from these interviews, and therefore I needed to find other sources of evidence. However, 
these interviews in Shenzhen in August 2015 were very useful for my case selection and the 
preparations for my fieldwork. It also made me more careful about relying on interviews as my main 
source of information and I included more observations and online document analyses.  
In order to get a full picture of the main challenges and advantages for Chinese firms in Nigeria, I 
did not only interview senior managers from both multinationals, but also important partners and 
competitors from these Chinese firms. Appendix 1 shows the full list of the organizations, functions 
and locations of the interviewees. Access to these persons was provided via my connections in 
China and Africa. To support the semi-structured interviews I used an interview guide. The Methods 
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chapter (starting from page 35) further explains the process of how the topics on my interview 
guide were translated into potential observable manifestations and empirical fingerprints of the 
causal conditions identified in the literature.   
According to the Bayes' theorem – on which process tracing is build – new empirical evidence 
updates our belief in the validity of the hypothesis. It can either increase or decrease our belief in 
the hypothesis based contingent upon: 1) our prior confidence based on existing research, 2) the 
theoretical weight of the evidence in relation to the hypothesis, and 3) the amount of trust we can 
place in the evidence being accurate (Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 178). The levels of prior confidence, 
uniqueness, accuracy and theoretical certainty are explained per empirical fingerprint in the next 
section. Every sub-paragraph in the results section starts with a causal mechanism showing the 
levels of prior confidence, uniqueness, accuracy and theoretical certainty for each selected 
empirical finger print per theory.  
The causal mechanisms look slightly different from the preliminary one I presented after the 
literature review, because I refined my understanding of the causal relations during the process of 
determining the levels of prior confidence, certainty, uniqueness and accuracy (see method chapter 
starting from page 35). Figure 13 shows the final list of the expected empirical fingerprints. 
 
7.4. Results and discussion 
7.4.1. The political and institutional contexts in China and Nigeria 
Before we can ask ourselves the question ‘if X causes Y, what do we expect to observe?’ we need 
to find out whether X and Y are true, or merely assumptions. Let us first have a look at X.  
As stated in the literature review, the high level of PS and low level of IM in China are rather 
assumed than measured. Do these assumptions hold when measured? Similar to the quantitative 
study, I use “government stability” from the ICRG to measure the level of PS for the period 2003-
2011. With an average score of 10.6 China ranked 9 out of 140 countries. This means that China 
was indeed within the 25 per cent highest ranking countries in terms of PS.  
Government stability from ICRG focuses on the narrow definition of PS and includes: government 
unity, legislative strength, and popular support. In contrast, the “political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism” indicator from the WGI measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including human rights. Human rights are 
measured by using data from Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department and Human Rights 
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Watch. It will not be surprising that China scores much lower on “political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism” than on “government stability”, merely due to its very low ranking in human 
rights. According to the WGI China ranked 152 out of 215 countries and territories. However, since 
human rights are not seen as a risk for doing business – unfortunately rather the opposite – I do 
not take them into account in measuring the level of PS. A report from Human Rights Watch states 
for example: ‘In countries characterized by severe human rights violations, like Nigeria, 
corporations often justify their presence by arguing that their operations will enhance respect for 
rights, but then adopt no substantive measures to achieve that end’ (1999: 3) 
Therefore I classify China indeed as a country with a high level of PS. 
Similar to the quantitative study, I use the “rule of law” indicator from the WGI to measure the level 
of IM for the period 2003-2011. China ranked 123 out of 214 countries in terms of IM. That means 
that China was among the 50 per cent lowest ranking countries in terms of IM, but not in the 25 
per cent lowest ranking countries. However, China ranked much lower than all Western European 
countries and the U.S.; which all ranked above 40. In other words, according to the threshold I set, 
China was not a very low ranking country in IM. However, compared to its Western counterparts, 
it is. 
 
 
 
Nigeria ranked 96 in government stability in the dataset of the ICRG with an average score of 7.7. 
This means that Nigeria was among the fifty per cent lowest ranking countries in terms of 
government stability, but not in the 25 per cent lowest ranking countries. In other words, according 
to the threshold I set, Nigeria was not a very low ranking country in PS. According to the WGI Nigeria 
ranked 209 and is therefore within the 25 per cent lowest ranking countries in terms of “Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism”. The lower scores for Nigeria in the WGI dataset are 
caused by very low scores on human rights and low scores on security risks. Since security threats 
is an important indicator for doing business, I classify Nigeria indeed as a country with a low level 
of PS based on the analysis of both the ICRG and WGI databases.  
According to the rule of law indicator of the WGI Nigeria ranked 195 out of 214 countries. That 
means that Nigeria was indeed among the 25 per cent lowest ranking countries in terms of IM. 
To conclude: X = relatively low level of IM and high level of PS in China. 
 
  
 
107 
Although there is no accurate source on the market shares of Chinese and Western firms in the 
various economic sectors in Nigeria, it is clear that the success of Chinese firms differ much per 
economic sector. The oil production in Nigeria is for example mainly in the hands of six U.S. and 
European multinationals in JVs with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), namely: 
Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Total, Agip, and Texaco. However, Chinese firms are big in the oil and gas 
infrastructure in Nigeria, but also in railways, road construction and telecom infrastructure. The 
Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE together captured the majority of the telecom infrastructure market 
since they first arrived in Nigeria about two decades ago. What role does the institutional distance 
play in the success of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria? 
 
 
The next sub-sections provide an analysis of the suggested four paths in the causal mechanism 
based on the four hypotheses derived from the literature, namely: 1) disadvantages become 
advantages, 2) late-comer position, 3) government support, and 4) not much competition from 
advanced market firms.  
7.4.2. Disadvantages become advantages 
Prof. Wang’s suitcase gets checked thoroughly upon arrival at Lagos airport. I can just pass the 
security without my suitcase being checked. When the security is done with my friend’s luggage, 
Prof. Wang tells me that this is a standard procedure for Chinese travelers in Africa and that he is 
used to it. ‘You know, we Chinese always carry a lot of cash with us and the security knows that. 
Plus we Chinese we do not want to make any trouble. So if a security officer asks for money, Chinese 
travelers usually give money in order to avoid a scene. They know that and therefore they always 
pick us.’ I asked him if he gave the security guard some money. ‘No of course not, I have travelled to 
many African countries before and I know what is going on.’ 
What is it about “having experience with operating in challenging institutional conditions in China” 
that can cause Chinese firms to be more successful in host countries with challenging institutional 
conditions and low PS than their Western competitors? A popular thesis found in the literature on 
the use of informal contracts states that: when formal institutions fail, personal relations become 
more important (Birkenbach & Liu, 2012; Tamilina & Tamilina, 2012). “Failing institutions” in China 
and Nigeria are observed as (relatively) low levels of rule of law. Morck et al. (2008) argue that the 
discomfort of many Chinese executives with contractual arrangements may be an understandable 
response to judicial inefficiency in China, where free market institutions remain a work-in-progress. 
Morck et al. explain that Chinese firms’ expertise in managing complex markets at home actually 
To conclude: Y = Chinese (telecom) infrastructure firms benefit from the lows level of IM 
and PS in Nigeria and are taking over successfully from Western firms in Nigeria. 
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make them more capable than their Western counterparts ‘of dealing with burdensome regulations 
and navigating around the opaque political constraints’ in host countries with a weak rule of law 
(2008: 346). In this section I explore the existence of the empirical fingerprints that I expect to find 
if this thesis holds, namely: 
1. China is in 25% lowest ranking countries with regards to enforcing contracts. 
2. Senior managers of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms state that they rely more on informal contracts than 
on formal contracts in less-advanced markets. 
3. Local business persons state that informal contracts are more important than formal contracts in Nigeria. 
 
Figure 35 Causal mechanism highlighting the role of disadvantages that become advantages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 1: China belongs to the 25 per cent lowest ranking countries in terms 
of enforcing contracts. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high: China has a relatively low level of rule of 
law. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is relatively high; meaning that I will 
significantly downgrade my confidence in the hypothesis if I do not find this evidence. 
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The uniqueness of this evidence is high too. If I find that China is indeed ranking very low in terms 
of enforcing contracts, then this confirms that China has no credible legal system and that the use 
of formal contracts is difficult in China. 
The accuracy of the data is medium. I am using the Ease of Doing Business Ranking from the World 
Bank. The yearly Ease of Doing Business report from the World Bank has a long record of being 
reliable. However, the recent statement from the World Bank's chief economist, Paul Romer, 
regarding unfair and misleading methodological adjustments made a major dent in the image of 
the World Bank’s report and the trustworthiness of its methodology (Woody, 2018).11 In order to 
make it right, Mr. Romer has announced to recalculate the national rankings of business 
competitiveness going back to at least four years. The last major changes in the methodology and 
parameters of the EoDB rankings were done under the watch of Romer’s predecessor Kaushik Basu. 
Mr. Basu was World Bank’s chief economist from 2012-2016. In order to be safe I look at the ranking 
of China in 2007 (the earliest available EoDB ranking for “enforcing contracts) and 2011 (the last 
ranking before Mr. Basu became the Chief Economist of the World Bank).    
 
In 2007, China ranked 63 out of 175 economies in terms of enforcing contracts and in 2011 China 
climbed up to rank fifteen out of 183 economies. This means that in 2007, China belonged to the 
fifty per cent high ranking economies in terms of enforcing contracts and in 2011 it belonged even 
to the 25 per cent highest ranking economies.  
 
 
Since the theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence was high, it would make sense to reject the 
hypothesis that Chinese firms have an advantage over Western firms in host countries with a low 
level of IM due to their experience with using personal relations instead of formal contracts. 
However, the data shows that China has improved much in terms of enforcing contracts from 2007 
and 2011 – a period of just four years. It is therefore plausible that China ranked much lower in 
terms of enforcing contracts during the period from when Huawei and ZTE were established (1987 
and 1985) until when they first entered the Nigerian market (1999-2002). The EoDB does not 
provide data for this period, but the importance of guanxi– the system of social networks and 
influential relationships which facilitate business and other dealings – in Chinese business culture 
                                                          
11  http://www.businessinsider.de/world-bank-says-it-unfairly-influenced-business-rankings-and-will-redo-
2018-1?r=US&IR=T. 
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 1.  
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could be attesting for this historical low level of enforcing contracts in China. Therefore, I will 
continue exploring evidence for the preference of Chinese managers for informal contracts over 
formal contracts and the necessity of using informal contracts in Nigeria. 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
After passing two speed bumps, heavily armed security guards and a tanker – which belong to the 
neighboring U.S. Consulate – we arrive at the gate of the Netherlands Trade and Investment Office 
in Lagos. A security guard checks our passports and makes a phone call to check if we are indeed 
expected. We now enter what looks like the garden of a desolated villa and pass an empty swimming 
pool on our way to a newly build extension of the main house. A local receptionist appoints us a 
table in the middle of the room before she calls Mr. Westerhuis – the Senior Economic Advisor. Mr. 
Westerhuis is interested in our research and immediately starts talking after a short introduction 
round: 
Doing business in Nigeria is often like the ‘Wild West’ of America back in those days: it offers 
opportunities, but it is also a fighting market. This also counts for the telecom market. Everything is 
negotiable. And it is all about your networks. All the big companies here have influential people in 
their boards. And when you think of it, this is actually not so different from the Netherlands, China or 
whatever country. But in the Netherlands or China it would not be called corruption, but lobbying 
capacity. 
 
Empirical fingerprint 2: Senior managers of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms state that 
they rely more on informal contracts than on formal contracts in Nigeria. 
 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium: much has been written about the 
importance of guanxi in Chinese business culture (see for example Wong & Chan, 1999). However, 
so far the use of guanxi by Chinese firms in Nigeria has not been studied. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is relatively high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. If  
The accuracy of the data is low. I rely on self-report. 
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The PR Manager of Huawei in West Africa believes that guanxi relationships are important in every 
country. ‘Even in Europe’ [smiles]. He does not believe that the success of Chinese firms in 
challenging African markets has anything to do with Chinese firms’ expertise in networking.    
However, personal networks have been repeatedly mentioned in the interviews I had with senior 
Chinese managers in Nigeria as an important factor for the success of Chinese firms in Nigeria – 
although not in the form of replacing formal contracts. It has more to do with good connections 
within the Chinese community in Nigeria. For example, Mr. Hu Jiego – one of the most promising 
Chinese business persons in Nigeria– explains that the success of the Chinese textile firms in Nigeria 
can be explained by the fact that they are very well organized via a textile association (personal 
communication, 11 January, 2016). Mr. Shonibare, the MD Investment Banking, United Capital Plc 
in Lagos – a leading African investment banking and financial services group – also noticed that 
Chinese investors do not make use of their services but instead ‘come in via Chinese firms’ (personal 
communication, 8 January, 2016). 
These observations during my visit of a Chinese hostel in Lagos illustrate the close personal 
connections among Chinese workers in Nigeria: 
Late in the afternoon on January 5, we are picked up by “George” and his Nigerian driver. George is 
one of Prof. Wang’s teaching colleagues in Lagos. They met about one and a half year earlier at the 
training program for the teachers of the Confucius Institute in China. George and his colleagues live 
in a Chinese guesthouse in Lagos and the moment they heard that their friend Prof. Wang is in Lagos 
they invited us over for dinner at the guesthouse. When we arrive at the guesthouse a Nigerian 
security guard checks who is in the car and then opens the security gate for us. We follow George 
upstairs where we enter a common room with a large TV corner, a large round table and a bar with 
behind it an entrance to the kitchen. The table is set for eight persons and the one delicious Chinese 
dish after the other is brought in from the kitchen by a Nigerian girl. Busy sounds come from the 
kitchen and I see about two Nigerian and two Chinese men in the kitchen. The owner of the 
guesthouse – a Chinese lady who lives in Nigeria since 1989 – invites us to sit on the large couch in 
the TV corner and gives us a paper cup with tea. She is very eager to hear what we are doing in 
Lagos and to share her life story with us. It is not clear to me who is related to the woman in terms 
of family and who is working at the guesthouse. Everyone refers to her as “aunt” and to each other 
as “friend” or “older brother”. When we are sitting around the table and everyone introduces himself 
it becomes clear to me that all the men around the table are in Lagos for work. The teachers live in 
the guesthouse during their four year stay in Nigeria and many Chinese managers who come to 
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Nigeria for a shorter period of time (about 2 months) stay in the guesthouse too. One of the teachers 
cooked the fish. They all agree that he is a great cook. They cook, eat and play (cards, computer 
games, etc.) together, creating a “home” far away from China. 
During an interview with a senior manager of ZTE in Abuja the manager explains: ‘There is a large 
Chinese community in Nigeria and we support each other. You can see how many Chinese are here 
during the basketball and football tournaments we organize in Abuja; employees from many 
different Chinese companies play together’ (personal communication, 12 January, 2016). ZTE 
cooperates closely with the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) providing 
information and communications system equipment for its railways. The ZTE manager explains that 
about 30 years ago the German company Julius Berger did most of the infrastructure in Nigeria, but 
that nowadays CCECC took over the leading position. Their strong network among Chinese firms in 
Nigeria could be part of their success story.  
A few days after our meeting with the manager of ZTE in Abuja we meet two Chinese engineers 
from CCECC in the swimming pool of a five-star hotel in Abuja. Like us, they were taking a break and 
looked for a way to escape the heat – it is close to forty degrees Celsius in Abuja these days. They 
approach my friend Prof. Wang and soon have a lively conversation in the pool about their work, 
our research and life in Abuja. At the end of the afternoon we exchange numbers and they invite us 
for the next day to have dinner at their home. The two engineers live together with their boss and 
another employee in a villa in a quiet area just outside the city.  
This is in great contrast with the life of Mr. Buitelaar – a Dutch expat who is the MD of Smile in 
Nigeria – a small specialized South African telecom company that is a customer of Ericsson, Huawei 
and ZTE. Mr. Buitelaar lives alone in a spacious apartment along the river in a chic neighborhood 
just outside Lagos. He spends his time by –among other things – bargaining at the local markets, 
going out for dinner in restaurants and playing tennis looking for social interaction with the locals. 
He has Nigerian and international friends, but does not meet up regularly with other Dutch expats 
in Nigeria. It seems to be a Dutch trait to prefer to explore a new environment yourself rather than 
to learn from the experiences and make use of the networks fellow countrymen have built up 
already. I am happy that Mr. Buitelaar makes an exception for me and shows me the out and about 
in Lagos and introduces me to the MD of Ericsson.  
There is something to be said for both strategies. On the one hand, Chinese expats are not likely to 
make the same mistakes as their fellow countrymen who arrived first and they can quickly immerge 
in the life of the new country. However, it could also be argued that their circle stays quite limited, 
while Dutch expats are not constricted by ready-made networks and can end up with a much more 
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varied local network. All in all it seems that Mr. Westerhuis and the PR manager of Huawei are right: 
personal networks are important everywhere and for everyone and all business persons engage in 
networking. However, some are better in networking than others and some have extraordinary 
networking skills... Meet Mr. Hu Jieguo: 
Mr. Hu Jieguo postponed a few meetings in Lagos and flew straight to Abuja from Canada – where 
he visited his son– in order to be able to meet with us. Mr. Hu came to our hotel to pick us up and 
bring us to his hotel where he invited us for a dinner. He wears a bright orange T-shirt; no sign of 
fatigue. Mr. Hu studied hotel management in Canada, but his hospitality seems to come naturally. 
He is the Chairman of the West Africa Golden Gate Group with two hotels in Nigeria, two hotels in 
Liberia and one hotel in Ghana. The hotels are a success and presidents and government officials 
from various countries have lived in his hotels. Although the hotels are its main business, the Golden 
Gate Group is also involved in real estate, construction, production of construction materials, 
machinery and international trade. Mr. Hu is also the Deputy Director of the China-Africa Business 
Council. He sees hotels as a good and natural place to start communication between different 
cultures in order to reach a better understanding. The hotels are clearly only the starting point of 
his bridging project: on the back of his bright orange T-shirt is written “Press”. Mr. Hu also publishes 
a newspaper in Chinese English and French. 
Mr. Hu is an extraordinarily good networker and proudly tells us about his good relations with high 
officials in Nigeria and that he even has a direct communication line with the President of Nigeria 
since his been officially appointment Chief of the area he lives. He tells us how one day he was driven 
home from a dinner at his Golden Gate Hotel in Lagos by the Deputy-Inspector General of the police 
(he explains that in China this would be equivalent to the Deputy Minister of Police) – a good friend 
of his. His friend drove, and Mr. Hu was sitting next to him. When they were stopped by a police 
road block a police officer looked at both their faces and asked something. When his friend 
answered, the young policemen said shortly: ‘No, I want to speak to the Master.’ Mr. Hu said 
immediately: ‘No, no he is the Master.’ His friend was not amused and asked the police officer to 
show him his batch number. ‘Tomorrow you will leave to a border post!’ Mr. Hu could not stop 
laughing. Even when he tells me the story now he laughs out loud (personal communication, 11 
January, 2016). 
 
Of course, it is helpful that you know the Deputy-Inspector General of the police of Nigeria when 
you arrive at a road block right after a party. However, it is not necessarily typical for Nigeria. For 
example, a good friend of mine from a rich city in Germany told me that the head of police who 
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lives in his area arranged that there are no alcohol-controls between the city center and the area 
he and his rich friends live. Connections are important everywhere. 
 
 
 
 
To conclude: I reject the hypothesis that having experience with operating in challenging 
institutional conditions in China is giving Chinese telecom firms an advantage in Nigeria compared 
to their Western counterparts in terms of adaptation to the use of informal contracts. 
Figure 36 Evidence hypothesis 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.3. Late-comer position 
The Chinese cultural counselor in Abuja invited my friend Prof. Wang and me for a hot pot dinner in 
the Golden Gate hotel in Abuja. During our dinner he tells us about his experience with Nigerian 
pottery artists: 
At a meeting with Nigerian pottery artists in Abuja, I showed them a ppt about 8.000 year old 
pottery from China. After the presentation the Nigerian artists asked me: Who influenced you? 
Who taught you that? Did the Europeans teach you that? Then they asked if they could do 
business by sending Nigerian clay to China. Some Nigerian artists – who had been to China – 
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To conclude, I found disconfirming – although not strong (since I rely on self-report) 
– evidence for the second empirical fingerprint. Therefore, I will not continue with 
exploring the third proposed empirical fingerprint. 
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explained their colleagues that China has good clay and does not need Nigerian clay (personal 
communication, 11 January, 2016).  
Chinese investors are considered to be late-comers on the African continent. They have been 
preceded by Arab, European and American traders, conquerors and investors. Relatively little is 
known about China in the former European colonies and the Chinese government puts much effort 
in building a positive image of China on the African continent.  
While being a late-comer on the market is usually perceived to be a disadvantage, it could also be 
an advantage for Chinese firms in Africa as suggested by Morck et al. (2008). What is it about 
“internationalizing later than their Western competitors” that can cause Chinese firms to be more 
successful than their Western competitors in host countries with challenging institutional 
conditions and low PS? 
“Internationalizing later” can be defined in two different ways. Firstly, we could look at the time in 
between when the firm was established until it first started to invest abroad. Secondly, we could 
look at the time between the moments when the Western competitors of Chinese firms started to 
invest abroad and when the Chinese firms started to invest abroad. When we focus on the first 
definition, Chinese firms actually internationalized much quicker than most of their Western 
competitors. This was due to – among other things – the opportunity they had to learn from 
Western firms that invested in China because of supportive policies from the Chinese government 
(Nakai & Tanaka, 2010) – also referred to as the springboard theory (Luo & Tung, 2007). However, 
compared to their Western competitors, Chinese firms are still fairly new on the international 
market; and might make other choices because of that. In other words, the late-comer position of 
Chinese firms is expected to be observed by a large difference in years between when Chinese firms 
and their Western competitors entered the international market.  
In this section I explore the existence of the empirical fingerprints that I expect to find if the thesis 
holds that Chinese firms are more successful in Nigeria than their Western competitors because of 
reasons that are linked to the late-comer position of Chinese firms. These fingerprints include: 
1. There are at least ten years between when Ericsson internationalized and the moment Chinese firms 
internationalized. 
2. A) Chinese firms use less advanced technology than Ericsson. 
  B) Chinese firms use less advanced management systems than their Western competitors. 
6. Customers from telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria declare that Chinese firms are most often cheaper than 
Ericsson in tenders. 
7.   Customers from telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria state that they prefer Chinese firms due to their low  
costs. 
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9. The market shares of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms are relatively low in the U.S. and Europe. 
10. Chinese firms’ official internationalization strategy is to target less-advanced markets. 
11. Hardly any new tenders for telecom infrastructure projects in advanced markets since Chinese firms started to 
invest abroad. 
Figure 37 Causal mechanism highlighting the role of the late-comer position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 4: There are at least ten years between when Ericsson internationalized 
and the moments when Huawei and ZTE internationalized. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high: Much has been written about the 
latecomer position of ZTE and Huawei (see for example Fan (2011)). 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
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The uniqueness of this evidence is high: If I find that ZTE and Huawei started internationalizing ten 
or more than ten years after Ericsson, then ZTE and Huawei are indeed latecomers on the 
international market.  
The accuracy of the data is high: the data is retrieved from the company websites and can easily be 
verified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Hu – a successful Chinese business man in Nigeria – remembers how the Nigerian president kept 
asking him: ‘Please make sure your fellow countrymen stop flooding us with these cheap products.’ 
Until one day when the President said it again during an important meeting with many more people 
around the table and Mr. Hu decided to reply to him: ‘When I studied in Canada my dad gave me 
some money every now and then if he was happy with my results. Then I went to a restaurant and 
ordered a steak. The other days I ate hamburgers. [Pause] In China it is the same: we have steak 
and hamburgers, you can choose.’ The President laughed and said: ‘You nasty man.’ Since that time 
nobody asked him again about cheap Chinese products in Nigeria (personal communication, 11 
January, 2016). 
Empirical fingerprint 5A: ZTE and Huawei are using less advanced technology than Ericsson. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium: the quality of Chinese products is 
under much scrutiny globally. While some praise the quality of products from Huawei and ZTE 
(Gibbs, 2018; Rutnik, 2018; Segan, 2018) others criticize it. 
Ericsson opened its first sales office in the U.S. as early as 1902 (Ericsson, 2018).   
Huawei’s internationalization process started in 1996 that resulted in its first overseas 
office in Russia in 1997 (a JV) (Wu & Zhao, 2007). 
ZTE established its first overseas office in Islamabad (Pakistan) in 1998 (ZTE, 2012). 
 
To conclude, I found confirming evidence for the fourth empirical fingerprint. 
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The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is low: When I find that the quality of the 
technology of Huawei and ZTE is currently similar to or better than the technology of Ericsson I 
would need to verify if that is the case because the technology of Huawei and ZTE recently improved 
or if it has been similar to the technology of Ericsson from the moment they started to operate 
abroad.   
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. 
The accuracy of the data is medium: I use interview data that I triangulate with newspaper articles 
and other public sources.  
 
The Chief Technology Officer (CTO) from Smile in Nigeria told us that there are no differences in the 
quality of the technology of these three companies. ‘Technology-wise almost everyone is at the 
same level. Today I might be ahead, the other day… It’s like a race’ (personal communication, 
January 6, 2016). ‘Looking at the products coming from Huawei now, for instance, they are equal 
or better and they even have products which Ericsson does not have today’ (personal 
communication, 6 January, 2016). The MD of Ericsson in Lagos did also not claim that Ericsson offers 
better quality than Huawei and ZTE. When we asked him about the advantages of Ericsson in Nigeria 
compared to Huawei and ZTE he rather referred to an image of quality based on past success: ‘I 
think the brand name of Ericsson still resonates with quality’ (personal communication, 8 January, 
2016). Counterpoint Research analyst Peter Richardson even goes so far to state that: ‘Huawei is 
the biggest driver of the standards of 4G and 5G’ (in Wang, 2017).  
 
 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 5B: ZTE and Huawei are using less advanced management systems than 
Ericsson. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium: Child & Rodrigues (2005) point to 
studies that conclude that developing country multinationals generally suffer from significant 
competitive disadvantages compared to MNEs from advanced markets in terms of outdated 
To conclude, currently, Huawei and ZTE offer similar or better – rather than lower - quality 
products than their competitor Ericsson.  
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 5A. 
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technology and heavy reliance on expatriates caused by underdeveloped personalized 
management systems. Furthermore, they argue that the distinctive Chinese styles of management 
could prove to be a handicap for the management of overseas affiliates (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). 
However does this also (and still) count for Huawei and ZTE? 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is low: When I find that the level of 
management at Huawei and ZTE is currently similar to the level of management at Ericsson I would 
need to verify if that is the case because the level of management at Huawei and ZTE recently 
improved or if it has been similar to the management level at Ericsson from the moment they 
started to operate abroad.   
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. 
The accuracy of the data is medium: I use interview data that I triangulate with newspaper articles 
and other public sources.  
 
Kevin, the PR manager at Huawei West Africa, tells us that Huawei is still trying to improve itself 
compared with most of the Western companies. ‘We are learning from IBM, the giant company in 
the industry’ (PR manager at Huawei West Africa, personal communication, 6 January, 2016). 
In an interview with Xinhua News Agency, Mr. Ren Zhengfei – the founder and chief executive 
officer of Huawei – spoke about the inexperience of Huawei when it just started to invest abroad: 
When we started venturing into overseas markets, we knew nothing and had no idea of what 
project delivery was. We asked engineering consultants all around the world to help us. The 
first step was to study conscientiously so as to graduate toward a standardized management 
structure (“Huawei boss shares,” 2016). 
Since 1997, Huawei hired leading consultancies such as IBM, the Hay Group, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and the German Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (FhG) to improve its 
management systems in order to comply with international standards (Huawei, 2014; Zhang & 
Pierre, 2014). In 1997, the company introduced a new hiring and salary system from HAY Group, 
improved its accounting system and budget system with help from PwC and started improving their 
production quality and efficiency and automate the logistics system with support from FhG 
(Huawei, 2014; Zhang & Pierre, 2014). From 1998-2003, Huawei introduced and customized an 
integrated product development system and an integrated supply chain with support from IBM 
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(Huawei, 2014; Zhang & Pierre, 2014). In 2007, the company applied customer relationship 
management from Accenture (Zhang & Pierre, 2014).  
Zhang and Pierre (2014) argue that Huawei actively improved its management systems in order to 
comply with the requirements of some top international network operators (e.g. British Telecom 
and Vodafone Group) in order to achieve contracts with big international clients. These efforts have 
been rewarded: in 2005, Huawei signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Telefónica, became 
an equipment supplier of British Telecom, signed a global procurement framework agreement with 
Vodafone Group and became the preferred telecommunications equipment supplier for the 
Vodafone Group’s global supply chain (Larçon, 2009; Zhang & Pierre, 2014).  
In 2003, ZTE also signed agreements with Accenture and IBM with the aim to improve its 
management systems to support ZTE’s internationalization process (ZTE, 2003a; ZTE, 2003b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 6: Customers from telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria declare that 
Chinese firms are most often cheaper than Ericsson in tenders. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. 
The accuracy of the data is low: I am relying on information that was given to me during interviews.  
Huawei started improving its management systems with the help of leading U.S. and U.K. 
consultancies before it started to operate in Nigeria in 1999. However, at that time it was 
not at the same level of Ericsson yet. Huawei’s management systems officially met the 
standards of leading international carriers since 2005. ZTE has invested in its management 
systems later; however, ZTE seems to have quickly caught up with Huawei since it became 
the global asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) supplier for France Telecom (now 
Orange) in 2005 (ZTE, 2005). 
To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 5B. 
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The CTO of Smile Nigeria told us during an interview:  
It is all a price game at the end of the day. What happens typically in the market… You 
will find very few operators who have used the Chinese vendors as their first vendor. 
Generally people tend to use Ericsson, or Nokia or Alcatel-Lucent as the first party. Then 
the Chinese are getting in as a second vendor. When the things get commoditized, 
when the operator has settled down, then he is just multiplying his network. In that 
stage, these guys [Chinese firms] come in at much lower prices, because at that stage 
the risk is much less. The initial risk is higher. When we were setting up our network, 
we had three vendors in the race. Now finally, for various reasons – of which price was 
a major one – we did not take Huawei finally. Alcatel-Lucent and Ericsson won the race. 
Even on price (personal communication, January 6, 2016). 
A senior manager of MTN – the largest telecom operator in Nigeria – confirms that there are no 
quality or price differences between Ericsson, ZTE and Huawei. He argues that the advantages of 
working with Chinese firms are that they are more flexible than the traditional telecom vendors: 
they are more willing to adapt to timelines, open to various approaches to revenue and willing to 
walk the extra mile. ‘Although, the bigger they get – Huawei already took over from Ericsson – the 
more difficult it gets to negotiate with them’ (senior manager MTN, personal communication, 8 
January, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 9: The market shares of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms are 
relatively low in the U.S. and Europe. 
 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium: The European Commission 
threatened to ban ZTE and Huawei in 2013; however, in 2014 they had to drop the anti-subsidies 
In short: in the beginning ZTE and Huawei were cutting the prices. However, the 
competition quickly moved their production to China and lowered their prices as well.  
Currently there is no price difference between Chinese and Western vendors in Nigeria. 
Chinese firms win contracts with providers in Nigeria mainly based on their flexible 
attitude and patience. 
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for the 6th empirical fingerprint and 
therefore there is no need to check empirical fingerprint 7. 
 
  122 
case due to too much division on the matter with the EU (see the next page and page 56 for more 
details). 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is low: if I find that the market shares of Chinese telecom 
infrastructure firms are indeed relatively low in the U.S. and Europe, it does not necessarily mean 
that this is caused by the institutional and political context in China.  
The accuracy of the data is high: I retrieve the data from various reliable news outlets and 
databases.   
 
Europe 
In 2013, the EU threatened with trade duties against Huawei and ZTE. An internal EU report accused 
the Chinese firms of dumping cheap telecom equipment on the European market due to the export 
rebates that Huawei and ZTE receive from the Chinese government (Bilby, 2013). However, in 
October 2014 the EU dropped the anti-subsidies case against the two Chinese telecoms companies 
because of too much division on the matter within the EU: leading European telecom companies 
such as Alcatel-Lucent, NSN and Ericsson did not want a trade war with China; southern European 
companies were afraid of China’s threat to block European wine imports as a countermeasure; and 
individual member states made separate deals with China (Oliver, 2014). 
 
As a matter of fact, Europe has become Huawei’s most successful overseas markets (Wang, 2017). 
Huawei has long-time partnerships with all the main carriers in Western Europe (Orange in France, 
Telefónica in Spain, Telecom Italia in Italy, Deutsche Telekom in Germany, British Telecom in the 
U.K., etc.). Building telecom stations for important European carriers gave Huawei an advantage on 
the European mobile phone market (see Table 15). Huawei’s share in the European mobile market 
is steadily increasing. First Huawei took from the shares of Telephone Communication Limited and 
Nokia and now also from Apple and Samsung. Huawei is the top smartphone seller in Portugal and 
the Netherlands and the second largest in Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Spain (Cendrowski, 2017). 
Huawei has overtaken Apple and is the second largest smartphone maker by shipment in Finland, 
Italy, Poland and Spain.  
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Figure 38 Mobile phone market share in Europe by vendor, 2015-2017 
 
Source: Statista, 2018 
 
U.S. 
ZTE is also making inroads in Europe, but not as fast as Huawei. However, ZTE is much more 
successful in the U.S. market than Huawei. Huawei cannot use the same strategy as in Europe since 
Huawei does not have strong relationships with the “big four” in the U.S., namely: Verizon, 
American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T), T-Mobile and Sprint. These companies are staying away 
from Huawei and ZTE after a 2012 congressional report said their hardware could be used by the 
Chinese government for spying purposes. Therefore, no major American carrier uses equipment 
from Huawei or ZTE in its network (Moritz, Gurman & Shields, 2018). However, all four carriers have 
been selling phones from the two suppliers in the U.S. for several years. 
 
ZTE has been more successful than Huawei (with a 12.2 per cent mobile market share in 2017) in 
the U.S. because ZTE adapted more to the U.S. market. ZTE’s growth can be attributed to their 
unique business model, which is referred as: America China Worldwide (ACW) (Richardson, 2013). 
As the order of the acronyms suggests, ZTE prioritizes the U.S. market over even its home market. 
While China is the largest mobile phone market in general, the U.S. is by far the largest market for 
smart phones over $500 dollar.  
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However, in January 2018, both Verizon and AT&T have dropped their plans to sell the new Huawei 
phones; under renewed pressure from the U.S. government (Bartz, 2018; Moritz et al., 2018). Until 
April 2018, ZTE did not receive the same level of pushback from the U.S. government as Huawei 
did. Until March 2018, AT&T and Verizon were still selling ZTE phones via their websites while not 
selling a single Huawei phone. In April 2018, the U.S. Commerce Department reactivated a sanction 
that had been settled before in March 2017, which banned any American businesses from selling 
products or services to ZTE for the next seven years. Following the order, ZTE had to cease business 
(Jiang, 2018). However, much to anyone’s surprise, U.S. President Trump announced on May 13 
that he was working with Chinese President Xi Jinping to find a way to get ZTE back into business, 
fast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 10: Chinese firms’ official internationalization strategy is to target less-
advanced markets. 
 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is low: ZTE’s business model is ACW: America, 
China, and Worldwide. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is medium: it could be an old story. 
The accuracy of the data is high: interview data triangulated with data from public reports (annual 
reports etc.) regarding the order of moving to host countries.   
Huawei is large in Europe and ZTE’s mobile market shares in the U.S. had been increasing 
steadily until the uproar in April 2018. Furthermore, the fact that Huawei and ZTE do not 
sell telecom infrastructure equipment on the U.S. market is not related to the latecomer 
position of the Chinese firms, but to geopolitical interests.    
 
To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 9. 
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As mentioned in the results for fingerprint 9, the U.S. is ZTE’s target market.   
On a country level, Huawei’s target markets are: Russia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Bulgaria 
(Huawei, 2004). However, Huawei started to focus on the European market already in the year 2000 
with the establishment of an R&D center in Stockholm. The establishment of research centers 
abroad is recognized as ‘a classis IBM technique’ that helped Huawei to get closer to potential new 
customers (Ante, 2012). The European market is currently Huawei’s largest market outside China.  
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 11: Hardly any new tenders for telecom infrastructure projects in 
advanced markets since Chinese firms started to invest abroad. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is low: constant upgrade of networks.   
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. 
The accuracy of the data is high. 
 
Both the U.S. and Europe have already dense telecom infrastructure networks. However, the more 
their economies rely on devices that are online that are dealing with increasingly large quantities 
of data, the more data volumes and guaranteed quality connections they need. In order to keep up 
with the demand for higher capacity, telecom companies around the world (including Huawei and 
ZTE) team up to continuously upgrade the networks. From the 1980s until now we have seen 4 
“generations” of wireless telephone technology: from analog telecommunications standards to 
ZTE is mainly focused on the U.S. and Huawei’s largest market outside China is Europe. 
To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 10. 
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superfast broadband internet access and the development of 5th generation wireless networks (5G) 
is currently being led by several companies.  
In December 2017 the European telecommunications ministers agreed on a joint roadmap for the 
development of 5G networks (Boni, 2018). The Federal Communications Commission of the U.S. 
announced in February 2018 that it plans to launch new auctions of high-band spectrum starting 
later in 2018, to speed the launch of next-generation 5G networks (Shephardson, 2018). Due to the 
2012 congressional report U.S. companies are not allowed to use hardware from Chinese telecom 
equipment companies. However, many countries allied to the United States do not share 
Washington’s security concerns. Huawei has signed 25 MoUs - pre-cursors to potential commercial 
contracts - with telecom operators worldwide; including: Britain’s BT, BCE, France’s Orange 
Germany’s Deutsche Telekom and global player Vodafone (Auchard & Jiang, 2018). 5G is planned 
to be commercially available worldwide by 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To conclude: I reject the hypothesis that their late-comer position is giving Chinese telecom firms 
an advantage in Nigeria compared to their Western counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
 
In short: Due to an update of the telecom wireless telecoms networks worldwide to the 
next generation (5G) there are many new tenders for telecom infrastructure projects 
expected in the U.S. and Europe from about 2018-2019 onward. However, at the time of 
my fieldwork in January 2016 the statement was true that the markets in the U.S. and 
Europe were matured.  
 To conclude, I found somewhat confirming evidence for the 11th empirical 
fingerprint. 
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Figure 39 Evidence hypothesis 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.4. The role of the Chinese government 
During our meeting with the PR manager of Huawei West Africa I do not have to raise the question 
about the role of the Chinese government, because the PR manager mentions it himself:  
Every year I fly back to Shenzhen to the headquarters to have a global PR meeting. You 
have to know that we have offices in 170 countries so every year we have about 
hundreds of PR people flying back to the headquarters for this meeting. And the Chinese 
PR people will always complain about the same thing: “oh we have been asked so many 
times by the Western media about our relationship with the Chinese government: do 
you receive special support from the government?” We are getting quit tired of this 
question. Only the PR manager in the U.K. does not complain, because there they know 
that it is not true (PR manager Huawei West Africa, personal communication, 6 January, 
2016). 
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European firms complain that their Chinese competitors are outcompeting them in Africa because 
of the extraordinary support these Chinese firms receive from the Chinese government. For 
example, the German construction company Julius Berger was the most favored infrastructure 
company in securing both states and federal projects in Nigeria until Chinese construction 
companies arrived. Furthermore, since the internationalization of Huawei and ZTE most other 
telecom infrastructure firms are out of competition on the African continent. European businesses 
have been asking their respective governments for more support in order to stay competitive.12 
What is it about “the role of the Chinese government” that can cause Chinese firms to be more 
successful in host countries with challenging institutional conditions and low PS than their Western 
competitors?  
In this section I explore the existence of the empirical fingerprints that I expect to find if the thesis 
holds that Chinese firms are more successful in Nigeria than their Western competitors because of 
reasons that are linked to the role of the Chinese government. These fingerprints include: 
 
12. Huawei and ZTE have close ties with the Chinese national government. 
8. Investments from Chinese telecom infrastructure firms in advanced markets are blocked out of fear for Chinese 
political agenda. 
13. A) China is importing large quantities of oil from Nigeria. 
B)There is an infrastructure-for-oil agreement between the Chinese and Nigerian government that includes 
telecom infrastructure. 
14. Chinese telecom infrastructure firms receive financial support from the Chinese government for projects in 
Nigeria. 
15. Chinese firms have some coping strategies that are not an option for Ericsson. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 From personal communication with representatives of the Dutch and U.S. embassies in Nigeria and a 
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands. 
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Figure 40 Causal mechanism highlighting the role of the Chinese government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Mr. Hu Jieguo, Chinese SOEs in Nigeria receive much support from the Chinese 
embassy and much financial support from the Chinese government. ZTE is hundred per cent SOE 
and Huawei is a bit less clear, but has also close relations with the government, according to Mr. 
Hu. Interestingly enough there is much competition between these two firms. ‘They fight like dogs 
in Africa,’ told Mr. Hu (personal communication, 11 January, 2016). Mr. Hu receives much critique 
from his Nigerian business partners about the fighting between these two companies.  
 
Empirical fingerprint 12: Huawei and ZTE are SOEs. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium to high: various sources come to 
different conclusions about the ownership of Huawei and ZTE; however, they most often assume a 
close link to the Chinese government. 
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The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is medium: If I find that Huawei and ZTE 
are officially not SOEs there could be still close links between the members of the board of the 
companies and the Chinese government. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high: If I find that ZTE and Huawei are SOEs, then there are per 
definition close links with the Chinese government. 
The accuracy of the data is high: the data can easily be verified.  
 
A state-owned enterprise is usually defined as a firm in which a state, a government or a public 
authority, holds at least 50.01 per cent of the firm‘s shares. Li & Cheong (2016) explain in length 
how the economic reforms in China have produced three types of state-owned enterprises, namely:  
1. State-owned enterprises, state-owned corporations and state legal person joint ownership 
enterprises: Firms that are hundred per cent owned by the state; 
2. State-holding enterprises: Firms of which the state owns more than fifty per cent of the 
firm’s shares, or has the highest ownership among the other minority shareholders; 
3. State joint-ownership enterprises: Firms in which the state has a minority ownership and 
exercises no control. 
These three types of SOEs are in line with the definition of SOEs (enterprises where the state has 
significant control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership) by the OECD (2015). 
 
ZTE 
According to Li and Cheong’s (2016) definition, ZTE Corporation is a state-holding company: the 
state – though a minority shareholder – is the largest shareholder among all shareholders, and it 
also exercises control through its holding company ZTE Holdings. The ownership share of State legal 
persons in ZTE Corporation has diminished largely in the past twenty years and fell from 68.8 per 
cent in 1998 to 33.88 per cent in 2015 – making it no longer a majority shareholder (Li & Cheong, 
2016). However, state-enterprises still own 51 per cent of ZTE Holdings –the largest stakeholder in 
ZTE Corporation (see Figure 41). The other stakeholder that owns 49 per cent of ZTE Holding is a 
group of former employees of the original state enterprise. Li and Cheong argue that since ‘these 
“insiders” grew up with the Corporation, their “ownership” counts for much more than ownership 
as legally defined’ (2016: 258). Li and Cheong (2016) believe that these “insiders”– together with 
Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Nominees Limited (HKSCCNL; the nominee company voting 
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with ZTE Holdings which appointed them) – would ensure that there would be de facto state 
ownership and little contest in board decisions. Furthermore, five of the nine Board members of 
ZTE Holding are state-appointed and ZTE Holding is represented on ZTE Corporation’s Board by five 
directors (one third of the Board members of ZTE Corporation). All Board directors and senior 
managers have worked in management positions within the related entities of ZTE Corporation and 
its parent companies. Like other state enterprises, ZTE Corporation has a (mandatory) Party 
Committee. However, Li & Cheong (2016) found that the Committee in ZTE Corporation functioned 
far less intrusively than those in major state enterprises.  
Li and Cheong (2016) also point out two indicators of ZTE Corporation’s autonomy from state 
control, namely: exemption from repatriation of the after-tax profits to the state and the fact that 
ZTE is free to set its own prices.  
Figure 41 Ownership Structure of ZTE Holdings (2016) and ZTE Corporation (2015) 
 
Source: Adapted from Li & Cheong (2016) 
 
Huawei 
Huawei has a unique ownership structure; although we do not know all the details about it yet. 
What we do know is that the founder of the company — Mr. Ren Zhengfei — is its biggest 
shareholder; nevertheless he owns just 1.4% shares. The other 98.6% of the shares are owned by 
the staff of Huawei – also referred to as the “Union”. Huawei says 80,000 of its 150,000 employees 
have joined the ownership plan (Sevastopulo, 2014). When an employee leaves, she has to sell her 
shares back to the company unless the person is too senior – having spent 10-15 years working for 
it – then she can sell the shares back to the company at a later moment in time. The members of 
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the Union vote every five years to pick 51 representatives, who then select the company’s recently 
expanded board of seventeen directors. 
 
Mr. Ren Zhengfei has veto right on major decisions; however he states that he has never used the 
power of veto, and instead prefers to talk to his senior management (Thomas, 2014). Mr. Ren 
rejects the idea of listing Huawei to the stock market stating and told Western journalists in London: 
‘…[public] shareholders are greedy and want to squeeze every bit out of a company as soon as 
possible’ (Thomas, 2014). He continued to state that not listing on the stock market is one of the 
reasons they have overtaken their competitors. 
Both Huawei and ZTE are not listed among the Central Enterprises controlled by SASAC (SASAC, 
2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘When you control telco networks, you can control everything,’ said one official involved in the 
deliberations between the Australian Prime Minister and the Heads of National Security Agency 
and the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. (Kehoe, Grigg and Murray, 2018, February, 
23). 
 
Empirical fingerprint 8: Investments from Chinese telecom infrastructure firms in advanced 
markets are blocked out of fear for a Chinese political agenda. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium: In the design phase of this study 
Huawei and ZTE were effectively blocked from the telecom infrastructure market in the U.S. for 
According to the definitions of the OECD and Li & Cheong (2016) ZTE is an SOE and Huawei 
is not.  
 To conclude, I found confirming and disconfirming evidence for empirical 
fingerprint 12. This means that the causal mechanism looks different for the two firms. 
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alleged security reasons, while Huawei and ZTE continued building telecom infrastructure in the 
EU. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. 
The accuracy of the data is high: the data is retrieved from news reports from multiple highly 
regarded news sources. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, Huawei’s and ZTE’s overseas expansion has met with criticism in the 
U.S. and Europe. The European Commission has threatened with trade sanctions against China if 
the Chinese government would not stop with ‘illegal subsidies’ to ZTE and Huawei. However, the 
EU dropped the anti-subsidy case later due to too much division on the matter within the EU.  
 
The U.S. government has been fiercer and more consequent. At the beginning of 2018, it warned 
U.S. citizens to not buy products from Huawei and ZTE for security reasons (Bershidsky, 2018, 
February, 15). Then in April it banned ZTE for seven years from the U.S. (“UPDATE 7-U.S. bans 
American,” 2018) and the U.S. Justice Department is currently investigating Huawei’s potential 
involvement in illegal sales to Iran (Freifeld & Auchard, 2018). On top of that, the U.S. government 
successfully convinced the Australian government to reconsider Huawei’s involvement in the 
construction of its 5G network.  
 
A U.S. congressman who serves on the influential House intelligence committee has warned that if 
the Turnbull government allows China's Huawei to help build 5G wireless networks in Australia, the 
Canberra-Washington security partnership could be damaged (Kehoe, 2018). The U.S. argues that 
because of the high level of intelligence sharing between Five Eyes countries (U.S., U.K., Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada) the presence of Huawei or ZTE in any of these countries could present a 
significant U.S. national security threat.  
 
Meanwhile, Huawei has signed 25 MoUs with European and other global telecom operators to trial 
5G equipment; including agreements with BCE and TELUS in Five Eyes country Canada. In fact, 
Huawei launched its first global end-to-end user trial of 5G in Vancouver; together with TELUS 
(“Huawei launches first,” 2018). 
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Empirical fingerprint 13A: China is importing large quantities of oil from Nigeria. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high: Chinese economic activities in Africa are 
often referred to as the hungry dragon thirsty for oil. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is medium: Chinese firms could import oil from Nigeria without 
involvement from the Chinese government. However, evidence from Western countries shows that 
when Western firms import much oil from a certain host country, their national government is 
involved. 
The accuracy of the data is high: the data is retrieved from ITC TradeMap. 
Mr. Hu (the Deputy Director of the China-Africa Business Council) explained to me that China does 
not import a single drop of Nigerian oil, for the simple reason that Chinese refineries cannot process 
Nigerian oil (personal communication, 12 January, 2016). The reason, according to him, is that the 
quality of Nigerian oil is too high for the old refineries in China. Nigerian oil is sweet and light; which 
makes it highly appropriate for processing it into gasoline, kerosene, and high-quality diesel. 
However, Chinese refineries work better on sweet and heavy oil (from Angola for example) which 
is processed into fuel oil for China’s booming industries. Mr. Hu explained that the main reason for 
China to buy crude oil from Nigeria is to do something about its trade imbalance with Nigeria. All 
the Nigerian crude oil that Chinese actors buy is sold on the international market (Mr. Hu, personal 
communication, 12 January, 2016). 
The data from 2007 and 2011 from ITC TradeMap (see Figure 42 and Figure 43) confirms Mr. Hu’s 
statement that China is a consistently small buyer of Nigerian crude oil: 
Huawei and ZTE are indeed blocked in the U.S. and the U.S. government tries to assert its 
influence to block Huawei and ZTE also from Australia. However, both Huawei and ZTE 
still have access to Canada and European markets. 
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 8. The results 
are ambiguous. 
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Figure 42 Buyers of Nigerian oil in 2011 
 
Source: created by the author based on ITC TradeMap data. 
 
Figure 43 Buyers of Nigerian oil in 2017 
 
Source: created by the author based on ITC TradeMap data. 
 
 
 
 
 
In short: contrary to popular belief, China is importing very small quantities of Nigerian 
crude oil. 
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 13A.  
 
  136 
Empirical fingerprint 13B: There is an infrastructure-for-oil agreement between the Chinese 
and Nigerian government that includes telecom infrastructure. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium: Since Chinese firms agreed on 
resource-for-infrastructure deals with other African countries like Angola and the DRC it makes 
sense to assume that there is also an oil-for-infrastructure deal in oil-rich Nigeria. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is low: there can be other ways through 
which the Chinese government supports Chinese firms to get access to Nigerian oil. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is medium: it would seem to mean that there is a vast interest for 
the Chinese government to be involved in such a deal. However, evidence from the resource-for-
infrastructure deal in the DRC (Van der Lugt, 2011) shows that such a deal can be initiated by the 
African host country and be between Chinese firms rather than the Chinese and African host 
country’s government. 
The accuracy of the data is medium: the data is retrieved from multiple news outlets. 
 
It was the Nigerian government led by President Obasanjo who proposed the oil-for-infrastructure 
deals with Chinese firms. A South African researcher specialized on conflict minerals argues that:  
Following persistent lobbying by the Nigerian government, Beijing opted to engage with 
Obasanjo’s plan, believing it created opportunities both to increase China’s presence in 
Nigeria’s oil sector and secure lucrative new Nigerian construction contracts for Chinese 
companies (Mhtembu-Salter, 2009: 2). 
In April, 2006, the Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a two-day official visit to Nigeria to consolidate 
existing bilateral relations between the two countries. During this visit President Hu and his Nigerian 
host signed an MoU that committed Chinese companies to playing a role in the planned 
rehabilitation of Nigeria’s decayed rail network and the failing Kaduna oil refinery and to build a 
600-megawatt hydroelectric power station at Mambilla. In exchange the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) were granted “the right 
of first refusal” on oil blocks (Taylor, 2007). Although making it until far into the preparation phase, 
the oil-for-infrastructure deal between China and Nigeria never materialized. There exist various 
explanations for the failure of this oil-for-infrastructure deal.   
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The most common explanation is the change of government that took place before the projects 
were implemented. The Nigerian Senate refused a government-backed amendment of the 
constitution that would allow President Obasanjo to run for a third term and elections were 
planned for April 2007. These elections were won by Umaru Musa Yar’Adua who was from the same 
party as Obasanjo, but from a different ethnic group; resulting in personnel and policy changes. The 
new President demanded a formal investigation in the last bidding round and also put the 
rehabilitations of the Lagos–Kano railway and Kaduna refinery and the construction of the Mambilla 
power station on hold.  
Although the new government has cited a variety of concerns, Mhtembu-Salter (2009) is convinced 
that the key issue is that the new political elite preferred to trade oil blocs for cash and not for 
infrastructure so that they could pocket the money. A telling example of corruption in the oil 
industry in Nigeria is that the Nigerian government sold a 51 per cent stake in the Kaduna refinery 
to Bluestar Oil (a company run by cronies of President Obasanjo) against the interest of CNPC, just 
before President Obasanjo left office. Downs (2007) argues that the Director-General of Nigeria 
Bureau of Public Enterprises (Ms. Irene Chigbue) covered up the Nigerian government’s 
cancellation decision by claiming that China was not meeting up to expectations as CNOOC had not 
been forthcoming with the takeover plans of the Kaduna refinery. 
The Nigerian analyst Umejei adds that the new Nigerian leadership also had a valid reason for 
questioning the oil-for-infrastructure deal since ‘China’s offer when deploying its infrastructure for 
resources falls below the prevailing market price’ (2013). He quotes a member of Nigeria’s House 
of Representatives (Honorable K.G.B. Oguakwa), saying: ‘Nigeria prefers to sell her oil on the 
international market which is more lucrative than to adopt the Chinese model’ (in Umejei, 2013).  
Another factor that hindered the deal is that the four blocks that CNPC acquired were of very low 
quality. According to Downs CNPC decided to relinquish them after doing some seismic work (2007: 
54). It could be that the quality of the crude was lower than expected; however, as mentioned in 
the analysis of fingerprint 13A, it could also be that the quality of the crude oil did not match the 
needs of the Chinese refineries. 
Finally, a last argument provided by Umejei (2013) is that the Western oil companies in Nigeria 
fiercely opposed the deal out of fear to lose their position in an important oil supplier for especially 
the U.S. at that time.    
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________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The PR Manager of Huawei in Lagos elaborates on his remark that the PR managers of Huawei get 
tired of questions about the support they receive from the Chinese government:  
PR manager: For our PR in the U.K. they will say no I don’t have this kind of questions. They know 
that you don’t have because, even for the financial part about the funding for example, we are trying 
to find some competitive financial services for our partners. But usually we do not choose China 
Construction Bank or eh yes they are one of our global strategic partners, but just one of them. Like 
we are also working with HSBC and we are also working with Standard Chattered here. So we are 
still trying to say that Huawei is a global company. 
S: Yes but I still think that any big company in the world… when you operate abroad you will every 
now and then ask support from your embassy. Do you have situations like that as well in which the 
Chinese embassy can help you?  
PR manager: Ehm we hardly have that situation, because most of our customers are telecom 
operators. It is a private industry so we are not much into that. Even, for example, when we are 
working in Nigeria with the federal government to provide a national information and 
communication technology infrastructure backbone network [National Information and 
Communication Technology Infrastructure Backbone (NICTIB)]. We are working with a Nigerian 
state-owned company to provide this network for the federal government, but we are still working 
with our local partners first. Galaxy Backbone is the local partner. We work with them. They work 
with the Nigerian Federal Government. Yes the funding we get from China Exim Bank. Yes for that 
part we need to communicate a lot with the Chinese embassy, because yes it is a kind of policy. They 
need to report back to the Chinese government to say OK which industry needs the support. Eh OK 
we need to get the funding from China so eh yes we do communicate with the embassies, but I think 
it is common for every business of every country. It is not a special case. 
Most likely the deal was prevented because of a combination of these reasons. Most 
important for this analysis, is that the deal was initiated by the Nigerian government, that 
the Chinese government showed interest at the highest levels; however, it did not 
materialize and therefore does not play a role in current Chinese investments in Nigeria.  
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 13B.  
 
  
 
139 
Empirical fingerprint 14: Chinese telecom infrastructure firms receive financial support from 
the Chinese government for projects in Nigeria. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high: It is an often heard complaint from 
Western firms. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. 
The accuracy of the data is medium: the data is retrieved from interviews with multiple 
stakeholders including Chinese firms and their competitors, Chinese and Western embassy 
representatives and an employee from a Chinese bank in Nigeria. 
 
A manager at MTN (the largest telecom operator in Nigeria) believes that it is easier for the Chinese 
telecom infrastructure companies than for Western companies in Nigeria, because Chinese firms 
‘have more financial muscle, because they have upfront investment’ (personal communication, 8 
January, 2016). Telecom infrastructure projects are extremely expensive and it is difficult for 
governments of especially emerging countries like Nigeria to finance these projects. The manager 
at MTN told me that: ‘the Chinese firms have an advantage over other firms because they can offer 
a financial-package in cooperation with a Chinese bank to ensure that the project can be financed’ 
(personal communication, 8 January, 2016). He seemed to refer to the Export-Import Bank of 
China(China Exim Bank) since there are no Chinese banks in Nigeria; except maybe for Stanbic IBTC 
Nigeria.13 
 
A senior manager of ZTE Abuja confirmed the statement from the MTN manager: ‘Part of the 
success of Chinese firms is the support we receive from the Chinese government. We are still 
developing, so of course we get much support from our government’ (personal communication, 12 
January, 2016). The manager continues to explain how ZTE receives support from the Chinese 
government: ‘ZTE Nigeria only gets loans from Chinese banks. Not just one, but different ones’ 
                                                          
13 Stanbic IBTC Nigeria belongs to the South African based banking group Standard Bank Group in which the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) has a twenty per cent stake since 2007 (Chen & Bosch, 2007). 
A Chinese employee at Stanbic IBTC Nigeria explained that Stanbic does not provide loans for Chinese 
infrastructure projects in Nigeria because it cannot compete with the concessional loans from China Exim 
Bank. However, she told me that Chinese small and medium enterprises interested in doing business in 
Nigeria can go to ICBC and Stanbic then provides the guarantee in Nigeria (personal communication, 10 
January, 2016). 
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(personal communication, 12 January, 2016). Many bids in Nigeria include the sentence: “you have 
to use a local bank for the bid security.” However, the interest rates of banks in Nigeria are very 
high (both Nigerian and foreign banks on the Nigerian market) because of the high risks of currency 
devaluation, which is also linked to the falling oil prices. The Nigerian currency depends too much 
on oil (for about 30%). Therefore, ZTE uses Chinese banks to give a guarantee to Nigerian banks. 
The dollars never touch ground in Nigeria, because as soon as they touch ground, they are already 
controlled. To illustrate the difficulties with the banking system in Nigeria, the manager of ZTE gives 
the example of its USD sixty million deal with MTN signed in March 2012. At the moment of our 
interview ZTE was still waiting for the payment. MTN was willing to pay; however, it had difficulties 
getting the dollars into Nigeria (personal communication, 12 January, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Empirical fingerprint 15: Chinese firms have some coping strategies that are not an option 
for Ericsson. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high: the support from the Chinese 
government is generally expected to give Chinese firms an edge over Western firms. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high. 
The accuracy of the data is medium: the data is retrieved from interviews with multiple 
stakeholders including Chinese firms and their competitors, Chinese and Western embassy 
representatives and an employee from a Chinese bank in Nigeria. 
 
Both Huawei and ZTE admit to have received (indirect) financial support from the Chinese 
government via the Chinese Exim Bank. 
 To conclude, I found confirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 14.  
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The China Development Bank, for example, is the largest quasi-commercial bank in the world. With 
assets of USD 350 billion, it is bigger than the World Bank and the Asia Bank. The China Exim Bank 
is the world’s third largest export credit agency – its principal mandate being ‘to implement 
Government economic, trade and finance policies’ (The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of 
China: Annual Report, 2016). 
By providing preferred lines of credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises and foreign governments 
wishing to purchase Chinese made goods, the China Exim Bank supports the overseas expansion of 
Chinese firms in line with the country’s “Go Global” strategy.14 The long-run goal of the “Go Global” 
strategy is to increase the productivity and competitiveness of these enterprises vis-à-vis their 
global competitors. Foster, Butterfield, Chen and Pushak state that:  
In the case of concessional loans, there is a requirement that a Chinese enterprise be 
selected as the contractor or exporter. Moreover, no less than 50 percent of the 
equipment, materials, services, or technology needed to implement the project should 
be secured from China (2009: 55). 
For example, Nigeria received USD 200 million in loans from the China Development Bank in 2004 
to buy Huawei equipment (Executive Research Associates, 2009: 77). 
The Swedish MD of Ericsson in Lagos expects that his Chinese competitors have more options than 
he has, but he is not sure about it (personal communication, 8 January 2016). One of his theories is 
that his ‘Chinese friends’ found a way to deal with the challenge to get paid in dollars in Nigeria by 
closely cooperating with other Chinese firms who buy oil from Nigeria. He can imagine that a 
currency swop takes place in which Chinese telecom companies are paid in Naira and then exchange 
the Naira for Renminbi(RMB) with Chinese investors who use the Naira to buy oil from Nigeria. I 
asked him if it is possible for him to set up a similar construction with another Swedish or European 
company. In answering my question, he noticed an important difference between the Chinese and 
Swedish (and other European) governments. He was thinking aloud and suggested that it could 
work if there would be a European investment bank located in Lagos who would connect European 
firms in a similar way as he expects that a Chinese investment bank is facilitating the cooperation 
between Chinese firms in Nigeria. However, then he realized that there is not any European 
investment bank that would promote European companies to buy from other European companies, 
because protectionism is seen as unethical. ‘That is different in China. So from that aspect it is not 
an equal playing field’ (MD Ericsson, personal communication, 8 January, 2016). 
                                                          
14 http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/en-TCN/index_617.html 
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Mr. Westerhuis, from the Netherlands Representative Office in Lagos, explained that similar 
financing packages are possible for Dutch infrastructure companies via the programs Drive, Oreo 
and Develop2Build (personal communication, 7 January, 2016). However, he admits that the 
Chinese government has much more money available for infrastructure projects in Africa. The 
Dutch government prioritizes nine top-sectors in which the Netherlands excels internationally and 
supports these sectors. The (infrastructure) construction sector is not one of the nine selected top-
sectors. Is this unfair competition? Maybe China is now in a favorable position in Africa where 
western European countries have been for a long time. Mr. Westerhuis forwarded the thought that 
maybe the Western countries have failed to grab the opportunity because of their emphasis in their 
Africa policy on development aid/cooperation and on development money. ‘Moreover, among 
Western development cooperation policy advisers, for decades there was an almost religious 
believe that business should stay out of development. The Chinese now see this 
differently’(personal communication, 7 January, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above analysis result in two separate causal mechanisms for Huawei and ZTE due to the fact 
that ZTE is considered to be an SOE and Huawei not. However, this difference does not seem to 
result in a difference between the amount of support both Huawei and ZTE receive from the 
Chinese government. 
 
 
 
 
 
What the MD of Ericsson suspects was confirmed by Huawei and ZTE managers: the 
Chinese government is facilitating cooperation between Chinese firms and the Chinese 
Exim Bank supports Chinese firms in a way that cannot be matched by European 
investment banks. However, this has more to do with a lack of money and setting 
priorities on the European side than with a difference in ethical standards.  
 To conclude, I found confirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 15.  
 
  
 
143 
Figure 44 Evidence hypothesis 2 (Huawei) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45 Evidence hypothesis 2 (ZTE) 
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7.4.5. Little competition from advanced market firms 
In this section I explore the existence of the empirical fingerprints that I expect to find if the thesis 
holds that Chinese firms are more successful in Nigeria than their Western competitors because of 
reasons that are linked to receiving little competition from advanced market firms in Nigeria. These 
fingerprints include: 
9. Advanced market telecom infrastructure firms state in media that they perceive less-advanced markets as high 
risk business environments. 
10. Ericsson’s official internationalization strategy is to target advanced markets. 
11. The market shares of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms are much higher than Ericsson’s share in Nigeria. 
19. China is the most valued investor in Nigeria.   
20. Chinese firms experience fewer difficulties with regulations and corruption in Nigeria than their Western 
competitors.  
 
 
 
Figure 46 Causal mechanism highlighting the role of lack of investment from advanced markets 
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Empirical fingerprint 16: Advanced market telecom infrastructure firms state in media that 
they perceive less-advanced markets as high risk business environments. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high. 
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is medium.  
The accuracy of the data is high. 
 
The only negative statement from Ericsson about the business environment in less-advanced 
markets I can find is quite resent and reads: ‘We see macro economic [sic] uncertainty in Middle 
East and Africa that is hurting investment’ (“Ericsson remains in,” 2017). However, this statement 
was not made to indicate why Ericsson does not invest (much) in such markets, but instead as one 
of the explanations for its continuous losses since the third quarter of 2016. Ericsson was betting 
on the fast-growing demand for mobile Internet services in sub-Saharan Africa to boost its sales 
(Motsoeneng, 2016). Ericsson is not the only advanced market telecom infrastructure company 
seeing potential in emerging markets: In a World Bank paper, Nokia is quoted stating that ‘in the 
next five years more than 80% of the growth in global mobile subscriptions is expected to come 
from emerging markets with relatively low levels of current penetration and high populations’(in 
Bray, 2005: 13).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 16.  
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Empirical fingerprint 17: Ericsson’s official internationalization strategy is to target advanced 
markets. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium: Child & Marinova (2014a) predict 
that Ericsson is more successful in other advanced countries. General FDI theory predicts that firms 
invest in low-risk host countries. However, the advanced markets are maturing and the growth 
opportunities are in emerging markets.  
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high:  
The accuracy of the data is high:  
Ericsson has offices in more than 180 countries in the world and “Europe and Latin America” is its 
biggest market area (Ericsson, 2018). This sounds as if Latin America and Europe are the two main 
markets for Ericsson. However, this is not the case. In March 2017, Ericsson reorganized its business 
structure in order to increase efficiency and reduced their division of their global market from ten 
Regions to five Market Areas. See Figure 47 for Ericsson’s division of its global market into five areas 
and the net sales numbers per area.  
Figure 47 Five market Areas of Ericsson since March 2017 
 
Source: Ericsson annual report 2017: 5 
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When we compare the net sales numbers for the ten regions in 2016 with the net sales numbers of 
the five area markets in 2017, we see that Ericsson’s largest market by far is North America, 
followed by North East Asia (mainly China) and South East Asia and Oceania.  
Table 17 Net sales numbers Ericsson per region (SEK bln), 2016-2017 
Region Net sales 2016 Net sales 2017 
North America 54,7 49,6 
Latin America 17,9 56,2 
Northern Europe and Central 
Asia 
9,1 
Western and Central Europe 16,2 
Mediterranean 20,9 
Middle East 19,2 25,1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9,2 
India 10,7 30,6 
South East Asia and Oceania 22,2 
North East Asia 27,4 23,5 
Sources: Annual reports 
 
The data from Table 4 show that Ericsson’s main market is indeed an advanced market; however, 
they also show that Ericsson is not only targeting advanced markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 17.  
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Empirical fingerprint 18: The market shares of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms are 
much higher than Ericsson’s share in Nigeria. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is medium:  
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is high:  
The accuracy of the data is low:  
 
Unfortunately I was not successful in obtaining detailed information regarding the market shares 
of Ericsson, Huawei and ZTE in Nigeria. According to Ericsson, MTN and Smile, Ericsson and Huawei 
were the two largest telecom equipment vendors in Nigeria of about equal size and ZTE the much 
smaller third player of the only three telecom equipment vendors active in Nigeria during the time 
of my field research. A manager of ZTE in Nigeria boosted that Huawei and ZTE together occupied 
the majority of the Nigerian market, but that had more to do with Huawei’s impressive market 
share, than with ZTE’s market share. Without knowing the exact numbers, the size and architecture 
of the offices of the telecom equipment vendors in Nigeria speaks volumes.  
Figure 48 shows the office of ZTE in Lagos, hidden in an old villa in a gated community, not showing 
any signs of being the office of a multinational. One could assume that this is a temporary office 
while for example waiting for the construction of a large office building. However, the similar status 
of ZTE’s office in Abuja and the fact that the address in Lagos has not changed in August 2018 
substantiate my suspicion that this is the long-term situation of ZTE’s office in Lagos.  
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Figure 48 Office ZTE in Lagos 
Source: Google Maps  
ZTE’s offices in Lagos and Abuja are both located in residential areas. We would not have found the 
office in Abuja by ourselves if our driver arranged by ZTE would not have dropped us of in front of 
it. There is no sign that this villa houses a telecom infrastructure giant. (I remember Mr. Buitelaar’s 
story about the extremely high costs of licenses for logos and signs on the property of a company in 
Nigeria.) The contrast could not have been bigger with the entrance of ZTE’s HQ in Shenzhen. The 
reception hall of ZTE’s HQ has been clearly designed with the aim to impress visitors: very spacious, 
marble floors and walls, lots of light from giant windows and an endlessly high ceiling. The men and 
women behind the marble reception desk are highly professional and dressed up very well. A woman 
carefully maintained a giant planter with beautiful orchids while we were waiting to meet with a 
senior ZTE manager. How different is ZTE’s office in Abuja with the old garage door turned into the 
main entrance. No cozy decor. It looks like a temporary office: as if a secret service quickly put up 
something in a residential area that can easily be removed again. We enter a room the size of a 
small class room in which many desks are cramped together in three rows. A local staff member 
works at one of the desks. The Chinese staff member who welcomed us at the entrance asked us to 
sit down behind one of the desks and wait. We see a few young Chinese employees walking in and 
out. It takes about five minutes before we are asked to walk upstairs to the office of the senior 
manager. The office of the manager is large and light, but also quite empty and it again gives the 
feeling of a temporary office. The office seems to be in the former master bedroom of the villa with 
the bathroom with Jacuzzi attached to it (there was no door so we could look into it).  
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Figure 49 shows the castle-like solid office of Huawei in Lagos towering high above the other 
buildings in its area, showing that Huawei is an established company and here for the long-run.  
Figure 49 Office Huawei in Lagos 
 
Source: courtesy of the author  
 
Huawei’s office in Lagos is a sturdy modern building with hints of the traditional Tang architecture 
in the design of the roof. It towers above the further low buildings at this part of Victoria Island. The 
lobby of the impressive building is small with a low ceiling and feels a bit cramped. Four local security 
guards are sitting at cheap desks on the left side right after entering the door. They are wearing ill-
fitting cheap uniforms and hats that are most likely manufactured in China. Opposite of their desks 
are three lines of blue plastic connected seats as you can also find at airports. Most of the seats are 
taken. It is quite chaotic with too many people for the small waiting area and delivery people 
bringing in things. The PR manager – whom we have an appointment with – comes down personally 
to pick us up. He takes us into the elevator and tells us that he will show us the areas in which visitors 
are allowed to come. He first shows us a spacious room that again reminds me of a class room due 
to the fact that the desks are connected in eight long rows facing one wall with two electronic 
boards. About half of the desks are in use. I see mostly local and some Chinese employees in the 
room. Most work alone behind their desk, some others stand together in small groups to discuss 
something. The PR Manager explains that the electronic boards are there for the employees to use 
when they need to solve a problem together. We then walk into a large open space where about 
thirty Chinese-style desks are neatly arranged in the back of the room – leaving much space to walk 
or sit or stand together in small groups to discuss something. The atmosphere is relaxed. Many 
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employees are standing between the desks and chat. In various corners of the big open space are 
people sitting together for a short meeting – Chinese, local and “other” (Indian?), all quit young. I 
see more local than Chinese employees, but in every room and corridor I see at least also one Chinese 
person. The PR manager tells us that Huawei has about 1500 staff members in Nigeria, from thirteen 
different countries of which about seventy per cent is Nigerian. The Chinese and local staff seem to 
mingle in a natural way. The only clear separation happens when we go downstairs for lunch after 
our meeting. There are two giant canteens: one serving local food and one serving Chinese food. I 
cannot detect a single Chinese person in the canteen with local food and not a single Nigerian in the 
canteen with Chinese food.  
Figure 50 shows the modern shining office of Ericsson in Lagos, radiating the “business” image of 
Ericsson.   
Figure 50 Office Ericsson in Lagos 
 
Source: Emis Int. 
 
Without having access to the exact market shares, the different head offices in Nigeria makes the 
information from the interviews – that Ericsson and Huawei are the two largest telecom equipment 
vendors in Nigeria of about equal size and ZTE the much smaller third player – highly plausible. 
 
  To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 18.  
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Empirical fingerprint 19: China is the most valued investor in Nigeria.   
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is low:  
The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is low:  
The accuracy of the data is medium:  
It is not common for a government to highlight one specific investor as their most valued investor 
because it could upset other investors who might become less willing to invest more in the country. 
The same counts for Nigerian government officials who would not highlight just one investor as 
their most valued investor. However, we could use statistics to measure the importance of Chinese 
investments for the Nigerian economy. Following the discussion on bias in FDI statistics on page 30, 
I look at the number of FDI projects from fDi Markets instead of FDI flows or stock.  
In terms of number of projects the U.S. was by far the largest FDI source country in Nigeria (see 
Table 18). China was the sixth largest FDI source country for Nigeria in the period 2003-2011; right 
after France, but still much smaller than South Africa and India.   
Table 18 FDI projects in Nigeria by geographical origin, 2003-2011 
Economy 
Number of  
FDI projects  
United States 75 
United Kingdom 59 
South Africa 42 
India 36 
France 20 
China 14 
Germany 13 
South Korea 12 
Netherlands 11 
Mauritius 10 
Source: fDi Markets, Financial Times 
To conclude, when looking at the number of FDI projects, China is not the most valued foreign 
investor in Nigeria.  
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________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
During a dinner in his hotel Mr. Hu Jieguo tells us: ‘The Nigerian government tries to block Chinese 
textile, but they do not manage to do so. During the day there are long lines with trucks from Benin 
waiting for the border to Nigeria. They don’t get access. However, during the night everything gets 
smuggled in. Under the military regime this did not happen. When the country was led by the regime 
the people said: “it was better during colonial times.” Now the people are saying: “it was better 
under the regime.” The regime was tough on smugglers and thieves. It was safe and the foreign 
reserve was high. The regime blocked imports in order to support local industries. You could not 
even import one biscuit; only with a special license. The result was that the production in Nigeria 
improved and there were many jobs for the local workers. I do not want to go against what the WTO 
says, but free trade is not good for everyone. It is only good for the rich who export a lot.’  
At the U.S. embassy in Abuja they have another opinion: ‘Officially there is no import ban, but do 
not ask about the formal market for foreign currency… Since June 2015 there are 41 commodities 
(very broad commodity groups: 700-800 products) you can get foreign currency for. ICT is the fastest 
growing sector in Nigeria. However, with this regulation they force IBM, HP and Microsoft to buy 
locally. This way the government artificially forces to create the local capacity to produce both hard 
and software. It is likely that there are some big monopolists benefitting from this regulation. 
However, it will not benefit the country. They need to set up import substitution, but you cannot do 
this overnight. We emphasize free trade. The advice from the U.S. to Nigeria: maybe it is better to 
use quotas and tariffs than to ban imports. But the response from the Nigerian government is: that 
is too prone to corruption.’ 
 
 
Empirical fingerprint 20: Chinese firms experience fewer difficulties with regulations and 
corruption in Nigeria than their Western competitors. 
The prior confidence in this theoretical hypothesis is high:  
 To conclude, I found disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 19.  
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The level of theoretical certainty of this piece of evidence is high. 
The uniqueness of this evidence is low:  
The accuracy of the data is low:  
 
This statement implies a larger influence of Chinese firms to bend the rules to their will in Nigeria 
when they are a more valued investor. The former exercise showed that China is not the most 
valued investor in Nigeria and therefore the 20th fingerprint could be ignored. However, since China 
is by far the largest financer of infrastructure projects in Nigeria (Jayaram et al., 2017), it is possible 
that Chinese firms involved in important infrastructure projects (like for example telecom 
infrastructure) might have this special leverage. 
When asked about their main challenges of operating in Nigeria senior managers of Ericsson, 
Huawei and ZTE mentioned very similar challenges: 
Table 19 Main challenges for telecom equipment vendors in Nigeria, 2016 
 Ericsson Huawei ZTE 
1. Unstable currency Bringing stakeholders 
together 
Different time 
perception 
2. Power shortages Lack of funding for 
large infrastructure 
projects 
Safety 
3. Area boys Power shortages Find and keep high-
skilled workers 
4. Lack of long-term 
thinking 
 Power shortages 
5. Lack of funding for 
large infrastructure 
projects 
  
6. Safety   
7. Find and keep high-
skilled workers 
  
Source: from personal communication with senior managers of Ericsson, Huawei and ZTE in January 2016. 
Power shortages are mentioned by all managers as one of the main challenges of operating in 
Nigeria which they all hope to see addressed as quickly as possible. Lack of funding for large 
infrastructure projects is linked to the challenge of bringing stakeholders together. The PR manager 
of Huawei West Africa explained to us that it is usually the government who is leading the project 
and decides whether or not a large infrastructure project will be implemented or not (personal 
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communication, 6 January, 2016). However, in Nigeria all the infrastructure (roads, railway, ports, 
electricity, telecom, etc.) need investment and the government does not have enough funding 
available. Therefore it becomes a complicated project involving many stakeholders (Ministers, 
investors, telecom operators, telecom equipment vendors, etc.) and it appears a challenge to bring 
all stakeholders together and implement projects (PR Manager Huawei, personal communication, 
6 January, 2016). Finding and keeping high skilled workers is a concern for both Ericsson and ZTE. A 
senior manager of ZTE in Abuja told us that he is often asked by Nigerians why ZTE does not set up 
an R&D center in Nigeria. He explained to us that it is not possible because it is difficult for ZTE to 
find the necessary skilled local workers and ZTE is lacking support from the Nigerian government 
(personal communication, 12 January, 2016). 
Huawei has no lack of skilled local workers. Their experience is that there are plenty highly educated 
Nigerians and Huawei is not so concerned about the movement of high skilled workers between 
firms (personal communication, 6 January, 2016). ‘Some high-skilled workers move to one of the 
operators after some experience and training within Huawei; however, we consider this to be part 
of the network building with the telecom operators’ (PR Manager Huawei, personal 
communication, 6 January, 2016). Safety is also not mentioned as a challenge by Huawei, because 
Huawei employees live in a guarded compound and the company provides free transportation and 
free food in the staff cantina (personal communication, 6 January, 2016). The Chinese workers at 
Huawei are likely more concerned about the level of safety in the country, because it restricts their 
movements, but it is not considered to be a serious challenge impacting the business of Huawei in 
Nigeria. Unstable currency is only mentioned by Ericsson, perhaps because of the earlier mentioned 
advantage of Chinese firms that they receive support from Chinese banks so that they can get paid 
in Chinese RMB directly instead of the local Naira.  
What is most striking is that none of them mentioned corruption as a main challenge, although the 
MD of Ericsson mentioned one aspect of it, namely the area boys. When directly asked about 
corruption, all managers started to sigh and moan. It is one of the things in Nigeria that gives them 
most headaches. However, they were prepared and knew that it was part of the business in Nigeria. 
A British expat wrote about Nigeria and said that although corruption is found everywhere, it is the 
degree – or extent – of corruption which makes Nigeria different from for example the U.K. 
(Newman, 2013). To give an idea of the extent of corruption in Nigeria Newman lists the following 
examples: 
…falsifying a CV (I don’t mean enhancing, I mean pretending you’re a Lead Piping 
Engineer of 12 years experience [sic] when actually, until yesterday, you were a 
fisherman); selling positions in a company; stealing diesel from the storage tanks 
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you’re paid to protect; issuance of false material certificates; impersonating an 
immigration officer to access an office, from which you then tap up the people within 
to fund your latest venture; selling land which isn’t yours; deliberately running down 
the country’s refining capacity in order to partake in the lucrative import of fuels; 
falsifying delivery notes of said refined fuels in order to receive greater government 
subsidies; deliberately restricting the country’s power generation capacity in order to 
benefit from the importation of generators (which must be run on imported fuel); 
theft of half-eaten sandwiches and opened drink containers from the office fridge; 
tinkering with fuel gauges at petrol stations to sell customers short; conspiring with 
company drivers to issue false receipts indicating more fuel was supplied than actually 
was; supplying counterfeit safety equipment; falsifying certificates related to 
professional competence (e.g. rope access work); paying employees less than 
stipulated in their contract (or not at all); cloning satellite TV cards, meaning the 
legitimate user gets their service cut off when the other card is in use (the cards are 
cloned by the same people who issue the genuine cards); the list is literally endless. 
There is no beginning or end to corruption in Nigeria, it is a permanent fixture 
(Newman, 2013). 
All managers admit that it is impossible to do business, or even live, in Nigeria without being 
involved in some sort of corruption. However, all companies also draw clear lines regarding what 
they except. For example, an area boy (another word for a gang member) who asks for a “protection 
fee” in order for workers to get access to the site where they have a job to do is hard to ignore, 
since it is about the safety of the worker. However, a container that sits unopened in the harbor 
because an officer wants “a service fee” before he opens and clears it can be ignored. And that is 
what both Ericsson and the Chinese firms do: wait instead of pay. It is not just a matter of integrity. 
From a business perspective it is better to show that you have patience and cannot be bribed, 
because that can save you much money in the future.  
When I asked the managers about the rules and regulations in Nigeria, they are considered to be 
stable and fair. Since Buhari became President in 2015 the rules are better enforced. According to 
the MD of Smile in Nigeria, international companies thought for a long time that they could get 
away with certain behavior, because the former government warned without any consequences 
(personal communication, 4 January, 2016). However, Buhari warned the telecom operators only 
once that they had to comply with Section 20(1) of Registration of Telephone Subscribers 
Regulations 2011 which states that states that all SIM cards across all mobile networks in the 
country should be registered. According to the MD of Smile, MTN – the largest telecom operator in 
Africa – did not expect any consequences and ignored the warning (personal communication, 4 
January, 2016). However, President Buhari followed through and handed down a 3.9 billion USD 
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dollar fine15. The leadership of MTN was shocked and feared even bankruptcy (“Fine threatens to,” 
2016). With help of the South African government and former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, 
MTN could negotiate the fine down to 1.4 billion USD which it agreed to pay in terms (Brock & 
Laessing, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To conclude: I reject the hypothesis that little competition from advanced market firms is giving 
Chinese telecom firms an advantage in Nigeria 
 
Figure 51 Evidence hypothesis 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The initial fine that was imposed in October 2015 was 5.2 billion USD. This amount was reduced by 25 per 
cent by the Nigerian Communications Commission to 3.9 billion USD in December 2015 (without a written 
statement explaining the reasons for this reduction) (Shapshak, 4 December, 2015). MTN then hired former 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder in January 2016 to help it reduce the fine further with success: a deal was 
struck in July and the final fine amounted to 1.7 billion USD (Brock & Laessing, 2016).     
In short, being the most valued infrastructure financer does not give Chinese telecom 
equipment vendors an edge over their competitors in terms of compliance with rules and 
regulations. Corruption is a challenge for all companies in Nigeria and they also have to 
all act carefully to not be affected by President Buhari’s fight against corruption. However, 
the support Chinese firms receive from Chinese banks make them better equipped for 
dealing with the foreign currency restrictions in Nigeria. 
 To conclude, I found mostly disconfirming evidence for empirical fingerprint 20.  
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7.5. Conclusion 
The results of the tests of the four hypotheses using process tracing show that the existing theories 
do not produce a causal mechanism that links the initial condition X with outcome Y (see Figure 52). 
Figure 52 Resulting causal mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the results do give a strong indication that the explanation for the seemingly indifferent 
attitude of Chinese investors towards the rule of law in a host market is mostly linked to the late-
comer status of Chinese firms and the role of the Chinese government. However, far less direct 
support than often assumed. The main difference between the Chinese telecom equipment 
vendors and Huawei is that the Chinese firms can circumvent the foreign currency challenge and 
the challenge that the local government does not have much funding available for large 
infrastructure projects due to loans from Chinese policy banks. 
In order to test if loans from Chinese policy banks are a unique factor for the location choice of 
Chinese telecom equipment vendors or if these loans play an important role in the location choice 
of Chinese firms in Africa in general, I test the relation between location choice and Chinese loans 
with another regression analysis. The next chapter discusses the results of both the quantitative 
and qualitative study and combines the results for a more thorough analysis.  
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8. Mixed analysis 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results from both the quantitative and qualitative strand of this research 
project. Furthermore, it shows how the results of the qualitative study triggered a follow-up 
quantitative analyses and how these results triggered another in-depth analysis of the qualitative 
study. In other words, this is the part of my study in which the quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are mixed. 
Chapter 7 showed that the only specific advantage Chinese telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria 
have over their competitors from the West is their ability to add a financial package to the deal in 
the form of a concessional loan from the China Exim Bank. A concessional loan from the China Exim 
Bank is usually for 15 to 20 years with a grace period of 3 to 7 years (which is subject to negotiation) 
(MOFCOM, 2016). During the grace years the receiving government only pays interest and does not 
have to start to repay the loan yet (MOFCOM, 2016). The Chinese Government provides 
concessional loans to governments in order ‘to support other developing countries with 
concessional funding’ (Exim Bank, 2018). The China Exim Bank is the only bank designated by the 
Chinese Government to implement such facilities (Exim Bank, 2018).  
These types of loans were the most commonly used finance modality for Chinese infrastructure 
projects in Africa, accounting for more than half of Chinese finance of infrastructure projects within 
the continent for the period 2001-2009 (see Figure 53) 
 
Figure 53 Chinese infrastructure financing modalities in Africa, 2001-2009 
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Source: Massa (2011) 
 
Atkins, Brautigam, Chen, and Hwang (2017) from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 
International Studies China-Africa Research Initiative (SAIS-CARI) found that the share of 
concessional loans actually increased over time, because they found that in the period 2000-2015 
almost 67 per cent of all Chinese loans to Africa came from the Chinese Exim Bank. 
Figure 54 shows the application and execution process of Chinese concessional loans: first, a 
borrowing government applies to the China Exim Bank for the loan. The Bank then sends a 
preliminary appraisal report to MOFCOM who signs a Framework Agreement with the borrowing 
government. The borrowing government then signs a Project Loan Agreement with the China Exim 
Bank. The Chinese contractor then submits the documents according to the contract and requests 
the payment from the foreign executing agency upon which the foreign executing agency submits 
the documents and reports the process to its national government. The borrowing government 
reports the process to Exim Bank and requests the China Exim Bank to disburse the loan. The loan 
is then disbursed from the China Exim Bank to the Chinese contractor directly. The foreign 
government is responsible for the payment of interest and fees to China Exim Bank. 
Figure 54 Schedule process of Chinese concessional loans 
 
Source: Chen in Massa (2011) 
 
A downside of this bureaucratic process is that it can take long before the Chinese firms receive the 
money from Exim Bank. In order to make the agreed deadlines, Chinese infrastructure firms often 
have to start building before they have received any money and bear the financial risk (this was 
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revealed to me during interviews with managers from various Chinese infrastructure companies in 
the DRC (see Van der Lugt (2011) and my current study in Nigeria).     
This construction in which the money flows directly from China Exim Bank to the Chinese contractor 
avoids the difficulties of bringing in foreign currency to Nigeria and removes exchange rate costs. 
The fact that Chinese firms receive the money directly from China Exim Bank could be part of the 
explanation for my finding that Chinese investments are significantly directed to countries with 
relatively high levels of inflation (see the results of the first quantitative study in Table 5).  
In order to test if loans from Chinese policy banks are indeed a major factor influencing the location 
choice of Chinese telecom equipment vendors (and Chinese firms in general), I test the relation 
between location choice and Chinese government loans with another regression analysis. This 
chapter describes this second and last quantitative study and discusses the findings in combination 
with the findings from the qualitative study. 
 
8.2. Research design and methods 
Based on the findings of the qualitative study I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis: Chinese ODI is attracted to African countries that receive relatively more concessional 
loans from China.  
Similar to the first quantitative study, I test my hypothesis in this second quantitative study based 
on the number of Chinese FDI projects per African country as reported by MOFCOM. Chapter 0 
specifies which data is included in the fDi Markets and MOFCOM data bases and which gaps exist; 
in order to show that the data are comparable and robust. I use the same variables as in the first 
quantitative study (namely: IM, PS, market size (GDP), endowment of natural resources, inflation, 
trade (im- and export), and welcoming to FDI) and add the variable “loans”.  
The most trustworthy source for data on Chinese loans to Africa at the moment is SAIS-CARI (Atkins 
et al., 2017). Their “Chinese loans to African governments” database includes all mainland Chinese 
loans to Africa, coming from a variety of sources, including: MOFCOM, the two Chinese policy 
banks— China Exim Bank and China Development Bank, Chinese private/commercial banks, and 
Chinese SOEs or private businesses providing suppliers credits or investment loan financing. 
Atkins et al. (2017) differentiate between various types of loans, namely: commercial loans, zero-
interest loan, concessional loans, export buyers’ credit, preferential export buyers’ credit, suppliers’ 
credit, and master facility loans. For my research I am mostly interested in concessional loans; 
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however, the part of the database that is publicly available only provides data per African country 
for the sum of all these loans per year. A separate table – in the part of the database that is publicly 
available – provides the data per lender per country; however, that table presents the data for the 
period 2000-2015 combined. Therefore, I decided to use the broad category of loans that include 
all the loans Atkins et al. (2017) identified in order to be able to use the same regression model for 
the same period of time. Using a broad category for “loans” will produce a good estimation for the 
effect of concessional loans on the location choice of Chinese investors in Africa since almost 67 
per cent of all Chinese loans to Africa came from the Chinese Exim Bank in the period 2000-2015 
(Atkins et al., 2017).   
I apply the same panel regression model using fixed covariate effects and a random 
intercept as in the first quantitative study. Based on theoretical considerations, I apply 
logarithmic transformations to the variable LOANS in order to stabilize linearity of the 
relationships and homoscedasticity of variances. Using the MIXED linear model command 
in SPSS (version 24) I fit to the data via generalized least squares a mixed effects model with 
fixed main effects and a random intercept: 
lnFDIproj = α + β1lnGDP + β2NREXP + β3INFL + β4lnEXP + β5lnIMP + β6lnIFDI + β7POL + β8INST + 
β8lnLOANS + εit 
8.3. Results and discussion 
Table 20 shows the results for the effect of loans on the location choice for Chinese investments to 
Africa for the period 2003-2011. 
Table 20  Results for loans as a determinant for Chinese investments to Africa, 
2003-2011 
 
Significance for 
Chinese FDI 
Hypothesis 
supported 
INST 
0.131+ 
(0.077) 
No 
POL 
-0.168*** 
(0.029) 
No 
lnGDP 
0.001 
(0.051) 
 
NREXP 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Yes 
INFL 
0.014* 
(0.005) 
No 
lnEXP 0.367*** Yes 
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(0.040) 
lnIMP 
0.045* 
(0.020) 
Yes 
lnIFDI 
-0.120** 
(0.045) 
No 
lnLOANS 
0.051** 
(0.017) 
Yes 
Observations   
Standard errors in parentheses 
+if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
These results show that Chinese investments are indeed significantly directed to African host 
countries that receive most loans from China – as predicted based on the findings from the case 
study on Chinese telecom infrastructure companies in Nigeria.  
During my field research in Nigeria I found that competitors of Chinese firms and representatives 
of the U.S. embassy in Nigeria perceive the indirect financial support Chinese firms receive from the 
Chinese government as unfair. An EU policy briefing from 2011 also describes Chinese export 
finance as an ‘unfair advantage for Chinese exporters’: 
Chinese export finance activities have played an important role for China’s “going-global”   
strategy: they have strengthened China’s economic relationships with several developing 
countries especially in Africa, ensured China of significant access to natural resources, 
and enhanced China’s sphere of influence. At the same time, Chinese export credits have 
become a competitive threat to exporters from the OECD. China is not a member of the 
OECD and is therefore not obliged to comply with the OECD guidelines that: limit tied aid; 
regulate credit practices; impose maximum repayment terms, country risk classification 
and minimum interest rates; require the exchange of information; and impose social, 
environmental and governance standards on financing activities. This creates an unfair 
advantage for Chinese exporters (Massa, 2011: abstract). 
However, a representative of the Netherlands trade and investment office in Lagos reflected that 
the support Chinese firms currently receive from the Chinese government is not so different from 
the support European and U.S. firms used to receive from their respective governments:  
We would do the same if we still could. We have supported our companies financially in 
the past. Currently the Chinese are the ones who have the means, so they can offer this 
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kind of support to their companies. We have done, and are doing the same (Senior 
Economic Advisor, personal communication, January 7, 2016).  
The MD of United Capital in Lagos told me the same:  
China is a big exporter, and as a result they built up significant external funds and they 
can deploy those funds for investments abroad. You know if Europe, I mean when 
Europe had those funds, they used it the same way; this is how business runs (MD 
Investment Banking at United Capital, personal communication, January 8, 2016).  
The MD Investment Banking at United Capital went further to show me the irony of the situation:  
European and U.S. companies aimed to increase their profit when they moved their large 
scale production to China. As a consequence, producing for and exporting to the world 
built up the foreign-exchange reserves of China which currently enables the Chinese 
government the advantage to support Chinese firms abroad (MD Investment Banking at 
United Capital, personal communication, January 8, 2016).  
 
Table 21 shows that China has indeed the largest foreign-exchange reserves in the world by far.  
Table 21  Top-3 countries with largest foreign-exchange reserves the end of May 
2018 
Rank Country Foreign-exchange reserves 
(in USD bln) 
1 China 3,111 
2 Japan 1,254 
3 Switzerland 813 
Sources: State Administration of Foreign Exchange (2018); Ministry of Finance Japan (2018); Swiss National 
Bank (2018). 
The enormous foreign-exchange reserves in China and the willingness of the Chinese government 
to use these reserves to support the internationalization of Chinese firms enables Chinese firms to 
take the hurdle of the lack of financial resources in Africa for implementing large infrastructure 
projects. In other words, Chinese firms are not so constrained by the lack of financial resources of 
many African host countries. The findings of my quantitative study show that this influences the 
location choice of Chinese firms. However, does this also mean that the success of large Chinese 
firms in Africa – with close connections to the Chinese government – can be explained merely by 
the indirect financial support these firms receive via the China Exim Bank? The findings from the 
qualitative study dispute that. 
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The case of Huawei and ZTE in Nigeria shows that having access to concessional loans from the 
China Exim Bank is not sufficient for Chinese firms to be successful abroad. While both firms are 
large telecom infrastructure firms in China and both firms have access to concessional loans from 
the China Exim Bank for some of their overseas projects, Huawei is much more successful in Nigeria 
than ZTE. Bhaumik, Driffield and Zhou (2016) point out that home country-specific advantages 
(CSAs), by their very nature, are available to all firms operating within an emerging market 
economy. And they argue that ‘there is little attempt to explain how apparently some firms are 
better able to gain from CSAs than others’ (Bhaumik et al., 2016: 165). 
Bhaumik et al. suggest that ‘a key strategic advantage that emerging market firms which 
internationalize have over those that do not may be their ability to leverage (or benefit from) CSAs, 
to begin with’ (2016: 169). Bhaumik et al. (2016) argue that  
If, therefore, an emerging market firm has the capability to deploy CSAs better than its 
counterparts and can cross the threshold to become an EMNE, it may open up a 
significant gap between itself and its non-MNE counterparts with respect to the ability to 
leverage CSAs. Thereafter, once they internationalise [sic] and therefore acquire greater 
ability to deploy and upgrade capabilities through linkage and learning, they further 
consolidate this advantage over their domestic peers (Bhaumik et al., 2016: 169). 
This idea of Bhaumik et al. (2016) has a clear (recognized by the author) compatibility with the LLL 
hypothesis of Matthews (2002, 2006); which has been shortly discussed in the literature review. 
This theory seems to be highly relevant for the internationalization processes of Huawei and ZTE. 
Table 15 and Table 16show that ZTE followed Huawei in its internationalization process. Huawei 
had its first overseas project two years earlier than ZTE and ZTE entered many overseas markets 
one or two years after Huawei.  
ZTE and Huawei entered the global market as relatively small telecom firms of roughly the same 
size (see Table 22).  
Table 22  Changes in revenue of the 5 largest telecom infrastructure vendors, 2003-201516 
 Alcatel/Lucent Ericsson  Huawei  Nokia networks ZTE  
2003  16,251 2,694 7,054 1,935 
2005 13,475 22,381 5,982 7,765 2,672 
2010 21,225 29,970 28,007 16,777 10,627 
2015 15,501 30,430 60,839 14,240 15,435 
                                                          
16  It needs to be noted that this table compares total revenue which includes revenue from network 
infrastructure equipment as well as from mobile devices.  
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Source: annual reports of Alcatel/Lucent, Ericsson, Huawei, Nokia networks and ZTE 
The revenue data shows clearly that Huawei has been much more successful since its 
internationalization than ZTE. In 2012, Huawei took over Ericsson as the world’s largest 
telecommunications equipment vendor (“Who’s afraid,” 4 August); while ZTE stayed one of the 
smallest (and since the acquisition of Alcatel/Lucent by Nokia in 2016 the smallest). Despite the fact 
that both Chinese firms have access to concessional loans from China Exim Bank. In other words, it 
seems that Huawei is better able to leverage the CSAs than ZTE is.  
Further research needs to be conducted on the exact reasons for the difference in success of 
Huawei and ZTE on the global market and the role of motives, experiences and support in this 
difference in success – which is beyond the scope of this research. The aim of this research was to 
test the role of institutional distance for the location choice of Chinese investors – especially with 
regard to their investments in relatively risky emerging markets – and to further explore the specific 
challenges and advantages of Chinese firms in such host markets. The next chapter will recapitulate 
the main points of this dissertation and draw a conclusion. 
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9. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
9.1. Research questions and main findings of the study 
The aim of this thesis was to test the explanatory power of current theories on the motives behind 
Chinese outward investments and to further explore the particular advantages and disadvantages 
for Chinese firms in high-risk markets outside their own region. The main research question of this 
thesis is: 
 
Why do Chinese firms invest in (relatively risky) emerging markets far away from their home 
country? 
 
In order to answer this question, this research was divided into two studies: a quantitative study on 
a national level and a qualitative study on a firm level. The purpose of the quantitative study was 
to test the widely expressed view that Chinese investment is attracted to host countries with 
relatively weak institutions by comparing the location choice of Chinese and U.S. investments in 
Africa. The main research question for the first study was: 
 
1. Are Chinese firms significantly more attracted to African countries with “poor institutions” 
than U.S. firms? 
 
What I found was that – differently from predicted by theories on Chinese outward investments – 
the location choice of Chinese firms in Africa is not driven by institutional distance, nor uniquely 
not deterred from political risk. To the contrary: both Chinese and U.S. investments are directed to 
institutionally mature and politically instable host countries. The relation between investment and 
a low level of PS in the host country is significant for both Chinese and U.S. investments. However, 
the relation between investment and a high level of IM in the host country is only significant for 
U.S. investments. Some scholars argue that the latter result shows that Chinese firms are indifferent 
to the rule of law and thus unique in that regard. 
 
I found this evidence not strong enough for the statement that Chinese investors so different in 
their location choice than Western investors and decided to further explore the role of institutional 
distance for the location choice of Chinese investors in Africa by conducting a case study. I used 
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theory-testing process tracing to further test and explore the causal mechanism between the 
perceived correlation between the levels of IM and PS in China and the levels of IM and PS in the 
host country.  
 
The aim of this second study was to test the main theories on the motives of Chinese firms for 
investing in a typical high risk host market and to explore the specific advantages and disadvantages 
for Chinese firms in such a host market – related to the institutional and political context in China. 
The main research question for this qualitative study was: 
 
2. How does the institutional and political situation in China influence the location choice of 
Chinese telecom firms for – and their success in– high-risk markets in Africa? 
 
I found that large Chinese telecom infrastructure firms do not have most of the expected home 
CSAs that are linked to the institutional and political context in China compared to their competitors 
from the West. The most likely home country-specific advantage these Chinese telecom (and other 
Chinese) infrastructure firms have is their possibility to offer their clients a finance package via the 
China Exim Bank. The indirect support for Chinese firms via concessional loans from China Exim 
Bank are often referred to as unfair and unique for Chinese overseas investments. However, as 
some of my respondents in Nigeria (from the Netherlands and Nigeria) openly admitted: Western 
governments have done the same for their national firms and would still do the same if they had 
the means for it. In other words, historically seen it is not a unique tool of the Chinese government 
linked to the Chinese social, cultural, economic or political context. However, at the moment it sets 
Chinese infrastructure firms apart from their foreign counterparts when investing abroad.    
 
In order to get a better understanding of the importance of accessibility to loans from the China 
Exim Bank for the location choice of Chinese firms, I decided to conduct a second quantitative study 
to compare my findings with the findings of the qualitative study. In other words, in this phase of 
my research project I mixed qualitative and quantitative research methods in order to study 
different aspects of the same phenomenon, namely: the impact of loans from the China Exim Bank 
on the success of Chinese firms in high risk host markets far away from China. The main research 
questions for this third study were: 
 
3. Is Chinese ODI attracted to African countries that receive relatively more concessional loans 
from China? 
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And the follow up question: 
 
4. Are Chinese telecom firms more successful than their competitors from the West because 
of their possibility to offer their clients a finance package via the China Exim Bank? 
 
The results of the quantitative analysis show that Chinese ODI is indeed significantly directed to 
African countries that receive more concessional loans from China. However, a close look at the 
situation of Huawei and ZTE in Nigeria shows that access to these concessional loans alone is not 
enough for being successful in a risky emerging market like Nigeria. While both Huawei and ZTE 
have the possibility to make use of the concessional loans from China Exim Bank is Huawei much 
more successful than ZTE in Nigeria.  
 
To conclude, my research shows that: 
• Chinese ODI is not unique in being directed to politically instable host countries; 
• Chinese ODI in Africa is not directed to host countries with similarly low levels of IM and 
high levels of PS; 
• Home country-specific factors are not the main determinants for the success of Chinese 
telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria – the largest receiver of Chinese ODI in Africa.      
 
9.2. Relationship to previous research 
This section will give a brief overview of the findings of the study and their relationship to previous 
work in these areas. 
 
The findings of my first study run counter the conventional wisdom that Chinese investment has 
unique characteristics that translate in, for example, different location choices compared to the so-
called “traditional investors” from the West. The discrepancy between the conventional wisdom 
and the reality on the ground seems to be for a large part caused by the use of subjective data in 
previous studies that have not been empirically tested and the lack of comparative studies. 
 
For example, Buckley et al. (2007) find in their much cited study that Chinese ODI is not deterred 
from political risk. This result is similar to my finding that Chinese investments in Africa are 
significantly directed to host markets with a low level of PS. However, a key difference with my 
research is that Buckley et al. (2007) treat this finding as a unique characteristic for Chinese ODI 
without comparing the results for Chinese ODI with other FDI source countries. After presenting 
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their finding that Chinese ODI is not deterred from political risk Buckley et al. (2007) provide six 
possible explanations for this finding. Since Buckley et al. (2007) assumed that their finding was 
unique for Chinese ODI, all their possible explanations look for specific Chinese characteristics. 
Unfortunately, these possible explanations have been later referred to as “results” by others – even 
by Buckley himself (e.g. Amighini et al. (2013); Buckley et al., (2016)). However, the results of my 
comparative analysis show that Chinese investments to Africa are not uniquely directed to host 
markets with a low level of PS. To the contrary: U.S., France, U.K., Canada, Russia and India 
investments are all directed to host markets with a relatively low level of PS.  
 
Regarding the institutional context, my results are in line with general FDI theory that predicts that 
firms tend to invest in stable and predictable host markets. However, my findings are in contrast 
with Kolstad and Wiig’s (2012) claim that ‘Chinese FDI outflows differ from FDI from other regions, 
in their attraction to poorly governed countries rich in natural resources’ (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012: 33). 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) find that Chinese investment is more attracted to a country with natural 
resources, the worse the institutional environment of that country and claim – without conducting 
a comparative study – that Chinese ODI is different in this regard from ODI from other regions. They 
even refer to their findings as: ‘consistent with an image of China as a “ravenous dragon”’ (2012: 
33). A closer look at their study teaches me that the interacted term they find is only significant for 
fuel export and Kolstad & Wiig admit in their conclusion that it is possible that ‘oil investment from 
China and from other countries is driven by the same set of factors’ (2012: 33). However, this 
information is presented separately in their paper and contradicts their main conclusion.     
 
The results of my study also run counter the institutional distance theory and its underlying 
assumptions. The institutional distance theory predicts that firms are most successful in host 
markets with similar levels of IM and PS as in their home country (e.g. Child & Marinova, 2014a). 
Morck et al. (2008) link success in specific host markets with attraction to such host countries and 
argue that Chinese firms are more prevalent in least developed countries with difficult institutional 
conditions, because Chinese firms are more successful in such countries than their Western 
competitors. For my research I used a framework that was adapted from Rodrigues by Child and 
Marinova (2014a). Child & Marinova (2014a) divided the countries of the world over the matrix 
without calculating the exact values for their levels of IM and PS and did not test the framework. I 
developed a model to test this framework and my results show that while U.S. and Chinese firms 
are coming from different institutional and political contexts at home, both U.S. and Chinese firms 
tend to invest mostly in African host markets with high levels of IM and low levels of PS. In other 
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words, when testing Child and Marinova’s (2014a) framework I came to other conclusions than 
what they had predicted based on their framework. 
 
Furthermore, my in-depth analysis of the challenges and advantages for Chinese telecom 
infrastructure firms in Nigeria shows that the location choice and success of Chinese firms in 
challenging host countries is much less determined by home-country specific factors than often 
claimed. And that further research is required in order to improve our understanding of the location 
choice and investment strategies of Chinese firms.   
 
More generally, beyond the topic of ODI in Africa, my work supports the use of a holistic approach 
in IB research that acknowledges the strong interrelation between firm-specific, push, pull and 
intervening factors. In previous research (Van der Lugt, 2016) I visualized this interrelatedness by 
adapting a push-pull framework developed by Lee (1966) in migration theory (see Figure 55) for the 
use of explaining the location choice of foreign investors (see Figure 56). 
Figure 55 Origin and destination factors and intervening obstacles in migration 
 
Source: Lee (1966: 50) 
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Figure 56 Push, pull and intervening factors in Chinese infrastructure investments in the DRC 
 
Source: Van der Lugt (2016: 197) 
 
The current study of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms in Nigeria confirms that home country 
(push) factors do play a role in the location choice of Chinese investors; however the success of 
Chinese firms abroad depends on more than support from the Chinese government only. I found 
that firm-specific factors like management style, share of local employees, brand recognition and 
language skills play an important role in the success of Chinese telecom infrastructure firms abroad.  
Based on these findings I further developed my adapted framework from Lee (1966) in order to 
capture the interrelatedness of push-, pull- and firm-specific factors in more detail (see Figure 57). 
Figure 57 Interwoven FDI determinants framework with detailed descriptions 
 
Home 
country 
Host 
country 
Motives 
Experiences 
Support 
Choice 
Strategy 
Success 
Push factors : 
Institutional 
environment; political 
environment; market 
size; culture; natural 
resource endowment; 
labour force; 
infrastructure; etc.  
Pull factors: 
Institutional 
environment; political 
environment; market 
size; culture; natural 
resource endowment; 
labour force; 
infrastructure; 
exchange rate; 
inflation; openness to 
IFDI; etc.  
Firm-specific/ 
Industry-specific 
factors: 
Stage of 
internationalization; 
ownership structure; 
international 
experience; etc. 
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Source: created by the author 
And the more simplified version: 
Figure 58 Interwoven FDI determinants framework 
 
Source: created by the author 
This framework needs further testing; however, it could divert FDI research away from perhaps 
superficial national differences and give a deeper insight into the internationalization process of 
both emerging and traditional MNEs. 
 
 
9.3. Limitations 
 
9.3.1. Selecting Africa 
My thesis has concentrated on Chinese investments in Africa. One could argue that Chinese 
investments to Africa are only a small percentage of its total outward investments and that 
knowledge about these specific flows can tell us little about Chinese outward investments in 
general. The same could be said about U.S. investments. 
 
It is true that Chinese investments in Africa accounted for only ten per cent of China’s global ODI 
stock in 2012 (still more than the share of its investments in Oceania or Latin America) and only one 
per cent of U.S.’s global ODI stock in 2012 (see Figure 20). However, the aim of this study is not to 
explain the location choice of Chinese firms in general. Instead the aim is to test the explanatory 
power of current theories on the motives behind Chinese outward investments and to further 
explore the particular advantages and disadvantages for Chinese firms in high-risk markets outside 
their own region.  
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After Asia, the advanced markets in Europe and Northern America, and the tax havens in the 
Caribbean most Chinese investments were directed to the African continent: a challenging region 
for business known for its instability. Traditional FDI theory cannot explain the still relatively large 
share of Chinese investments that flow to these high-risk host markets far away from China so soon 
in the internationalization process of Chinese firms. Is it because of the late-comer position of 
Chinese firms that does not give them much choice other than starting with the more challenging 
markets? Do Chinese firms have an advantage over their competitors from the West because of 
their experience with operating in a similarly challenging business context in China? Or is it because 
of the strategic natural resources in, and maritime route along, Africa that triggered the Chinese 
government to encourage Chinese firms to get a foot in this geopolitically strategic region?   
 
The fact that the share of Chinese ODI stock to Africa is much larger than the share of U.S.’s stock 
suggests that Chinese firms and/or the Chinese government are more interested in Africa than U.S. 
firms and/or the government of the U.S. However, one per cent of U.S. global ODI stock is still much 
larger than ten per cent of China’s global ODI stock as Figure 22 shows. In other words, U.S. 
investments to Africa actually outnumbered Chinese investments in terms of U.S. billions over the 
period 2003-2012. Furthermore, the relatively small share of U.S. ODI that flowed to Africa in the 
period 2003-2012 accounted for six to twenty per cent of the total FDI the African continent 
received. In other words, with a relatively small part of their investments, U.S. firms and/or the U.S. 
government bought much economic (and political) clout in Africa. Furthermore, the attempt of 
both former Secretaries of State MS. Clinton and Mr. Tillerson to put China in a bad light during 
their official visits to the African continent show that Africa is important to the U.S. and that the 
U.S. Government is ready to defend its strategic position on the continent.  
 
I believe that the increased competition in Africa led to hasty conclusions regarding the motives 
behind Chinese investments, merely based on assumptions. Therefore I believe that it is useful and 
necessary to test the assumption that the motives behind Chinese investments are unique by 
comparing Chinese and U.S. investments to Africa: a strategically important region for both, 
geographically about as far from China as from the U.S. with many high-risk host markets.   
 
9.3.2. Another comparative analysis with the U.S. 
Professor Shenkar from Ohio State University mentioned in his keynote speech at the 6th 
international business conference at Aalborg University the overemphasis on the U.S. in IB. He 
encouraged scholars to stop using the U.S. in comparative studies and to use other countries 
instead since the U.S. is used in almost every comparative study in IB yet not typical for all Western 
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economies. I do agree with professor Shenkar and would have preferred to conduct an in-depth 
comparative analysis including many more countries than the U.S. and China. However, the 
challenge is that only the U.S. and China provide sufficient data for an in-depth comparative analysis 
of their location choice in Africa.  
 
I noticed this surprising lack of information from other OECD countries for the first time during a 
study on FDI in sub-Saharan Africa that I conducted for Oxfam (Van der Lugt & Hamblin, 2011). For 
example, according to data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS, the key source for FDI 
outflow figures concerning the U.K.) U.K. firms had only invested in two of the fifteen Southern 
African Development Community countries (namely South African and Zimbabwe) over the period 
2000-2005. After contacting the ONS we learned that this was the only information available since 
some information was suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. 
 
In preparation for the comparative analysis in this thesis I collected data on FDI for France, India, 
Brazil and Russia and found the same suspicious gaps in the data. Therefore, I decided to conduct 
the detailed comparative analysis with only Chinese investments and U.S. investments; the only 
two countries that provide detailed information regarding their ODI flows to African countries. And 
I included a small comparative analysis with the available data for the other FDI source countries as 
a robustness check (to see if China and the U.S. are outliers in their location choice or if it is a more 
general trend that firms tend to invest in politically instable and institutionally mature host 
markets). However, due to the rivalry between China and the U.S., the similar (potential) global 
reach of both nations and the threat the government of the U.S. expresses to feel from China in 
Africa17. I believe it is highly relevant to compare Chinese and U.S. investments to Africa.      
 
9.3.3. Unreliability of FDI data 
I am aware of the challenges with FDI data. Last year, the editor in chief of Columbia FDI 
Perspectives from the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Prof. Dr. Karl Sauvant, published 
a paper with the telling title: “Beware of FDI statistics!” In this paper he identifies five shortcomings 
in FDI statistics that limit their accuracy, and therefore also their usefulness for analysis (Sauvant, 
2017). One challenge is that some countries (like for example the U.S.) report FDI stock data at book 
value instead of market value. Data on FDI flows from FDI home countries that use different 
reporting standards are as comparable as apples and bananas.  
                                                          
17  See for example: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45811/html/CHRG-110shrg45811.htm; 
McDowell, 2012 
  176 
 
Another challenge are tax havens and countries that are not tax havens but that are convenient for 
channeling FDI to other countries using holding companies (e.g. Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg). It is clear that these investments are channeled through one country to another 
country, but we do not know the final destination of this money. Without knowing the final host 
country of these investments a large part of global investment flows remain unknown which makes 
the publicly available data on FDI flows incomplete and therewith incomparable.    
 
However, these challenges with FDI data do not impact the relevance of my findings for three 
reasons. Firstly, I only compare Chinese and U.S. ODI flows directly in one of the context chapters; 
with the necessary disclaimers. Secondly, for the quantitative analysis I use the number of FDI 
projects. In this case it does not matter whether the money for the investment project came in via 
a tax haven or not. Thirdly, I only compare the number of Chinese FDI projects for different African 
host countries. In another model I compare the number of U.S. FDI projects for different African 
countries and I compare the results of both models to analyze the differences in location choice 
between Chinese and U.S. firms.  
Another challenge with FDI statistics that does influence my study is that the data provided by 
MOFCOM on Chinese FDI projects is considered to be unreliable by many Western and Chinese 
scholars. One could question whether the FDI data of MOFCOM is more unreliable than the FDI 
data of any Western institute; however, that is beyond the scope of this study. It is true that I rely 
on data from MOFCOM for the number of Chinese FDI projects in African host countries and it is 
likely that there are flaws in this data. This means that based on this data I cannot state with 
certainty that Chinese ODI to Africa is indeed directed to African host countries with high levels of 
IM and low levels of PS. However, the aim of my research is not to find the truth behind the location 
choice or motives of Chinese ODI to Africa. The aim is to test the explanatory power of current 
theories on the motives behind Chinese outward investment that are based on the same unreliable 
data that my study is based. The point that I make is that based on the publicly available data one 
cannot state that Chinese ODI is uniquely directed to politically instable or institutionally immature 
host countries; as is currently stated in the literature.  
 
9.3.4. Are infrastructure development projects investments? 
At the 5th Conference of the "Chinese in Africa/Africans in China Research Network" in Brussels in 
June 2018 we had an interesting discussion among scholars from various disciplines about the 
definition of investment and whether or not the definition includes infrastructure projects financed 
with concessional loans. A sociologist from the U.S. was convinced that many scholars use ‘an 
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unacademically broad definition of investment’ that blurs rather than shines light on the 
phenomenon of Chinese investments in Africa. An economist from Cambridge explained that from 
an economic point of view these infrastructure projects do indeed count as investments and all 
other participants agreed with the economist. My previous research in the DRC also shows that 
these infrastructure projects require large investments from the Chinese infrastructure companies. 
For example, in the Sicomine deal it was for a long time not certain whether or not the China Exim 
Bank would provide concessional loans for the infrastructure projects included in the deal (see Van 
der Lugt, 2016). At first the Bank agreed and the Chinese infrastructure firms started their projects 
in order to make the deadlines. The firms paid wages and materials while waiting for the money 
from the Bank. However, when the IMF criticized the project and threatened to block it and the 
China Exim Bank started to feel insecure about whether or not the allocated mines would produce 
enough in order to make the deal profitable the Bank decided to step out of the deal. At the time 
of my interviews, the Chinese infrastructure firms already heavily invested in their projects and had 
no idea if they would get a return on their investment. 
 
Another example from the telecom infrastructure sector shows that Chinese telecom vendors also 
invest in their infrastructure projects backed by concessional loans in Africa. The first African 
country ZTE invested in was the DRC because it had an opportunity to buy a major share in the 
newly established telecom operator Congo Chine Télécoms (CCT) in 2000 (Mthembu-Salter, 2011). 
However, telecom operations is not a strength of the telecom vendor and the project failed. ZTE 
sold its shares to France Telecom-Orange in 2011 (Mthembu-Salter, 2011). When ZTE saw its losses, 
it made a striking move in 2007 and tried to acquire land in the DRC to grow palm oil.18 Although 
this palm oil project never materialized, it shows that ZTE was desperate to earn back some of its 
lost investment in the telecom sector in the DRC.  
 
To conclude, concessional loan backed infrastructure projects are investments from the perspective 
of the Chinese firms involved who often need to pay in advance and take the risk. 
 
9.3.5. Single case design 
Due to restrictions related to time and finances it was not possible to include more than one case 
in this study. The study of Chinese investments in another sector or another country could have 
provided other valuable insights. However, for the scope of this explorative study it was sufficient 
                                                          
18 See this link for an informed discussion on the exact numbers of hectares ranging from three million to 250 
hectares http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2010/03/china-and-african-land-grab-drc-oil.html. 
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to look at the case of two large telecom infrastructure firms in the largest African recipient of 
Chinese ODI. The insights gained from this study were sufficient to show that the motives and 
strategies of Chinese firms in Africa are more complex than stated in previous research and require 
further research.  
 
 
9.4. Problems arising during the research 
Several problems arose during data collection for both my quantitative and qualitative study. For 
my quantitative study I started off using freely accessible data from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators from the World Bank on the rule of law and PS, and from UNCTAD on FDI flows. However, 
in order to decrease the chance for bias, I decided to use data from the IRCG database for PS and 
to use number of investment projects from fDi Markets. My access to these expensive databases 
was restricted to data for the period 2003-2011. That was sufficient for this study; however, it 
would be interesting to repeat our analysis with more recent data.  
Another problem that occurred during the collection of data for my quantitative analysis was that 
data is relatively scarce for African countries. Due to the fact that ICRG has limited data on the level 
of government stability for many African countries, my sample included only 35 of the 54 African 
countries. A third challenge with collecting data for my quantitative study was that fDi Market data 
is not complete for Chinese investment projects in Africa. To solve this, I used the MOFCOM 
database for the number of Chinese projects. 
Qualitative studies usually rely on the flexibility of the researcher. Especially getting access to 
companies and persons can be challenging. The biggest problem arose in China, in August 2015. I 
just arrived in Shanghai after the interviews with the senior managers in Shenzhen and was busy 
preparing the workshop when Prof. Wang called me. He spoke with our key contact person in ZTE 
who was angry with us. The senior managers in Shenzhen were not happy with the interview and 
did not allow us to use anything they told us for our research. We were surprised because during 
the interviews it did not look like they had a problem with our questions. However, we of course 
needed to respect their concerns and promised that we would not quote them or use any of the 
information they provided us. That was very unfortunate; however, at least the conversations gave 
us strong clues about the strategies, motives, challenges and advantages for ZTE in Africa. We only 
needed to find other sources for the evidence.   
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9.5. Recommendations  
9.5.1. For future research 
Future research should take note of the challenges with FDI statistics when claiming findings 
regarding the determinants behind the location choice of foreign investors and should keep up to 
date regarding the newest FDI data available. The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
works on improving the rules and regulations regarding outward investment and the reporting of 
FDI might get more transparent in the near future.   
 
As noted in the limitations, my qualitative study is a single case design which was sufficient to show 
that current theories on the specific advantages for Chinese firms in challenging home countries do 
not hold. However, further research needs to be done on the specific challenges and advantages 
for Chinese firms in other sectors and in other high-risk host countries in order to build new theories 
that can explain the location choice of Chinese firms.   
 
Future research into Chinese economic activities on the African continent should also include more 
comparative analyses in order to move beyond the unfounded claim that the behavior of Chinese 
actors in Africa is unique. Comparative analyses will allow us to learn about the specific differences 
between home countries, sectors and firms within the social, historical, political and economic 
context of the study. And it could also teach us about the similarities between Chinese and other 
foreign actors in Africa and the possibilities for cooperation.  
 
9.5.2. For policy 
After having conducted fieldwork in many African countries I am convinced that most African policy 
makers are well-informed on Chinese economic activities in their region. My policy 
recommendations focus therefore on policy makers from traditional FDI source countries – like the 
U.S. and Western Europe – and businesses from the U.S., Western Europe and China. Since it is so 
obvious to African policy makers that Chinese and Western governments and firms are interested 
in their countries for very similar reasons, it is not in the interest of Western actors to portray 
“China” as a worse version of them. It makes these traditional investors look untrustworthy. I see 
two options for Western governments with an interest in Africa: an idealistic and a business option.  
 
In case the idealistic intentions – to protect the environment and local workers in Africa – are real, 
these governments do best by acknowledging that in this increasingly multi-polar world order they 
can only change their own actions and at best might inspire others to follow their lead. In other 
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words, in order to protect the environment and local workers in Africa these governments should 
focus on the actions of their own national firms and held them accountable for their actions abroad. 
FDI home countries do have limited legal responsibility for how their national companies are 
operating abroad since that would question the right of sovereignty. However, civil society 
organizations in both the host and the home countries can use the technique of naming and 
shaming: publication of bad practices of companies from a certain nationality can lead to stricter 
control by their home government. The work of Profundo in the Netherlands is a good example of 
how successful this technique can be. Especially when the firms are informed before publication 
and are given the chance to change their policies before the public shaming happens.   
 
However, in case Western European governments and firms are indeed also merely in Africa for 
doing business (instead of the claimed intentions throughout history to bring civilization, religion, 
democracy, good governance, etc.) then they better realize quickly that their real intentions are too 
transparent. Not admitting them makes these traditional investors unreliable business partners in 
an era in which African host markets have plenty of choices with whom to do business with. 
Furthermore, in order to make their cry for more transparency on the Chinese side less ridiculous, 
Western governments should first become at least as transparent as the Chinese government 
regarding their FDI flows to African host markets.  
 
From a business point of view, ZTE could consider investing in English proficiency among its staff in 
Nigeria and at the HQ in Shenzhen. Nigeria is the largest market for telecom infrastructure in Africa 
and some of its customers in Nigeria mentioned language barriers as a reason for why ZTE is less 
successful in Nigeria than Ericsson and Huawei. This would also encourage closer cooperation 
between the Nigerian and Chinese employees at ZTE Nigeria whom I saw interacting barely at the 
times of my interviews – in clear contrast with the intensive interaction between local and Chinese 
employees at Huawei. 
 
Furthermore, Huawei and ZTE seem to have room for improvement in their efficiency and 
affectivity in Nigeria by improving professional cooperation between the two companies. Clients, 
competitors and fellow Chinese business men referred to Huawei and ZTE in Nigeria as two fighting 
dogs – whose fights are annoying and costly for their clients. According to the MD of Ericsson it is 
common in the telecom infrastructure sector that after a period of fierce competition during the 
bidding process the various telecom vendors work closely together in the implementation of the 
project. Ericsson has very good experiences with cooperating with both Huawei and ZTE. However, 
when Huawei and ZTE have to cooperate together in a project they are making it difficult for each 
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other. This behavior can cost Huawei and ZTE projects in the future and strengthen Ericsson’s 
position at the expense of Huawei and ZTE.    
 
Western firms should better evaluate and anticipate long term drawbacks of getting access to the 
Chinese market. Chinese telecom vendors have been able to catch up quickly with their competitors 
due to cooperating with these Western firms on the Chinese market. Are a few golden years with 
access to the largest market in the world worth losing on the global market afterwards? For some 
shareholders it is; however, not for employment and technological development in the home 
countries of these Western firms.  
 
 
9.6. My contribution 
In addition to the provision of some directions for future research, my study has made three 
contributions to the literature on Chinese outward investment. 
 
Firstly, by comparing the location choice of Chinese and U.S. ODI to Africa I show that – based on 
the available data on FDI stock and flows from UNCTAD and number of FDI projects from ICRG – 
the argument that Chinese outward investment is uniquely directed to politically instable host 
markets no longer holds. Instead, my findings show that both Chinese and U.S. investments are 
significantly directed to relatively politically instable host markets in Africa. I improved the models 
developed by Buckley et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2016) to study the location choice of Chinese 
ODI and this improved model can be used for future comparative analyses between various FDI 
source countries in Africa – once the data is available for more home countries.  
 
Secondly, the use of process-tracing sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of some particular 
assumed causal relations between the home and host markets contexts. By doing that it reveals the 
flaws in the assumed link between institutional distance and the location choice of investors. My 
findings show that home and host country factors are not sufficient for explaining the success of 
Chinese firms in high-risk host countries far away from China and that firm-specific factors play an 
important role too. These results reveal some of the complexity of the motives and strategies 
behind Chinese outward investment that require further research.  
 
Thirdly, by interviewing the persons who are behind the decisions made in order to deal with the 
complexity of a challenging host market, this study put faces to the anonymous statistics on Chinese 
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ODI to Africa. By going to the field and ask Chinese managers themselves about their main 
challenges and advantages in a high-risk host country like Nigeria my study reveals – for some 
perhaps surprising – similarities between Chinese and other foreign firms in Nigeria. 
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Appendix 1  List of interviewees 
 
Organization Function Location  
ZTE Senior manager Shenzhen 
ZTE Senior manager Shenzhen 
ZTE Senior manager  Lagos  
ZTE Middle manager Lagos  
ZTE Senior manager  Abuja  
Huawei Manager PR Department  Lagos  
Ericsson  MD Nigeria  Lagos  
MTN  Manager  Lagos  
MTN  Manager  Lagos  
Smile MD  Lagos  
Smile CTO  Lagos  
Nigeria - China Business Council  Chairman  Abuja  
Stanbic Manager  Lagos  
Shijiazhuang Enric Gas equipment Business development manager Lagos  
Shenkai Petroleum equipment Africa market manager Lagos  
Lekki Free Zone  Assistant MD  Lagos  
Netherlands trade and investment office  Senior economic advisor Lagos  
Embassy of the USA  Counselor for Economic Affairs Abuja  
Embassy of the USA  Economic Officer  Abuja  
Embassy of the USA  Political Officer  
Abuja  
 
 
  II 
Chinese Consulate Economic and Commercial Consul Lagos  
Chinese Consulate Commercial Consul Lagos  
China cultural center in Nigeria  Director Abuja  
United Capital  MD  Lagos  
United Capital  Manager  Lagos  
 
  
  
 
III 
 
Appendix 2  Interview guide Chinese firms 
 
Introduction questions 
Before we get to the main questions we would like to ask you some introduction questions in order 
to get a picture of your position in and experiences with [the company[. 
• Could you please share with us since when you work for [the company] and, more 
specifically, since when you work on your current position? 
• Did you also work in other countries for[the company] and if yes in which one(s)? 
 
[the company]’s investments in Nigeria 
1. When did [the company] start to invest in Nigeria and could you please tell us how this 
came about? (If you are familiar with this issue) 
a. Who initiated the first investment in Nigeria? 
b. What was the main reason for investing in Nigeria at that time? 
c. How did the decision process work: which departments were involved and who 
had to officially agree? 
d. How did [the company]start operating in Nigeria? (For example, as a: JV, Wholly 
owned sub, strategic alliances, etc.?) 
e. How did [the company]’s operations in Nigeria evolve from that first investment? 
 
2. Since that first investment [the company] has been involved in many projects in Nigeria. 
How many projects are we talking about roughly?  
a. Could you please give us a rough overview of the kind and number of projects [the 
company] has been and is currently involved in Nigeria? 
b. Could you please give us an idea of the total volume of the investments in Nigeria 
(if not precise, then maybe a rough number like: “more than…”) 
 
3. Which achievement(s) of [the company] in Nigeria are you personally most proud of and 
why? 
  IV 
 
4. Which [the company] project (or more than one if you like) comes first to your mind if you 
think about a successful project? 
a. What made this particular project successful? 
b. When is a project successful? What measure(s) do you use? 
 
5. What are the main challenges in less successful projects? 
a. How did [the company] respond to these challenges? 
b. What worked? (Could you provide some examples?) 
c. What did not work? (Could you provide some examples?) 
 
6. How would you describe the business environment in the telecom sector in Nigeria?  
 
7. How do you perceive the political environment in Nigeria? Stable or not so stable and why? 
a. In which ways could this pose a threat or opportunity for doing business? 
 
8. How do you perceive the rules and regulations in Nigeria? 
a. How clear are the rules and regulations? 
b. How fair are the rules and regulations? 
c. Are the rules and regulations similar as in China or not and in what way? 
d. What happens to a company if it does not comply with the rules? In what way is 
that similar or different to China? 
e. In which ways could the rules and regulations pose a threat or opportunity for 
doing business? 
 
9. What role do formal contracts versus Guanxi-relations have in Nigeria? 
a. Is that similar as in China or not and in what way? 
 
10. Do you feel welcome in Nigeria as a Chinese company? 
a. What kind of support did [the company] receive from the Nigerian government 
when starting the business in Nigeria? 
b. Do you think this support is related to the good relations between China and 
Nigeria and in what way? 
 
11. What is the role of the HQ in [the company]’s operations in Nigeria? 
  
 
V 
a. What kind of support does the subsidiary receive from the HQ? (For example: 
financial, material, guidance, etc.) 
b. In what way does the HQ influence or control the activities of the subsidiary in 
Nigeria? Or is the subsidiary operating quite independently? 
 
12. What kind of support does [the company] receive from the Chinese government/ 
embassy? 
a. Financial support? 
b. Diplomatic support? 
c. Opening doors with aid projects? 
d. Other kind of support? 
 
13. (If corruption has not been mentioned yet in the answers to the above questions) Nigeria 
is known for its high level of corruption. How do you deal with this? What effect does 
corruption have on [the company]’s activities in Nigeria? 
a. What are the regulations from China regarding dealing with corruption abroad?  
b. How do corruption scandals impact the reputation of [the company] (at home and 
abroad)? 
 
14. What is your personal opinion about this: Does experience with doing business in China 
prepare better for doing business in Nigeria than experience with doing business in 
Europe?  
 
15. Is it easier or more difficult for [the company] to do business in Nigeria than in Europe?  
 
All questions are followed by prompting questions like for example: asking for an example, asking 
for meaning, asking for evidence, asking for more detail, etc. 
  
  VI 
 
Appendix 3  Interview guide Ericsson 
 
Introduction questions 
Before we get to the main questions we would like to ask you some introduction questions in order 
to get a picture of your position in and experiences with [the company[. 
• Could you please share with us since when you work for [the company] and, more 
specifically, since when you work on your current position? 
• Did you also work in other countries for[the company] and if yes in which one(s)? 
 
[the company]’s investments in Nigeria 
1. When did [the company] start to invest in Nigeria and could you please tell us how this 
came about? (If you are familiar with this issue) 
a. Who initiated the first investment in Nigeria? 
b. What was the main reason for investing in Nigeria at that time? 
c. How did the decision process work: which departments were involved and who 
had to officially agree? 
d. How did [the company]start operating in Nigeria? (For example, as a: JV, Wholly 
owned sub, strategic alliances, etc.?) 
e. How did [the company]’s operations in Nigeria evolve from that first investment? 
 
2. Since that first investment [the company] has been involved in many projects in Nigeria. 
How many projects are we talking about roughly?  
a. Could you please give us a rough overview of the kind and number of projects [the 
company] has been and is currently involved in Nigeria? 
b. Could you please give us an idea of the total volume of the investments in Nigeria 
(if not precise, then maybe a rough number like: “more than…”) 
 
3. Which achievement(s) of [the company] in Nigeria are you personally most proud of and 
why? 
 
  
 
VII 
4. Which [the company] project (or more than one if you like) comes first to your mind if you 
think about a successful project? 
a. What made this particular project successful? 
b. When is a project successful? What measure(s) do you use? 
 
5. What are the main challenges in less successful projects? 
a. How did [the company] respond to these challenges? 
b. What worked? (Could you provide some examples?) 
c. What did not work? (Could you provide some examples?) 
 
6. How would you describe the business environment in the telecom sector in Nigeria?  
 
7. How do you perceive the political environment in Nigeria? Stable or not so stable and why? 
a. In which ways could this pose a threat or opportunity for doing business? 
 
8. How do you perceive the rules and regulations in Nigeria? 
a. How clear are the rules and regulations? 
b. How fair are the rules and regulations? 
c. In what way are rules and regulations different from and/or similar as in Sweden? 
d. What happens to a company if it does not comply with the rules? In what way is 
that similar or different to Sweden? 
e. In which ways could the rules and regulations pose a threat or opportunity for 
doing business? 
 
9. Do you feel welcome in Nigeria as a Swedish company? 
a. What kind of support did [the company] receive from the Nigerian government 
when starting the business in Nigeria? 
b. Do you think this support is related to the good relations between Sweden and 
Nigeria and in what way? 
 
10. What is the role of the HQ in [the company]’s operations in Nigeria? 
a. What kind of support does the subsidiary receive from the HQ? (For example: 
financial, material, guidance, etc.) 
b. In what way does the HQ influence or control the activities of the subsidiary in 
Nigeria? Or is the subsidiary operating quite independently? 
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11. What kind of support does [the company] receive from the Swedish government/ 
embassy? 
a. Financial support? 
b. Diplomatic support? 
c. Opening doors with aid projects? 
d. Other kind of support? 
 
12. (If corruption has not been mentioned yet in the answers to the above questions) Nigeria 
is known for its high level of corruption. How do you deal with this? What effect does 
corruption have on [the company]’s activities in Nigeria? 
a. What are the regulations from Sweden regarding dealing with corruption abroad?  
b. How do corruption scandals impact the reputation of [the company] (at home and 
abroad)? 
 
13. What is your personal opinion about this: Does the experience Chinese businesses have 
with doing business in China prepare better for doing business in Nigeria than experience 
with doing business in Europe?  
 
All questions are followed by prompting questions like for example: asking for an example, asking 
for meaning, asking for evidence, asking for more detail, etc. 
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Appendix 4 An overview of the main importers of Nigerian crude oil, 2001-
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ITC Trademap, 2018 
Product 27: Mineral fuels, 
mineral oils, and products of 
their distillation. 
In USD thousand 
Mirror data 
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Appendix 5 
 
 
 
Table 23 Top-10 source countries of Nigerian imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exporters 
Imported 
value in 
2006 
Imported 
value in 
2007 
Imported 
value in 
2008 
Imported 
value in 
2009 
Imported 
value in 
2010 
Imported 
value in 
2011 
Imported 
value in 
2012 
Imported 
value in 
2013 
Imported 
value in 
2014 
Imported 
value in 
2015 
China 2852152 3799462 6767052 5475594 6696844 9205574 9296313 12042613 15393425 13701240 
Netherlands 1635970 2800570 4510801 3308854 4453405 5300431 3454851 3534243 3502172 3256025 
Belgium 519688 858116 1224370 1157179 903392 1994945 1910590 2866616 2181214 1967653 
United 
States of 
America 2230798 2786673 4101985 3658008 4060548 4904789 5029335 6388833 5967789 3437953 
Korea, 
Republic of 809476 2374958 2535989 816518 805616 2487016 853740 1570323 1323808 685801 
India 932942 992814 1369418 1543343 1917926 2557091 2828459 2897204 2872163 2286611 
United 
Kingdom 1540903 2051144 2665074 1935913 2115763 2524425 2523470 2424305 2271627 1620696 
France 1543249 1527606 2162068 1734526 2107097 2055067 1730766 2022205 2017181 1434944 
Germany 1228367 1486427 1834226 1484773 1436587 1804281 1645968 1791185 1852244 1164420 
Brazil 1373624 1512357 1535590 1066463 862541 1192085 1066605 875906 955469 688377 
Source: ITC Trademap, 2018  In USD thousand 
Product: All    Mirror data 
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Table 24 Top-10 destination countries of Nigerian exports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statutory Declaration 
Importers 
Exported 
value in 
2006 
Exported 
value in 
2007 
Exported 
value in 
2008 
Exported 
value in 
2009 
Exported 
value in 
2010 
Exported 
value in 
2011 
Exported 
value in 
2012 
Exported 
value in 
2013 
Exported 
value in 
2014 
Exported 
value in 
2015 
India 5682236 7017395 10124669 5645077 10257572 13604802 13962157 13759369 15663352 10233803 
United 
States of 
America 28959184 33740486 39217292 19737386 31357508 34465732 19405879 11984702 3935445 2003775 
Spain 4757578 5025700 6934186 3895915 5754354 8433305 9074047 7529752 8624936 5124580 
Netherlands 1174756 1197147 1557023 1767088 2764044 4136857 5695056 7505982 8682102 5402845 
France 2493083 1814462 4807701 2625884 3376437 6047034 4783724 5044576 5524853 3269953 
Germany 1762463 1245735 2652588 1646734 2656316 4737131 5701386 5493025 5305428 2185206 
South Africa 1366675 1771839 1892426 1838965 2200397 3118515 3721336 3616778 5135808 4579049 
United 
Kingdom 355445 647663 1644949 977655 1234985 3652239 5975151 4962194 4032722 2173267 
China 277747 537080 508381 896526 1071622 1583680 1273793 1546603 2656039 1240701 
Indonesia 4613 607205 114820 508849 921593 1626871 2770664 3122441 3306301 1288156 
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